Thesis-26a

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES
NO. VI.

CHRIST, THE "MAN FROM HEAVEN"

A Study of 1 Cor. 15, 45-47 in the Light of the Anthropology of Philo Judaeus

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SACRED SCIENCES AT THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOCTORATE IN THEOLOGY

BY THE

REV. BASIL AUGUSTINE STEGMANN, O. S. B., S. T. L.
of
St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1927

208
C17

PRESS OF
J. H. FURST CO.
BALTO.

ST. ALBERT'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES
NO. VI.

CHRIST, THE "MAN FROM HEAVEN"

A Study of 1 Cor. 15, 45-47 in the Light of the Anthropology of Philo Judaeus

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SACRED SCIENCES AT THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOCTORATE IN THEOLOGY

BY THE

REV. BASIL AUGUSTINE STEGMANN, O. S. B., S. T. L.
of
St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1927

Property of
COSA
Please return to
Graduate Theological

Imprimi Potest:

✠ ALCUINUS DEUTSCH, O. S. B., PH. D.,
Abbas.

Nihil Obstat:

HENRICUS SCHUMACHER, S. T. D.,
Censor Deputatus.

Imprimatur:

✠ MICHAEL J. CURLEY, D. D.,
Archiepiscopus Baltimorensis.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND ABBOT

ALCUIN DEUTSCH, O. S. B., PH. D.

ON THE OCCASION OF

HIS SILVER SACERDOTAL JUBILEE

1902—1927

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/christmanfromhea0000revb

PREFACE

Anyone familiar with the writings of Philo, or with the literature treating of his works, will peruse any new contribution to the study of the much-mooted Alexandrian philosopher with sympathetic caution. The position of importance, occupied by Philo in the earliest history of Christian exegesis, entitles him even in our day to more attention than is evident in modern commentaries. Because of the intrinsic difficulties, however, that beset the intruder into the seeming labyrinths of Philonic speculation, too many critics rest content with the comments of earlier scholars, and upon their authority take the many alleged contradictions in Philo for granted.

But the present problem, whether St. Paul depends on Philo for his distinction of an earthly and a heavenly man, is too vital for an accurate appreciation of the Apostle's writings not to be investigated at its first sources. The writer feels sufficiently rewarded for his bold attempt to face all difficulties in being able to present at least one phase of Philo's speculation in a new light. The solution arrived at concerning the Alexandrian's interpretation of the creation narrative in Genesis should remove the latter from among the supposed sources of St. Paul's reference to the Heavenly Man.

With sincerest gratitude the writer wishes to acknowledge the invaluable help in direction and encouragement he has received from his esteemed professor and friend, Dr. Heinrich Schumacher, S. T. D., of the Catholic University of America. That this work could be completed *in absentia* is above all due to his painstaking scholarly interest in the solution of a difficult problem. To the kindly and accommodating librarian of the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome, Dr. Leopold Fonck, S. J., special thanks for extraordinary conveniences of the splendid library, where the first part of the study was matured. And since the completion of the work after several years' interruption called for additional opportunities by the favor of his superior, it is gratifying to the writer that the

dedication of " Christ, The ' Man From Heaven ' " may serve as an expression of grateful felicitation to the Rt. Rev. Abbot Alcuin Deutsch, O. S. B., Ph. D., on the occasion of his silver sacerdotal jubilee.

BASIL A. STEGMANN, O. S. B.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, 1927.
St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

PREFACE v

CONTENTS vii

ABBREVIATIONS ix

BIBLIOGRAPHY xi

INTRODUCTION xiii

I. VIEWS OF MODERN CRITICS CONCERNING THE SOURCE OF THE PAULINE IDEA OF THE HEAVENLY MAN.

1. The Jewish Apocalyptic 1
2. Religious Syncretism 3
3. St. Paul's Own Speculation 5
4. The Urmensch Tradition 6
5. The Parallel in Philo 8
   a) Various Opinions 9
   b) The Main Parallels to St. Paul in Philo 16

II. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF PHILO.

1. The Creation of the World and of Man 20
2. The Two Genera of Man in Particular 32
   a) The Earthly Man—*γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος* 35
   b) The Heavenly Man—*οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος* 37
3. Difficulties in Philo in Reference to His Anthropology 42

III. PAULINE TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS IN I COR. 15, 45-47.

1. Text and Context of 1 Cor. 15, 45-47 50
   a) The Context 50
   b) The Text 54
   c) Various Questions arising from the Text 54

2. The Pauline Anthropology—*ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς* 60
a) *χοϊκός*: —*σάρξ*—*σῶμα* 61
b) *ψυχικός*: —*νοῦς*—*πνεῦμα*—*ψυχή* 63

3. *Πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* 68
a) Law of Sin and Death 69
b) Regeneration through the *πνεῦμα* 70
c) The New Creature 72
d) Likeness of the Resurrection 75

4. *Ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* 79
a) According to the Context 80
b) According to the Greek Patristic 83

IV. Comparison of the Terminology of St. Paul and Philo. 98

ABBREVIATIONS

BSt — *Biblische Studien.*
ExpT — *Expository Times.*
FThSt — *Freiburger Theologische Studien.*
HThR — *Harvard Theological Review.*
JE — *Jewish Encyclopedia.*
MPG — Migne, *Patrologia Graeca.*
JTHSt — *Journal of Theological Studies.*
NtlAbh — *Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen.*
NTSt — *New Testament Studies.*
RB — *Revue Biblique.*
WVSS — *Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.*
ZwTh — *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Texts

Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, ed. Cohn-Wendland, Berlin 1896 ff.
Works of Philo Judaeus, Translated by C. D. Yonge, London 1854.
Fragments of Philo Judaeus, ed. J. R. Harris, Cambridge 1886.
Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. H. J. Vogels, Düsseldorf 1920.
Novum Testamentum Latine, ed. H. J. White, Oxford 1911.
The New Testament, WVSS, vol. III. London 1921.
Patrologia Graeca, ed. Migne.
Lightfoot, J. B., *The Apostolic Fathers*, London 1907.
Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh.
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Edinburgh.

II. Other Works

Alford, H., *The Greek Testament*, London 1894.
Bachmann, Ph., "Der erste Brief an die Korinther," in *Zahns Kommentar zum N. T.*, Leipzig 1905.
Bailey, J. W., *Does Hellenism Contribute Constituent Elements to Paul's Christology?* Chicago 1905.
Bandas, R. G., *Master-Idea of Saint Paul's Epistles or The Redemption*, Bruges 1925.
Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, Freiburg i. B. 1908.
Bartmann, B., *Paulus*, Paderborn 1914.
Baur, F. C., *Paulus*, Stuttgart 1845.
Bentwich, N., *Philo Judaeus*, Philadelphia 1910.
Benz, K., *Ethik des Apostels Paulus*, BSt XVII (1912).
Bertrams, H., *Wesen des Geistes nach der Anschauung des Apostels Paulus*, NtlAbh IV. 4, Münster 1913.
Beyschlag, W., "Zur paulinischen Christologie," in *Stud. u. Krit.*, Gotha 1860.
——, *New Testament Theology*, Edinburgh 1895.
Bigg, C., *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford 1886.
Billings, T. H., *Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, Chicago 1919.
Bindley, H. T., *Study in I. Cor.*, In Expositor s. 8, v. VII. London 1904.
Bisping, A., *Exegetisches Handbuch zum N. T., 1 Cor.*, Münster 1883.
Bosse, F., *Der prae-existente Christus in Justin M.*, Greifswald 1891.
Bousset, W., *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen 1907.
——, *Religion des Judentums*, Berlin 1903.
——, *Kyrios Christos*, Göttingen 1921.

Brehier, E., *Les Idées philosophiques et réligieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie,* Paris 1908.

Brückner, M., *Entstehung der paulinischen Theologie,* Strassburg 1903.

Cone, O., *Paul, the Man, the Missionary and the Teacher,* London 1898.

Cornely, R., "Commentarium in I. Cor.," in *Cursus Scripturae S.,* Paris 1909.

Creed, J. M., "The Heavenly Man," in JTHSt XXVI (1925).

Dähne, A. F., *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie,* Halle 1834.

Deissmann, A., *Paulus,* Tübingen 1911.

——, *Die neutestamentliche Formel: In Christo Jesu,* Marburg 1892.

Delitzsch, F., *System of Biblical Psychology,* Edinburgh 1867.

Dieterich, A., *Eine Mithrasliturgie,* Leipzig 1903.

Dorner, J., *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ,* Edinburgh 1861.

Drummond, H., *Philo Judaeus,* London 1888.

Durand, G., *La Divinité de Jesus-Christ dans S. Paul, Rom. IX, 5,* RB 1903.

Edwards, T. C., *Commentary on I. Epistle to the Corinthians,* New York, 1886.

Ellicott, C., *St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians,* London 1887.

Feine, P., *Theologie des Neuen Testamentes,* Leipzig 1912 and 1922.

Felder, H., *Jesus Christus,* Paderborn 1911.

Felten, J., *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte,* Regensburg 1910.

Findlay, G. G., "1 Cor.," in *The Expositor's Greek Testament,* London 1904.

Gfrörer, A. F., *Kritische Geschichte des Urchristentums,* Stuttgart 1835.

Ginzberg, L., "Adam Kadmon," in *Jewish Encyclopedia.*

Godet, F., *Commentaire sur la première Epitre aux Cor.,* Paris 1885.

Goguel, M., "Recent French Discussion of the Historical Existence of Jesus Christ," in HThR XIX (1926).

Gressmann, H., *Israelitisch-jüdaische Eschatologie,* Göttingen 1905.

Gunkel, H., *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testamentes,* Göttingen 1903.

Hausrath, A., *Der Apostel Paulus,* Heidelberg 1872.

Heinisch, P., *Einfluss Philos auf die älteste christliche Exegese,* Münster 1909.

——, *Griechentum und Judentum im letzten Jahrhundert vor Christus,* 1911.

Heinrici, D. C. F. G., *Paulinische Probleme,* Leipzig 1914.

Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult,* Gieszen 1903.

Herriot, E., *Philon le Juif,* Paris 1898.

Holsten, C., *Evangelium des Paulus,* Berlin 1880 and 1898.

Holtzmann, H., *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie,* Tübingen 1911.

Holtzmeister, H., "*Dominus Autem Spiritus Est,*" Innsbruck 1908.

Hommel, F., "Apocalyptic Origin of the Expression 'Son of Man,'" in ExpT 11.

Jeremias, A., *Handbuch der Altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, Leipzig 1913.
——, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, Leipzig 1916.
Jowett, B., *Epistles of St. Paul to the Thess., Gal., Rom.*, London 1855.
Junker, A., *Ethik des Apostels Paulus*, Halle 1904.
Kennedy, H. A. A., *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, London 1919.
——, "St. Paul and the Conception of the 'Heavenly Man,'" in *Expositor*, s. 8, v. VII. London 1904.
Kohler, K., *Jewish Theology*, New York 1923.
Krebs, E., "Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert," in FThSt Heft 2, 1910.
Langen, J., *Das Judenthum in Palestina zur Zeit Christi*, Freiburg i. B. 1866.
Lattey, C., "Unity With Christ," App. III, Pt. II, WVSS N. T. v. III, London 1921.
Leisegang, H., *Der Heilige Geist*, I. 1. Teil, Leipzig 1919.
Lepin, M., *Christ and the Gospel*, Philadelphia 1910.
Lietzmann, H., *Briefe des Apostels Paulus*, Tübingen 1913.
Lobstein, P., *La Notion de la Preexistence du Fils de Dieu*, Paris 1883.
MacEvilly, J., *Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul, 1 Cor.*, Dublin 1875.
Müller, J. S., *Des Juden Philo Buch von der Weltschöpfung*, Berlin 1841.
Müller, Max, *Theosophy or Theological Tradition*, London 1899.
Ohleyer, L., "Pauline Formula 'Induere Christum,'" NTSt II., Wash., ington 1921.
Olschewski, W., *Wurzeln der paulinischen Theologie*, Königsberg i. Pr. 1909.
Pfleiderer, O., *Paulinismus*, Leipzig 1890.
Prat, F., *La Théologie de Saint Paul*, Paris 1913 and 1923.
Rackl, M., *Christologie des Hl. Ignatius von Ant.*, Freiburg i. B. 1914.
Radermacher, L., *Handbuch zum Neuen Testamente*, Stuttgart 1910.
Reinhard, W., "Wirken des Hl. Geistes im Menschen," FThSt Heft 22 (1918).
Reitzenstein, R., *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig 1910.
Ryle, H. E., *Philo and Holy Scripture*, London 1895.
Sabatier, A., *The Apostle Paul*, New York 1896.
Schaefer, A., *Die Bücher des N. T., 1 Cor.*, Münster 1883.
Schauf, W., "Sarx," NtlAbh XI, 1-2 (1924).
Schiele, F., "Rabbinische Parallelen zu 1 Cor. 15, 45-50," ZwTh 1899.
Schlatter, D., *Theologie des Neuen Testamentes*, Stuttgart 1910.
Schmidt, T., *Leib Christi*, Leipzig 1919.
Schnedermann, D., "I. Cor." in *Strack-Zöckler Kommentar*, München 1894.
Schumacher, H., *Christus in seiner Prae-existenz und Kenose, II.*, Rom 1921.
Schweitzer, A., *Paul and His Interpreters*, London 1912.
Seitz, A., *Evangelium vom Gottessohn*, Freiburg i. B. 1908.

Shoemaker, W. R., *The Use of רוח in the Old Testament and of πνεῦμα in the New Testament*, Menominee 1904.
Siegfried, C., *Philo von Alexandria*, Jena 1875.
Sokolowski, E., *Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus*, Göttingen 1903.
Somerville, D., *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edinburgh 1897.
Stanley, A. P., *Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, London 1865.
Thackeray, H., *Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, London 1900.
Thayer, J. H., *Greek-English Lexicon of the N. T.*, New York 1889.
Vitti, A., "Christus Adam," in *Biblica* 1926.
Weiss, B., *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testamentes*, Stuttgart 1903.
——, *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, Edinburgh 1892.
Weiss, J., "1. Korintherbrief," in *Meyers Kommentar*, 1910.
——, "Himmlischer Mensch," in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Tübingen 1909.
——, "Christus," in *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, I. Bd. 3.
——, *Urchristentum*, Göttingen 1914.
Wendland, P., *Hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, Tübingen 1912.
Witzel, M., *Drachenkämpfer Ninib*, Fulda 1920.
Zeller, E., *Philosophie der Griechen*, Leipzig 1881.
Zorell, F., *Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum*, Paris 1911.

INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of Positive Criticism into the realm of N. T. exegesis, the tendency has grown to analyse and subdivide the vast system of Christianity into its supposed structural elements, with a view to shed more light on the numerous problems by a closer study of its integral doctrines and component concepts. Thus the christology of St. Paul has been assigned to a special department in the workshop of modern biblical criticism, where its detailed problems are scrutinized with more intensity than breadth of view. The result of this tendency is summarized in the words of an eminent critic of St. Paul's interpreters: "It becomes apparent in Baur and increasingly evident in the work of subsequent investigators, that the self-consistency and logical concatenation of the system become obscured and disturbed in proportion as progress is made in the exact apprehension of the individual concepts and ideas."[1] This seeming paradox bears its emphasis on the words *exact apprehension,* which must be properly understood. For not a fuller and *true* apprehension of details can obscure an entire system, but rather the over-precise, disjointed study, which loses sight of the proper relation of the detail to the whole system of which it is an integral part.

To the disregard of this well-founded warning of Schweitzer may be attributed much of the confusion concerning the numerous disputed questions of N. T. study. A prominent example, one which has engaged the attention of most modern writers about the Pauline literature, is that of the Heavenly Man, arising from the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15, 45-47: "Even so it is written, the first man Adam became 'a living soul': the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual which is first, but the natural, [and] then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, earthly; the second man is from heaven." The ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος problem, severed from its context in the Epistle, has been examined in the light of Jewish Apocalyptic tradition about a

[1] Schweitzer, *Paul and His Interpreters,* London, 1912, 21.

essence, he is neither mere man nor Son of God in the metaphysical sense. His pre-existence is presupposed, as the descriptions of Is. 11, 2-5; Mich. 1, 4; Dan. 7, 13 were familiar. The Book of Henoch, emphasizing the pre-existence in several passages (39, 7; 48, 3. 6), describes him as neither image nor son of God, nor man, although "his face had the appearance of that of a man," and the title "Son of Man," borrowed from Daniel, is attributed to him (ibid. 131). The Messiah therefore of both Henoch and Paul, concludes Brückner (p. 147), is a pre-existent heavenly being in the form of man.

His knowledge of the Messiah preceded Paul's experience at Damascus, which struck like lightning into Jewish world-view and showed the old ideas in a new light (ibid. 7). To him as a Pharisee and disciple of Gamaliel, the "last Adam," (האדם האחרון) was a familiar and concrete idea; as Jew he could accept for Christ only the one concept *σάρξ*, whilst the Christian concept *πνεῦμα* was added by the vision of Damascus (ibid. 28 and 218). Thereafter Paul pictured to himself the pre-existent Christ in the figure of a man with a divine form of being—*δόξα*—and a divine essence—*πνεῦμα* (ibid. 69).

The interpretation of Brückner is a specific development of an older theory, advanced by F. C. Baur and C. Holsten, and later shared—with more or less important modifications—by Pfleiderer, H. J. Holtzmann, Feine, Beyschlag, Wrede, etc. Holsten, for instance, maintained [2] Paul must have been convinced that also with the second member of v. 45 (1 Cor. 15), concerning the "heavenly man," he rests on scriptural grounds, although in mentioning the two forms of man—*ὁ πρῶτος* and *ὁ ἔσχατος* (*Ἀδάμ*) Scripture presents rather the contrary order. Still St. Paul is supported by historical reality, which shows the second man to have preceded in the order of creation; and this is, moreover, confirmed by the theism of Jewish belief (Theismus des jüdischen Bewusstseins), which suggested the known relation of the two forms of man, as type and antitype, as *πρῶτος* and *ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ*. Olschewski,[3] however, observes that Holsten once held the theory of logico-psychological

[2] Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus*, Berlin 1880, 431 f.

[3] Olschewski, *Wurzeln d. paul. Christologie*, Königsberg 1909, 1 f.

deduction for Paul, and that later he accepted as the true source of the Pauline Christ-picture the oriental, syncretistic religious, through the medium of the Jewish Apocalyptic.

2. *Religious Syncretism.*

Another tendency, similar in method, attempted to minimize the Jewish influence upon St. Paul's christological views by stressing the important rôle of pagan and oriental ideas. W. Bousset, H. Gunkel, R. Reitzenstein and others have pursued this new direction in the search of the basis of the Apostle's concept, by showing the dependence of even the Jewish Apocalyptic ideas concerning the expected Messiah as the "heavenly man" on much older foreign parallels. Bousset attempted to prove that the Jews were not alone in expecting a "heavenly king";[4] that the confused representations of the "Son of Man," the pre-existent heavenly man of the Apocalyptic, afford a problem which must seek its solution in the comparative study of religions.[5]

Gunkel, after citing parallels for the notion of pre-existence from the Greek and oriental religions, concludes[6] that all these ideas have been transferred to Jesus, because already before him they belonged to the Christ. The picture of the heavenly Christ must have existed somewhere previous to the New Testament.

Hommel[7] agrees with this opinion by stating that the Apocalyptic had, in any case prior to Dan. 7, terms for the Messiah such as "one like a man," "one in the form or appearance of a man"; and referring to Chaldean traditions adds: "From that and no other source the Jewish Apocalyptic derived most of its figures." He gives prominence especially to the Adapa myth, which plays an important rôle in the "Urmensch"-source tradition.

In a summary treatise on the Heavenly Man, J. M. Creed[8] "considers the possible sources of the idea in oriental speculation, and

[4] Bousset, *Religion d. Judentums*, Berlin 1903, 346 f.

[5] Ibid. 462. Cf. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, Göttingen 1921, 126.

[6] Gunkel, *Zum relig. Verständnis d. N. T.*, Göttingen 1903, 93.

[7] Hommel, *Apocalyptic Origin of the Expression "Son of Man"* in ExpT 11, 341 ff.

[8] Creed, *The Heavenly Man*, JThSt XXVI (1925), 113-136.

discusses its possible relationship to the conception of the Son of Man in later Jewish and early Christian thought" (p. 113). He does not bring the oriental myths into relation with St. Paul's ideas, however it will be of interest to note them here to illustrate the possibility of the Apostle's dependence on older religious thought.

"We know from Hippolytus *Refut. V.* that in the second century the Naassene Gnostics, probably following a pagan source, had identified Attis with the Heavenly Man who descends into chaos, creates the world, and imparts life to the as yet lifeless ancestor of mankind" (p. 117). Creed furthermore derives from his authority (*Refut. V.* 6) that the Naassenes "pay honor to a Man and a Son of Man," and that this Man, whom they call Adamas, is bisexual. This latter qualification will interest us when we come to speak of Philo's distinction.

More striking is a parallel related in *Poimandres,* one of the Hermetic writings known to Zozimus. According to this source "after the revolution of the spheres had brought birds from the air, fishes from the water, fourfooted beasts and creeping things from the earth, Mind, the Father of All, who is life and light, 'begat Man equal to himself and him he loved as his own son, for he was exceedingly beautiful, having the image of his Father'." This heavenly bisexual Man, descending through the various spheres of creation, united with Nature, whence originated, when the cycle of time was completed, man's mortal and immortal nature (p. 120).

Creed summarizes: "The conception of the Heavenly Man is not, as we have seen, a central feature of most of the Gnostic systems, but in *Poimandres,* in the Naassene document, in Zozimus, the fundamental Gnostic ideas are embodied in the myths of a heavenly Man who descends into the dark lower world and in some way combines with the forces of the lower world to produce man as we know him, or sometimes the whole world order as it is. Bousset is in harmony with the general tendency in historical criticism when he turns to Persian religious literature for the source of the conception of the heavenly Man" (p. 122).

Whilst, according to Creed (p. 123), "there is nothing in the allusions of the existing Avesta which implies a myth of a primal heavenly Man," there is found in the Pahlavi texts of the Parsees a "doctrine of Gayomard as a heavenly being who falls a victim to the powers of evil, and from whose seed the human race is derived."

May these examples suffice to show the existence of oriental myths of a heavenly man. For want of a more acceptable explanation critics resorted to such sources as these from which the myths developed, and with which St. Paul was thought to have been familiar, to account for his distinction in 1 Cor. 15, 45-47.

3. *St. Paul's Own Speculation.*

Other interpreters see in the Christ-picture of St. Paul an invention or innovation through the Apostle's own speculation about the historical Jesus. According to Brückner,[9] Holsten accepted the nature and sinlessness of Jesus as sufficient ground for the conclusion on the part of Paul, that Christ must have been a "heavenly man," since absolute sinlessness excludes the property σάρξ, the source of evil and sin. Because of the redemptive mission of Christ, a conflict arose in Paul's mind and there was need of a transformation of thought. "So entstanden dem Paulus für seine messiasanschauung zwei widersprechende Forderungen, einmal der Messias müsse ein Wesen one σῶμα σαρκός gewesen sein, um one sünde gewesen zu sein, und zweitens, der Messias müsse ein Wesen mit einem σῶμα σαρκός gewesen sein, um den Tod haben sterben zu können."[10] Now from Paul's experience at Damascus, together with his speculation about the Messianic mission and the current belief in a double creation of man, arose the new conception of the Messias. "Damit der Messias der sündlose sei, ward er für Paulus der gen. 1, 26 geschaffene himmelsmensch, der ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος, der ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ." (Holsten, ibid.). Brückner draws attention to a "petitio principii" in Holsten's argument.

Other critics, like B. Weiss[11] and H. J. Holtzmann[12] attempt to explain that Paul's picture of the pre-existent Christ was a reflection from the post-existent, such as Paul saw him in the vision of Damascus; that the appearance of the exalted, spiritual man, Christ, determined for Paul the characteristics of the pre-existent

[9] Brückner, *Entstehung d. paul. Christologie,* 84 f. Cf. Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus,* Berlin 1898, II. 98-105.

[10] Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus,* II. 100.

[11] Weiss, B., *Biblical Theology of the N. T.,* Edinburgh 1892, 417 ff.

[12] Holtzmann, *Neutl. Theologie,* Tübingen 1911, I. 92.

"heavenly man." "In this exstatic vision," says Kohler,[13] "on his (Paul's) journey he beheld the figure of Jesus, the 'crucified Christ,' whose adherents he was pursuing, yet whom he had never seen in the flesh, appearing as a heavenly being, whom Paul identified as the heavenly Adam, the archetypal 'godlike' man." Thus this speculation does not exclude the influence of traditional notions. The "heavenly man" of the Apocalyptic is also here the pattern that is fitted out with the additional qualities of the post-existent Christ. The conclusions vary, however (cf. Holtzmann, *loc. cit.*), in determining whether in the mind of Paul Christ's pre-existence was real or merely ideal; whether the Pauline pre-existent "heavenly man" was a mental picture or a personal spiritual being, or existing in human form. The difference of opinion is mainly based on the interpretation of various texts of the Pauline Epistles. In the words of Somerville,[14] "The conception of Christ as the Second Adam, which is the nerve of the Pauline Christology, possesses this peculiarity that it is, as Sabatier puts it, 'a blending of history and faith'; it is an interpretation of the historic Jesus from the view-point of the Resurrection, and drawn from the Apostle's own experience on the working of the Spirit of the Risen Christ on his inner life." Lobstein[15] summarizes this idea in this fashion: "Saisie dans son principe générateur et dans sa signification primitive, la christologie paulienne plonge ses racines dans l'expérience capitale de la vie de l'Apôtre, dans sa conversion. De là l'induction religieuse qui le porte à faire du seigneur ressuscité et glorifié l'objectif et la norme de sa conception de la personne du Christ." And he continues to say that Paul raised the Jewish notion of the pre-existence to that of a real, personal pre-existence.

4. *The "Urmensch" or Double Creation Tradition.*

The tradition of an "Urmensch," the prototype of mankind, which is possibly Jewish-Hellenistic in origin,[16] is accepted by other interpreters as the direct source of the distinction of St. Paul in

[13] Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, New York 1923, 437.
[14] Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edinburgh 1897, 17 f.
[15] Lobstein, *La Notion de la Preexistence du Fils de Dieu*, Paris 1883, 31.
[16] Gunkel, *Zum relig. Verständnis d. N. T.*, 90.

1 Cor. 15. So Bousset remarks:[17] "Wir werden annehmen müssen, dass er (Paulus) einen weit verbreiteten Mythos von einem präexistenten, gottähnlichen Urmenschen folgt, dessen Spuren wir auch im Judentum, z. B. bei dem Alexandriner Philo, begegnen."[18] More recently Schmidt, who discovers most of the Pauline notions in the milieu of the Jewish church, concludes:[19] "Dass man auch Adam mit jenem himmlischen Urmenschen identifizierte, scheint Paulus zu wissen, aber er lehnt solche gedanken, die etwa den genannten des Philo entsprochen haben müssen, anscheinend mit vollem Bewusstsein ab: Nicht jener erste Adam war der pneumatische und der zweite der psychische, sondern vielmehr der erste war der irdische, dagegen nur der zweite Adam, Christus, ist der himmlische Mensch (1 Cor. 15, 45 ff.). Damit bleibt Paulus also nicht bei einer einfachen Verneinung dieser ihm entgegentretenden Gedanken vom Himmelsmenschen stehen, sondern er übernimmt sie zugleich; nur überträgt er sie von dem ersten Menschen Adam auf den zweiten, Christus."

The Jewish "Urmensch" tradition recognizes a duplicate biblical creation narrative and from this argues to a double creation of man: Gen. 1, 26 f. is taken as proof of the creation of the ideal man, who, being made in the image of God, must likewise be spiritual; Gen. 2, 7 speaks of the creation of the first man, formed of the earth. L. Ginzberg[20] refers to the rabbinical tradition recorded in the Midrash, according to which the Messiah is the first Adam, the original man (אדם קדמוני), who existed before creation, his spirit (Gen. 1, 2) being already present; he is also second Adam in as far as in appearance he followed creation, being as to the flesh of the posterity of Adam. Gressmann points out[21] that Paul seems to be still familiar with the connection between the heavenly form of the Messiah and the "Urmensch," because in 1 Cor. 15, 45 he does not simply treat them as parallels and opposites, but adds polemically (vv. 46 f.): "That was not first which

[17] Bousset, ad loc. 1 Cor. 15, 45 in *Schriften d. N. T.*, Göttingen 1917.

[18] This myth has been thoroughly traced by Bousset in his work, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen 1907, 160-223.

[19] Schmidt, T., *Der Leib Christi*, Leipzig 1919, 237.

[20] Ginzberg, *Adam Kadmon*, JE I. 181 f.

[21] Gressmann, *Israel. = jüd. Eschatologie*, Göttingen 1905, 365.

is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterwards that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth; the second man is from heaven." Even more emphatic is the statement of J. Weiss [22] that concerning the creation of the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ there is nothing at all narrated in Genesis; hence Paul must here be dependent on an exegetical or speculative tradition, according to which a double creation of man is recorded in the Scriptures. In another place [23] Weiss remarks that in this inference of a double creation narrative Paul goes the way of the Jewish-Greek philosopher Philo.[24] Thackeray [25] gives it as the thought of most commentators, that St. Paul in describing Christ as the second Adam, was using a common Rabbinic title. But this view, he says, is based on Rabbinic passages, which are of medieval origin. He admits (p. 42) that the phrase "the first Adam" (אדם הראשון) is exceedingly common about the time of St. Paul, but not in contrast to ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, which term is absent from Rabbinic literature till the XV. century. The idea of an antithesis between Adam and the Messiah occurs in the earliest Midrash on Genesis (VI. cent.), Bereshith Rabba 12 (ibid. p. 43).[26]

F. Schiele has examined the Rabbinic parallels to 1 Cor. 15, 45-50 and also came to the conclusion that mention of the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ does not occur before the work of Jalkut Simeon (XV. or XVI. cent.), and that such expressions at אדם הראשון (Aram. קדמאה) and אדם האחרון do not imply a contrast to a second Adam.[27]

5. *The Parallel in Philo.*

We find in the works of Philo, the Jewish-Alexandrian philosopher, a striking parallel in terminology to the Pauline antithesis between the "earthly man" and the "heavenly man." To state it

[22] Weiss, J., 1 Cor. ad loc. in *Krit.-exeg. Kommentar*, 1910.

[23] Weiss, J., *Religion in Geschichte u. Gegenwart*, Tübingen 1909, I. 1722.

[24] Cf. also Cone, *Paul, the Man* etc., London 1898, 42 f.

[25] Thackeray, *Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, London 1900, 41 f.

[26] Cf. Prat, *La Theologie de S. Paul*, II. 7, Paris 1923, and Bandas, *Master-Idea of St. Paul's Epistles*, Bruges 1925, 218 f. fn.

[27] Schiele, *Rabb. Parallelen zu 1 Cor.* 15, 45-50, ZwTh 1899, 20-31.

in the words of Thackeray: [28] "Philo had noticed the two accounts of man's creation in Gen. 1, 26. 27 and 2, 7, which are now explained by higher critics as due to welding together of two distinct sources, and based on them a doctrine, in which Platonism played a part, of a heavenly and an earthly man—a heavenly or archtypal man first created in the image of God (Gen. 1, 27) neither male nor female, not partaking of any earthly substance; and an earthly man, compounded of an earthly substance and a divine spirit, and differentiated as male and female (2, 7)." The same author (p. 45) mentions it as the prevailing view since Baur, that in 1 Cor. 15, 45 "we have a form of the doctrine of Philo, and that Christ is here spoken of as the pre-existent heavenly man."

This question of the relation between Philo and St. Paul is one of great interest and promise, not only because both writers had shared similar advantages of religious and intellectual education, a fact which might point to a mutual mental attitude toward the important conception of the "heavenly man"; but more precisely because the investigation of this intellectual relation bids fair to afford the richest evidence concerning the questions, whether the parallel terminology is identical or merely accidental, or whether only the form is borrowed and the Pauline contents new. If results show that St. Paul develops a new conception of the "heavenly man," independently of Philo, this information will prove most valuable for the history of primitive Christian theology.

The problem therefore will revolve about the accurate study of the decisive terms of both parallels, and their final comparison will ascertain whether or not a definite solution is possible. The result of such a study, moreover, will allow us to view and interpret 1 Cor. 15, 45-47 in a light, which, it is expected, may lead to a clear and satisfactory understanding of that much-controverted Pauline passage.

a) Various Opinions.

What about the relation between St. Paul and Philo? Two facts are quite universally admitted today among critics: that Philo, on the one hand, "evidently represented a powerful religious and philosophical movement, a movement which later on must have ex-

[28] Thackeray, op. cit. 44.

tended to many of the earliest Christian converts";[29] and on the other hand, that St. Paul as a native of Tarsus and a disciple of Gamaliel was well conversant with the philosophical and religious thought of his own day. Upon the evidence of historical information about Philo and St. Paul the conclusion is justified that both writers made common stock of many current ideas, both in the field of religion and of philosophy.[30] In the words of Deissmann:[31] "Both, the Jew Philo and the Jew Paul, are contemporaries. Both are of the Diaspora, come from great cities, and bear a prominently cosmopolitan stamp. Both live and weave in the Septuagint Bible. Both are capable of ecstatic-mystical experiences and come in contact in many details." Gfrörer thought,[32] the similarity in doctrine and ideas between Paul and Philo presupposes an intellectual traffic between Egypt and Judea, the Alexandrine wisdom must have crossed from Alexandria to Jerusalem. Before him Dähne[33] tried to account for the close relationship between Philo and Paul by supposing Gamaliel to have been the intellectual medium.

But when we inquire into a possible relation in any one particular idea, the verdict of mutual dependence is not warranted offhand, since the relation is not always obvious. Haste in forming conclusions has led to a variety of opinions regarding the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. and its supposed dependence on Philo. We shall cite a number of these opinions, indeed not exhaustively, but in sufficient number to manifest the general interest in the problem, as also to show the need and timeliness of the present study.

In the thorough work of Siegfried, which still holds a foremost place among the studies devoted to the writings of Philo, we find the statement,[34] that the doctrine of the first and second Adam shows a connection between 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. and Leg. alleg. I. 12

[29] Müller, M., *Theosophy or Theological Religion*, London 1899, 399.

[30] Wendland (*Hellenist. = röm. Kultur*, Tübingen 1912, 203, 210) seems to deny the influence of Philo by saying, that his position was an isolated one, that his ideas were shared by only a small circle.

[31] Deissmann, *Paulus*, Tübingen 1911, 76.

[32] Gfrörer, *Krit. Geschichte d. Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart 1835, lxxi.

[33] Dähne, *Geschichtl. Darstellung d. jüd. = alex. Religionsphilosophie*, Halle 1834, II. 239.

[34] Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, Jena 1875, 308 f.

(Mangey); that in both cases we have, a) a heavenly Adam in the pneumatic world and an earthly Adam in the heavenly world; b) the first Adam is in St. Paul as in Philo he that was created according to the image of God, who is above distinction, neither male nor female, etc. The common source, he adds, is for both the Midrash. This difficult passage of Siegfried can be understood only in the light of his own reasoning. He is correct in finding in St. Paul a heavenly Adam, but not so in Philo, for the Philonic οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος is not Adam. That both authors speak of the earthly Adam in the heavenly world, is true in so far as they attribute to the earthly Adam a heavenly principle, the πνεῦμα. But when Siegfried maintains that the first Adam is in St. Paul as in Philo he that was created according to the image of God, etc. he wrongly interprets both Philo and St. Paul. This will be explained in the sequel.

An opinion quite contrary to that of Siegfried is held by Ginzberg who, tracing the traditional source in Jewish literature, remarks:[35] "On the Midrash depends, according to some, the correct understanding of the Pauline passage 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff." After comparing the speculation of Philo with the Midrash tradition about the creation of the "original man," Ginzberg concludes (p. 182): "Paul, therefore, is not dependent on Philo, as most scholars hold; indeed he differs from him on most essential points. With Philo the original man is an idea; with Paul he is the personality of Jesus. With Philo the first man is the original man; Paul identifies the original man with the second Adam." Within the range of these two opposing opinions then, do we find the interesting speculation of modern critics.

Schweitzer,[36] in his examination of these interpretations, says of Reitzenstein in references to this author's view expressed in *Poimandres* (1904, 81 ff.): "After showing, in opposition to a canonized confusion of thought, that there is not the slightest connection between Paul's doctrine of the first and second Adam in 1 Cor. 15, 45-49 and Philo's theory about the two accounts of the creation in Genesis, since in that case the pneumatic heavenly man would be

[35] Ginzberg, *Adam Kadmon*, JE v. I, 181 f.

[36] Schweitzer, *St. Paul and His Interpreters*, 220 f.

first, and the psychic earthly man the second, he comes to the conclusion that the view set forth in 1 Cor. must have underlying it 'the belief in a god "Anthropos" who came to be identified with Christ'." Reitzenstein repeats in a later work[37] that the source of the Pauline phrase ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν has not yet been explained, since it cannot have been literally influenced either by the belief in the Messiah, or by a Jewish-Hellenistic speculation, dependent on the double creation narrative in Genesis of a first heavenly and a second earthly Adam; with the Philonic doctrine of ideas it has nothing at all in common. At the bottom of it all can only be the belief in a god Ἄνθρωπος, who was identified with Christ, because as god he receives the attributes πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν.

To B. Weiss, in his investigation of the assumed relation between St. Paul and Philo,[38] it appears incomprehensible "how the last Adam has grown out of the first created Adam, and how that idea of the heavenly man has so completely got rid of the character of the Platonic world (a character which hovers between indeality and reality), from which it is adopted by Philo, and has solidified itself into the full reality of a person that is identical with the historical Christ. The thought of the Logos of Philo, whom earlier writers discovered in the Pauline Christ (Usteri, p. 331; Dähne, p. 114 f.) is still more foreign to the Pauline circle of ideas."

The problem is stated more explicitly by Bachmann,[39] who straightway excludes as a possible source for 1 Cor. 15, 45-47 both the Rabbinic speculation about the double creation narrative and the Alexandrian distinction, expressed in Philo, of a first man—ἄνθρωπος γενικός or ἐπουράνιος—and of a second man—ἐπίγειος. Regarding the relation with the Pauline passage he argues: 1) Paul leaves Gen. 1, 27 out of consideration; for Philo it forms an indispensible basis. 2) The connection of the distinction between a first and second Adam with the Messianic idea is foreign to Philo, all-important for Paul. 3) Philo's ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος is an idea, that of Paul a reality. 4) In Philo the historical Adam is the second man and the first is his heavenly prototype; in Paul the

[37] Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig 1910, 173; ed. 1920, 200 f.

[38] Weiss, B., *Biblical Theol. of the N. T.*, 1892, I. 412.

[39] Bachmann, in Zahns *Kommentar*, Leipzig 1905, I. Kor. 468 n.

historical Adam is the first man and the second, or heavenly, man is the Messiah. 5) Philo speaks of the creation of the heavenly man at the beginning of the world; for Paul the "heavenly man" is the expression of the dignity of Redeemer as a result of the historical life of the Messiah. Hence, so Bachmann concludes, there can be no question of an actual relation between the picture of Christ in Paul and that of Alexandrian speculative exegesis.

For H. A. A. Kennedy [40] "it is nothing short of absurd to assert, as some scholars do, that Paul meant his readers to infer that the statement about 'the last Adam' formed part of his quotation from Scripture. The assertion is made to associate the Apostle's position with that of Philo."

What Lietzmann notes in his commentary on 1 Cor. in reference to 15, 45-47 [41] may serve to introduce another view-point, advanced by many critics, about the relationship between the Pauline and Philonic "heavenly man." Lietzmann, in showing the contradictory position of St. Paul and Philo on the question of the first and second Adam, considers 1 Cor. 15, 46 as excellent polemic against the current Jewish and Alexandrian view. Moreover he adds, that the exegetical argument of the Apostle rests on Gen. 2, 7, not on Gen. 1, 27 and 2, 7; from which it is evident that Paul here made use of a thought known to him from Judaism, quite independently and in a manner peculiarly his own.

Similarly Creed [42] in his recent article, though asserting that the Pauline doctrine of Christ as the second Adam "has nothing to do with the Heavenly Man either of Apocalyptic or Philonic philosophy," adds: "It is not impossible that St. Paul actually combats the Philonic doctrine in 1 Cor. 15, where he maintains that the natural man was prior to the spiritual man."

Brehier [43] already tried to find an argument for the Philonic heavenly man problem by referring to St. Paul's polemic text: "Si véritablement la critique de saint Paul contre la priorité chronologique de l'homme 'pneumatique' est une polémique contre cette théorie (sc. de Philon), nous ne pourrions pas en expliquer le

[40] Kennedy, in ExpT 8s. VII. 100.

[41] Lietzmann, *Briefe d. Apostels Paulus*, Tübingen 1913, 155.

[42] Creed, *The Heavenly Man*, in JThSt XXVI (1925), 134.

[43] Brehier, *Les Idees philos. et relig. de Philon*, Paris 1908, 124.

sens, sans cette identification du premier homme parfait à l'Homme céleste."

In a special study of the sources of Pauline christology Olschewski, discussing the theory of J. H. Holtzmann (*Lehrbuch der. neutl. Theologie,* 1897, II, 56),[44] maintains outright that a relation between the Pauline "heavenly man" and the Philonic view is unmistakable; however, that the relation is a polemical one, for Philo pictures the heavenly man as asomatic. Holtzmann, namely, is of the opinion that also other external analogies, contemporaneous with Alexandrianism, oblige us to hold that "the Pauline doctrine is not exactly Philonic, but doubtless, like the closely allied Philonic doctrines and the more widely divergent later views, grew out of the same stock of Jewish reflections on the creation narratives."[45] How Philo came to the discovery of a scriptural basis for the ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος, Holtzmann attempts to prove in another connection,[46] where he shows that Philo already identifies the ideal man with the Logos.

But whether Philo's Logos could ever have served as a basis for the Pauline picture of Christ, the heavenly Messiah, is a much-disputed question. Felder[47] says expressly, that the Philonic Logos has nothing to do with the Messiah. Whilst the Alexandrian shares entirely the Messianic expectation of his Jewish contemporaries and pictures in glowing colors the Messiah as he is known to us from Rabbinic-Pharisaic Messianism, he makes not the least mention of the Logos; yea, to connect the idea of the Logos with the idea of the Messiah did not enter the mind of Philo.

Feine,[48] on the other hand, and already Dähne,[49] try to show from Philo's writings that he at times, at least vaguely, identifies the Logos with the Messiah. From this speculation St. Paul is to have drawn his picture of the heavenly man, although, according to Feine (p. 266) and others, he did not at all agree with the Philonic theory of a double creation narrative in Genesis.

[44] Olschewski, *Wurzeln d. paul. Christologie,* Königsberg 1909, 55.
[45] Cf. Schweitzer, *St. Paul and His Interpreters,* 221.
[46] Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch d. neutl. Theol.* 1911, I. 135 f.
[47] Felder, *Jesus Christus,* Paderborn 1911, 490.
[48] Feine, *Theologie d. N. T.,* Leipzig 1912, 107.
[49] Dähne, *Gesch. Darstellung d. jüd. = alex. Rel.,* I. 437 f.

To trace the argumentation of the various exponents is beyond the limit of these pages and quite needless for a general perception of the problem. The different opinions, as we have seen, seek support from diverse channels, and to note only how at times the same interpreter has recourse to one or the other argument, or combines them for a more satisfactory solution, emphasizes the striking similarity in the parallel terminology. But the precise point of contact is the real crux of the problem. Thus J. Weiss is convinced that St. Paul bases his mention of the "last" or "second Adam" on some text of the Scriptures, which is at the same time the basis of Philo's speculation.[50] Since a literary dependence between the two writers, in his opinion, can not be proven, Weiss thinks that both Paul and Philo make use of a known tradition about a double creation narrative. Moreover, Philo must have known of a Hellenistic ἄνθρωπος myth and interpreted Gen. 1, 27 and 2, 7 accordingly in Rabbinical fashion. Paul, on the other hand, omitting certain characteristics of the Philonic "heavenly man," may also show traces of such a myth. Certain it is for Weiss, that both Paul and Philo find confirmation of their theory in Scripture and they both are at least indirectly dependent on the same source.

Turning then from these confusing speculations, we find ourselves confronted with the following questions, unsolved:

1) Did St. Paul present the same views as Philo concerning the "heavenly man"?
1) If not, what is his view and the meaning of his terminology?
3) Is the parallel terminology in St. Paul and Philo merely accidental?
4) Or is it possibly due in some way to a literal dependence, or to an indirect relation?

It is the scope of this study to attempt a solution of these questions by determining more precisely than has hitherto been done the individual concepts, conveyed by the parallel terminology, in the light of their respective contexts, and in their bearing on each writer's philosophical and theological doctrines.

[50] Weiss, J., *Christus*, in *Religionsgeschtl. Volksbücher*, I. Bd 3, 38-41; also in Meyers Kom., Göttingen 1910, I. Kor., and Urchristentum, Göttingen 1914, 375.

b) The Main Parallels to St. Paul in Philo.

The text of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 15, 45-47, reads:

v. 45 οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται· "ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν." ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν.

v. 46 ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν.

v 47 ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

v. 45 Even so it is written, the first man Adam became "a living soul": the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.

v. 46 But it is not the spiritual which is first, but the natural, [and] then the spiritual.

v. 47 The first man was from the earth, earthly; the second man is from heaven.[51]

We have here several marked antitheses and outstanding terms on which rests the comparison with the alleged parallels in Philo:

1. a) πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδάμ
   b) ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν
2. a) ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ (Χριστός)
   b) (ἐγένετο) εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν
3. a) πρῶτον τὸ ψυχικόν
   b) ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν
4. a) πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος (Ἀδάμ) ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός
   b) δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος (Χριστός) ἐξ οὐρανοῦ

Critics, who find in Philo the foundation for Paul's terminology, refer especially to the following passage, where Philo comments on the same text of Genesis (2, 7), which St. Paul makes use of in his antithesis, as seen above (v. 45).

Leg. alleg. I. 31:[52] Διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθροπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν οὐράνιος ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονὼς φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γεώδους οὐσίας ἀμέτοχος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος ἐκ σποράδος

[51] Text of the Westminster Version of the S. Scriptures.
[52] Text from the edition of Cohn-Wendland.

ὕλης, ἣν χοῦν κέκληκεν, ἐπάγη· διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐράνιόν φησιν οὐ πεπλάσθαι, κατ' εἰκόνα δὲ τετυπῶσθαι θεοῦ, τὸν δὲ γήϊνον πλάσμα, ἀλλ' οὐ γέννημα, εἶναι τοῦ τεχνίτου.

"The races [preferably "genera"] of men are twofold; for one is the heavenly man, and the other the earthly man. Now the heavenly man, as being born in the image of God, has not participation in any corruptible or earth-like essence. But the earthly man is made of loose material which he calls a lump of clay. On which account he says, not that the heavenly man was made, but that he was fashioned according to the image of God; but the earthly man he calls a thing made, and not begotten by the maker." [53]

Also here we have a striking antithesis and terminology:

1. a) οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος—κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς
   b) γήϊνος (ἄνθρωπος)—ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης, ἣν χοῦν κέκληκε
2. a) οὐράνιον . . . οὐ πεπλάσθαι
   b) γήϊνον πλάσμα

Another passage, likewise on Gen. 2, 7, emphasizes a further important contrast, namely the relation of the two types as to the order of their creation:

Op. mund. 134: Ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησιν ὅτι διαφορὰ παμμεγέθης ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον.

"And by this expression he (Moses) shows most clearly that there is a vast difference between man as generated now, and the first man who was made according to the image of God."

From this quotation we learn the additional distinction:

3. a) νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου
   b) γεγονότος πρότερον (κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ)

Since the πρότερον is referred by interpreters, as shall be seen later, to Gen. 1, 27 and the νῦν to Gen. 2, 7, we must consider another passage in Philo, which comments on Gen. 1, 27:

[53] English transl. of C. D. Yonge, Works of Philo Judaeus, London 1854. In some instances, to be indicated, Yonge's version, employed throughout this study, was adapted to more literal agreement with the original text.

Leg. alleg. II. 13: Πρὸ γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀποτελεῖ τὰ γένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· προτυπώσας γὰρ τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ γένος φησὶν εἶναι, ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται τὸν Ἀδάμ.

"For before making the species, he completes the genera, as he did in the case of man: for having first modelled the generic man, in whom they say that the male and female sexes are contained, he afterwards created the specific man Adam."

Whence another distinction:

4. a) προτυπώσας γὰρ τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον
   b) ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται τὸν Ἀδάμ.

If we now place the Philonic terms alongside the Pauline, the points of similarity and of difference can be seen at a glance:

St. Paul		*Philo*	
1. πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδάμ	(1a)	ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος . . . . Ἀδάμ	(4b)
" " ἐκ γῆς	(4a)	γήϊνος . . . . ἔκ σποράδος ὕλης	(1b)
(" ") ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν	(1b)	" πλάσμα	(2b)
πρῶτον τὸ ψυχικόν	(3a)	νῦν πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος	(3a)
2. ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ (Χριστός)	(2a)	γεγονὼς πρότερον (ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα)	(3b)
δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος (Χριστός) ἐξ οὐρανοῦ	(4b)	οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος (ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα)	(1a)
(ἐγένετο) εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν	(2b)	οὐράνιος οὐ πεπλάσθαι, κατ' εἰκόνα τετυπῶσθαι	(2a)
ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν	(3b)	προτυπώσας τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον	(4a)

It must not be assumed that this parallel sketch gives the actual equivalents in St. Paul and Philo, wherever no contradiction is obvious; that, for intsance, the οὐράνιος is identical with the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος in Philo. It is merely intended to present the parallels in both authors as they are usually referred to as the basis for the speculation about a relation between St. Paul and Philo.

With this picture before us, let us now take up the investigation of Philo's anthropology.

II.

The Anthropology of Philo.

The common interpretation of the texts in the work of Philo, *De Opificio Mundi,* where the author deals expressly with man's creation, is summarized in the German translation of L. Cohn's critical edition of the work, in a footnote to the passage, *Op. mund.* 76, as follows: "Philo nimmt auch beim Menschen eine doppelte Schöpfung an, die des Idealmenschen und die des wirklich ersten Menschen (vgl. § 134). Hier spricht er von dem Idealmenschen oder der Gattung Mensch, und diesem Idealmenschen spricht er Doppelgeschlechtigkeit zu, indem er in den Worten der Septuaginta 'ein männliches und ein weibliches erschuf er sie' die Andeutung finden will, dass in ihm die beiden Arten Mann und Weib potenziell vorhanden waren." This is said in reference to Gen. 1, 27. Another footnote is added to Philo's interpretation of the second passage (§ 134): "Philo findet in dem zweiten Bericht der Bibel über die Erschaffung des Menschen (1 Moses 2, 7) die eigentliche Schöpfung des ersten Menschen, während in dem ersten Bericht (1 Moses 1, 27) nur von dem Menschen in der Idee (dem Idealmenschen) die Rede sein soll." Critics, however, have never definitely stated in which precise terms Philo expresses or implies the interpretation, that the creation of the ideal and of the earthly man is narrated in the two Mosaic texts respectively. They rather consider their acceptation of Philo's doctrine as quite obvious. There is indeed an undeniable emphasis, throughout the works of the Alexandrian exegete, upon the definite distinction of the two types of man, the heavenly and the earthly, or the *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς* and the *πλασθεὶς ἐκ γῆς*. Still, even a cursory characterization of each, from the texts of Philo, does not preclude the doubt, when the passages are viewed in their contexts, that possibly in Philo's opinion the creation of one and the same man is meant in Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7; and that on the one hand the genus spoken of in *Op. mund.* 76 is not ideal, nor on the other hand, that the *πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος* created according to Gen. 2, 7 is not the composite earthly or first historical man. A similar doubt was ex-

pressed by Bailey,[1] but his conclusions do not solve all the difficulties. Before we begin, therefore, to define the natures and characteristics of Philo's heavenly and earthly man, we must dispose of these doubts and determine more definitely how the Jewish philosopher accounts for the respective creations of the two kinds of men.

1. *The Creation of the World and of Man.*

Philo spares no words in *Op. mund.* to impress his philosophical principle, that in the order of creation the ideal must precede the real. For God who foresaw "that there could not exist a good imitation without a good model, and that of the things perceptible to the external senses nothing could be faultless which was not fashioned with reference to some archetypal idea conceived by the intellect, when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect, in order that so using an incorporeal model, formed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect." (*Op. mund.* 16). As an architect first has in his mind a city to be built, so God first created the ideal world in his divine Reason (λόγος). Moreover, as the ideal city in the mind of the architect is nothing but his reason, so the ideal world can be said to be the Reason of God (ibid. 20).

The ideal creation was therefore enacted first, not in the order of time but rather in the order of sequence, because before the visible world time did not yet exist (ibid. 26). The most excellent creation, heaven, and the most universal ideas, earth, air, void, water, light, evening and morning—all in proper sequence—were made first, "in the beginning," the work of the one day creation (*οὐχι πρώτην ἀλλὰ μίαν*), so-called because of the unity of the ideal world (ibid. 29-35). Hence the first or one day creation is the all-embracing ideal world, distinct from the generic visible creation,[2] the account of which is now to follow.

[1] Bailey, *Does Hellenism Contribute Constituent Elements to Paul's Christology*, Chicago 1905, 24 f.

[2] Philo speaks of the six-day creation as generic in contrast to subsequent creation of species. Cf. below, p. 22 ff.

Thereupon God created the visible things according to their ideal patterns; for Philo continues: "The incorporeal world then was already completed, having its seat in the divine Reason; and the world, perceptible by the external senses, was made on the model of it"—ὁ δὲ αἰσθητὸς πρὸς παράδειγμα τούτου ἐτελειογεῖτο (ibid. 36). Then he proceeds to comment on the various creations in the order of the Mosaic narrative.

It is evident that Philo interprets the creations of the various days from the second to the sixth as real and visible creations, true to their ideal archetypes created on the first day. In speaking of the creation of the firmament, for instance, he says: "therefore he (Moses), very naturally contrasting that which was perceptible to the external senses and corporeal, with that which was perceptible only by the intellect and incorporeal, called this the firmament." (ibid. 36). This alone was the work of one day, the second, because of its dignity ἐν αἰσθητοῖς (ibid. 37). On the third day God created the earth and the sea and the plants. Still more unmistakable is Philo's distinction when he treats of the work of the fourth day: "the Creator having a regard to that idea perceptible only by the intellect, which has been spoken of in the mention made of the incorporeal world, created those stars which are perceptible by the external senses" (ibid. 55). On the fifth day God undertook to give life to moral genera (τὰ θνητὰ γένη ζωοπλαστεῖν—ibid. 62), the animals of the sea and of the earth and of the air. Last of all man was created, to whom the maker gave a superior mind, a soul as it were of the soul (νοῦν ἐξαίρετον, ψυχῇ τινα ψυχήν—ibid. 66), so that Philo could truly say: "God, intending to adapt the beginning and the end of all created things together, as being all necessary and dear to one another, made heaven the beginning and man the end: the one being the most perfect of incorruptible things among those things which are perceptible by the external senses; and the other the best of all earth-born and perishable productions" (ibid. 82).

Already in the introduction (*Op. mund.* 13-14) Philo points out the appropriateness of man's creation on the sixth day, because of his twofold nature, male and female. There Philo says, that the author of Genesis recounts the world's creation in six days, not

because the Creator had need of any space of time, but because there was need of order for the things created. Number is proper to order, and the number six is most generic for the laws of nature. For after unity itself, it is the first that is perfect, consisting of equal parts: of three as its half, of two as its third, and from their union we have six. This number is, as Philo thinks, endowed with the masculine and feminine nature; for in things the odd number is considered masculine, the even feminine. The principle of the odd is three, of the even two, from both arises six. Hence the world as the most perfect of creatures, should be described by the perfect number six.

From this it seems that Philo is here concerned with the earthly man, and not with the heavenly man, because in another passage (ibid. 134) the masculine and feminine natures are denied to the ideal heavenly man.

The explanation might well be anticipated, that Philo was so obsessed of his exegetical and philosophic preconceptions that in speaking of the generic creation of man he neglects to make clear his notions about the creation of the specific man Adam. In most cases when this name Adam occurs, Philo emphasizes its etymological significance and chiefly applies it to the earthly portion of man. So for instance in *Leg. alleg.* I, 90 in connection with Gen. 2, 16, where the name is met for the first time and is translated "earth." "For this is the interpretation of the name of Adam. Accordingly when you hear the name Adam, you must think that he is the earthly and perishable mind; for he that is according to the image is not earthly, but heavenly." In fact, the difficulty can be best understood by taking into account Philo's great distinction between genera and species (γένος and εἶδος). After the principle that first God created the genera, afterwards the species, he reasons (*Leg. alleg.* II, 13 in reference to Gen. 2, 19): "On which account Moses says 'And besides he made . . .' and that what had been previously created were genera is plain from what he says, 'Let the earth bring forth living souls,' not according to species but according to genus. And this is found to be the course taken by God in all cases; for before making the species he completes the genera, as he did in the case of man: for having first modelled the generic man, in whom they say the male and female sexes are con-

tained, he afterwards created the specific man Adam." Speaking in connection with the same text (Gen. 2, 19) in *Op. mund.* 148 ff., Philo refers to Adam as the first man, and explains how the giving of names to all animals was entrusted to him, because God knew that he had formed in mortal man a rational nature. Thereupon treating of the creation of woman (ibid. 151) he apparently understands it as a separate creative act—*ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλάσθη καὶ γύνη.* Consequently the species man, called Adam because of his earthly part, whom Philo in connection with Gen. 2, 7 (*Op. mund.* 136) names "the original man, he who was created out of the clay, the primeval founder of all our race," and (ibid. 139) "an image and imitation of God," was the first individual historical man, resulting from the creative union of the generic heavenly man and the generic earthly man in a human body upon the sixth day.

And it is important to emphasize already here, that since Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7 speak of the sixth day creation, which was generic (*Leg. alleg.* II, 13), we can speak of Philo's heavenly and earthly man as historical only in their combination in the resulting species Adam. These conclusions will be illustrated in what follows.

In accordance with Philo's principle, already quoted and which we meet frequently in his works (cf *Op.. mund.* 130; *Leg. alleg.* I, 22-24), that first the incorporeal, ideal world was created, that is, conceived in the mind of God, after which the corporeal was modelled, we must assume also the ideal man to have existed before the earthly man, consisting of an incorporeal and a material nature, came into being. Now Philo speaks of the man created on the sixth day as likewise corporeal, having called him "the best of all earth-born and perishable productions"—*τὸν δὲ τῶν γηγενῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν ἄριστον* (*Op. mund.* 82). Besides, since man is not alone an animated body, but possesses also the additional heavenly gift of the soul, the *νοῦς ἐξαίρετος*, his creation is mentioned last in order, for composite man partakes of the heavenly and the corporeal. It must, moreover, be borne in mind, that for Philo the first created man was generic, hence endowed with all the faculties of man, and also with the twofold nature, male and female. This is clearly expressed in the text already quoted: "Having first modelled the generic man, in whom they say that the male and female sexes are

contained, he afterwards created the specific man Adam." (*Leg. alleg.* II, 13).[3]

It shall become clearer as we proceed, that of the *two genera of men* (δύο γένη ἀνθρώπων), *the earthly and the heavenly, neither is the historical first man,* but that they are his component elements, figuratively spoken of as men, that is, *the two generic natures of the irrational and rational part of man,* which are combined in the creation of the sixth day to form the first historical specific man Adam. Then, as an individual man, he is called εἶδος,[4] but yet he remains the generic forebear of the race as to his generic component parts, after which all future individual human beings are modelled. Therefore the *generic heavenly* man, whom God made after the ideal pattern of the first day creation (Gen. 1, 27a), was created on the sixth day, together with the *generic earthly* man (Gen. 1, 27b). Now, because Philo understands Gen. 1, 1–2, 3 as a complete account of the creation of the world, and Gen. 2, 4-7 as a summary repetition, and the sequel as an allegorical amplification of man's creation, he can, in treating of the first composite historical man as actually created, speak of him promiscuously in three different senses: of the first individual man, or of the νοῦς ἐξαίρετος as the κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, or of the earthly element as the γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος, accordingly as his philosophical or moral scope demands.

To return now to *Op. mund.,* Philo continues his comments on the creation of the world by stating that all things were created and are existing together—τότε μὲν οὖν ἅμα πάντα συνίστατο—(ibid. 67) and adds: "But when all were collected in one place, then some sort of order was necessarily laid down for them for the sake of the production of them from one another, which was hereafter to take place" (ibid.). So the creation of the first individual historical man was one act of creating and uniting the superior mind to the earthly component element of man. But since the god-likeness is only in the rational mind, the image of the νοῦς of the first

[3] προτυπώσας γὰρ τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ γένος φησὶν εἶναι, ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται τὸν Ἀδάμ.

[4] This characterization is only a practical one. Logically the first man was generic; but as the original forbear, Adam, of subsequent human species he is considered as an individual and consequently called εἶδος.

ideal creation (cf. *Op. mund.* 69; 134; *Leg. alleg.* I, 21 f.; *Quis rer. div. her.* 230 f.), Philo dwells first on this ἡγεμονικὸς νοῦς, and then contrasts it with the earthly irrational part, which he calls the factitious man, and by which is justified the name Adam. It is essential therefore for the proper understanding of Philo's anthropology to bear in mind that *he speaks of either element separately as man, and again applies this term in its fullest sense to the combined natures, the historical man.*

The man in question here in reference to Gen. 1, 26 f. is the first historical man, at once created in his full manhood according to God's image and likeness. The god-likeness, however, does not exist in the body, but in the mind, the leader of the soul—τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν (ibid. 69).

Philo next gives an explanation of the use of the plural verb ποιήσωμεν (Gen. 1, 26), namely, that other beings subject to God cooperated with him in creating man and that they are responsible for the evil in man; not, however, that God would not have alone been able to create this man, so short-lived and frail—ἄνθρωπον δὲ βραχὺ ζῷον οὕτως καὶ ἐπίκηρον (*Op. mund.* 72). God did not make the soul of the wicked, since evil is hateful to him (*Mut. nom.* 30 ff.); hence he had other cooperators in the creation of man. This is more clearly stated in another context (*De Fuga*, 69 ff.) that the task of making the mortal part of our soul was assigned to his own powers, whilst he was fashioning the rational part within us. Philo understands Gen. 1, 26 of the creation of the entire composite man, and Gen. 1, 27 as an emphatic insistence on the divine creation of the nobler part, *the* man, ethically speaking for he says: "On which account, after Moses had already put into God's mouth this expression 'Let us make man' (Gen. 1, 26) as if speaking to several persons, he adds, as if he were speaking only of one 'God made the man' (Gen. 1, 27). For in fact, the one God alone is the sole creator of really the man, who is the purest mind; but a plurality of workmen are the makers of that which is called man, the being compounded of external senses; for which reason the man κατ' ἐξοχήν is spoken of with the article; for the words of Moses are 'God made the man,' that is to say, he made that reason destitute of species and free from all admixture. But in Gen. 1, 26 he speaks of man in general without the addition of the article; for

the expression 'Let us make man' shows that he means the being compounded of irrational and rational nature." (*De Fuga,* 71 f.).[5]

To show then that the historical generic human creation also embraces the wicked race of men—whereas man is not essentially evil (cf. *Mut. nom.* 33 f.; *Op. mund.* 136)—Philo continues in *Op. mund.* to explain that in the generic earthly man all the future species are already contained. This is the passage in which critics see expressed the creation of the ideal man, who in the translation of Cohn's text, already quoted, is identified with the genus man (Gattung): Παγὺ δὲ καλῶς τὸ γένος ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν διέκρινε τὰ εἴδη φήσας ἄρρεν τε καὶ θῆλυ δεδημιουργῆσθαι, μήπω τῶν ἐν μέρει μορφὴν λαβόντων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ προσεχέστατα[6] τῶν εἰδῶν ἐννπάρχει τῷ γένει καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ διαφαίνεται τοῖς ὀξὺ καθορᾶν δυναμένοις.—"Very beautifully after he had called the whole race 'man,' did he distinguish between the sexes, saying that 'they were created male and female'; although the individuals of the race had not yet assumed their distinctive forms; since the extreme species are contained in the genus, and are beheld, as in a mirror, by those who are able to discern acutely" (*Op. mund.* 76). From what we have already seen we must conclude, that the γένος ἄνθρωπος of this passage is the generic earthly man, endowed with a bisexual nature, and not an ideal heavenly man. For, to repeat, the sixth day creation was, unlike that of the first or one-day creation, earthly and generic, in as far as a higher immaterial life-giving principle was united with the irrational earthly human element to form the first historical man.

We can at once connect with the immediate context of the passages referring to Gen. 2, 7, because Philo's comments on the texts intervening between Gen. 1, 27 and 2, 7 are too diffuse and quite irrelevant here, since he is accumulating reasons, why man was created last, and is then extolling the excellence of the number seven. After this lengthy insertion Philo again returns to the sacred text and says of the Mosaic author, in explanation of Gen. 2, 4: "So Moses, summing up his account of the creation of the

[5] Here Yonge's translation has been changed to bring out the text.

[6] In place of this προσεχέστατα "nearest," the reading of Markland ἕκαστα "each," or of Turnebus ἔσχατα "extreme" or "ultimate," would be clearer.

world, says in a brief style (ἐπιλογιζόμενος δὲ τὴν κοσμοποιίαν κεφαλαιώδει τύπῳ) 'This is the book of the creation of the heaven and of the earth etc.'" (*Op. mund.* 129.) The summary headings which topically recapitulate the whole story of the creation are: Gen. 2, 4-5; Gen. 2, 6; and Gen. 2, 7. Philo refers Gen. 2, 4-5 to the ideal and incorporeal world, which also includes the ideal man; Gen. 2, 6 to the visible world, excepting man; Gen. 2, 7 to the creation of man, the combination of the ideal and earthly, emphasizing the great distinction between the now created sense-perceptible individual man and the man according to the image of God, or ideal man. (*Op. mund.* 129-135.) This distinction is now repeated in the following important passage: Ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησιν ὅτι διαφορὰ παμμεγέθης ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἤδη μετέχων ποιότητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἄφθαρτος φύσει. τοῦ δ' αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατασκευὴν σύνθετον εἶναί φησιν ἔκ τε γεώδους οὐσίας καὶ πνεύματος. θείου.—" By this expression he (Moses) shows most clearly that there is a vast difference between man as generated now, and the first man who was made according to the image of God. For man as formed now is perceptible to the external senses, partaking of qualities, consisting of body and soul, man or woman, by nature mortal. But man, made according to the image of God, was an idea, or a genus, or a seal, perceptible only by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, imperishable by nature. But he asserts that the formation of the individual man, perceptible by the external senses, is a composition of earthly substance and divine spirit" (ibid. 134).

Now, if we compare the description of the man created according to Gen 1, 26 f. with the definitions just quoted in reference to Gen. 2, 7 we shall see exactly Philo's view-point in his twofold distinction. According to the previous context, the man created on the sixth day is part of the sense-perceptible creation, of the earth-begotten and perishable things; but in as far as he was endowed by the Creator with a superior mind, he partakes also of the ideal or heavenly world. This distinguishes him from the other animals, makes him god-like, and justifies the expression that he

is created according to the image of God. This man, created on the sixth day, is generic; for on the seventh day God is said to have rested, *i. e.* ceased to create mortal genera (cf. *Leg. alleg.* I. 5). Hence he contains within himself the male and female species. Summing up Philo's characterization of this man, generic as to his component parts, yet the first historical human being, created according to Gen. 1, 26 f., we find that he is:

> *αἰσθητός, τῶν γηγονῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν,* as to his body;
> *θεοειδής, κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς,* as to his dominant mind;
> *γένος ἄνθρωπος, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ,* as the model of future species.

Matching this description with our quotation, in reference to Gen. 2, 7 above, we note that the notions *αἰσθητός, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, θνητός* (*φθαρτός*) are the same in both.[7] These are qualities of the *νῦν πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος*. Hence *νῦν* must refer both to Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7. Moreover, we have in both descriptions the term *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ*, and here lies the solution of Philo's distinction of two types or genera of men. From *Op. mund.* 69, where the *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς* is identified with the *τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμὼν νοῦς*, which mind in man's creation was given him as a special gift of God (ibid. 66); as well as from the concluding sentence of our previous quotation, where composite man is said to be made up of earthly substance and divine spirit, we infer that the *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος* in both passages is identical. In other words, the *ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονὼς πρότερον* is the *νοῦς ἐξαίρετος* of man, and since it is of an ideal nature, it is connected with the ideal creation of the first day—*πρότερον*, i. e. as recapitulated in Gen. 2, 4-5 (*Op. mund.* 129). Therefore it is further defined above as *ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἄφθαρτος φύσει.*

Thus whilst both the *πλασθείς* and the *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονὼς*

[7] It may be objected that in reference to Gen. 1, 26 f. a bisexual nature is attributed to the generic by the words *ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ*, whilst the passage referring to Gen. 2, 7 has *ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή*. It appears that Philo did not consider the first historical man bisexual, but both sexes were potentially contained in the generic earthly man, and in the actual combination with the heavenly generic complement, resulting in the historic individual, the specific distinction into sexes took place. See below the chapters on the two genera in particular.

ἄνθρωπος are elements of the first individual man, created according to Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7, it is important to observe Philo's emphasis on the distinction of the two genera of men, because it forms the basis of his ethical principles and allegorical interpretation. More will be said about this distinction when we treat of the earthly and heavenly νοῦς or man in particular.

Philo continues to describe the complete constitution of the real historical man when he again points out the divine origin of the soul and adds several reasons for the superior excellence of the first historical man, both as to his body and his soul, over his posterity (*Op. mund.* 135-148). Quite forcibly he asserts in the passage already quoted in part: "The original man, he who was created out of clay, the primeval founder of our race, appears to me to have been most excellent in all particulars, in both soul and body, and to have been very far superior to all the men of subsequent ages from his pre-eminent excellence in both parts" (ibid. 136). And again: "We shall be only saying what is the plain truth, if we call the original founder of our race not only the first man, but also the first citizen of the world" (ibid. 142). And: "Being akin and nearly related to the ruler of all, in as much as a great deal of the divine spirit had flowed into him." What is this relationship?, Philo asks, and presently gives the answer: "Every man in regard to his intellect is connected with divine Reason, being an impression of, or a fragment or a ray of that blessed nature; but in regard to the structure of his body he is connected with the universal world" (ibid. 146).

It is to be observed, that Philo in his Books of Allegories does not treat the second creation account as literal history, but as allegory. Thus what follows Gen. 2, 7 is not a new creation, but an allegorical exposition of the process of the previous creation. From this view-point the seeming contradictions become intelligible, and the one fact we have tried to establish, namely that Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7 record the same creation also according to Philo, is by no means obscured by other passages concerning the creation of man.

Of these passages the one most frequently quoted alongside of *Op. mund.* 134 is *Leg. alleg.* I. 31-32. In the first sentence of *Leg. alleg.* I, connecting with Gen. 2, 1, Philo repeats the thought of *Op. mund.* 129 ff. that having formerly spoken of the creation of

the νοῦς and the αἴσθησις, he now in speaking of the sixth day stresses the perfection on the part of both; for he says that neither the νοῦς ὁ ἄτμητος nor the αἴσθησις ἡ ἐν μέρει had been completed (for their perfection consists in their supplementing each other in the first individual historic man). Now therefore after the sixth day everything is said to be complete.

These few remarks of Philo serve as a very appropriate introduction to what follows, because he proceeds to amplify the statement that now the creation of the world was complete. For as he had done in the foregoing book, *Op. mund.*, so also here he treats of the summary headings in Gen. 2: vv. 4-5; v. 6; and v. 7. Interpreting the first text (vv. 4-5) he says: "By his most conspicuous and brilliant Word, by one command, God makes both things: the idea of mind, which speaking symbolically, he calls heaven, and the idea of sensation, which by a sign he named earth." (*Leg. alleg.* I. 21.) As yet nothing sense-perceptible existed. Again, as Gen. 2, 6 was previously interpreted of the visible creation, excepting man, so now in the same reference the mind is said to water the face of the earth; that is, the sense-perceptible things were now present for the operation of the mind (ibid. 28). However, before this operation of the human mind took place, that is, before the creation of man (Gen. 2, 7), so Philo points out (ibid. 29), the faculties of the animal soul, imagination and appetite, did not suffice for this process of mental apperception, for "the appetite is the brother of the imagination, according to the intensive power of the mind, which the mind keeps on the stretch, by means of the sensation, and so touches the subject matter, and comes over to it, being eager to arrive at and comprehend it" (ibid.).

This distinction of two faculties in the now fully created composite man (Gen. 2, 7), each of which he has separately spoken of as man, and now calls νοῦς—both the rational and the irrational—needs more precise explanation. This follows immediately in another classical passage: Διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν οὐράνιος ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς, φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γεώδους οὐσίας ἀμέτοχος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης, ἣν χοῦν κέκληκεν, ἐπάγη· διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐράνιόν φησιν οὐ πεπλάσθαι, κατ' εἰκόνα δὲ τετυπῶσθαι θεοῦ, τὸν δὲ γήϊνον πλάσμα, ἀλλ' οὐ γέννημα,

εἶναι τοῦ τεχνίτου. ἄνθρωπον δὲ τὸν ἐκ γῆς λογιστέον εἶναι νοῦν εἰσκρινόμενον σώματι, οὔπω δ' εἰσκεκριμένον.—"The races [genera] of men are twofold; for one is the heavenly man, and the other the earthly man. Now the heavenly man, as being born in the image of God, has no participation in any corruptible or earth-like essence. But the earthly man is made of loose material, which he calls a lump of clay. On which account he says, not that the heavenly man was made, but that he was fashioned according to the image of God; but the earthly man he calls a thing made, and not begotten by the maker. And we must consider that the man who was formed of earth, means the mind which is to be infused into the body, but which has not yet been so infused" (ibid. 31-32).

In the light of our previous results this distinction is now readily understood. However, we must here bear in mind that Philo's ethical view-point induces him to change his terminology somewhat in analysing the constitution of man. Whereas in the earlier passage (*Op. mund.* 134) he distinguishes in man body and soul, and emphasizes the presence of the additional dominant νοῦς in the human soul as against the irrational soul of other animals, he here lays more stress on the difference between the rational and irrational parts of the soul in man. Both he calls man; one the οὐράνιος or ideal man or rational νοῦς, because by its nature it belongs to the ideal or heavenly creation; the other γήϊνος or earthly man or irrational νοῦς, because it is earth-born and belongs to the perishable creation. Naturally, this earthly part of the soul can be spoken of separately, before it is united with the body (οὔπω εἰσκεκριμένον) and inspired with the divine breath of life. This is evident from the words with which Philo continues the foregoing quotation: ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός, εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμίν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς· τότε γὰρ γίνεται, οὐκέτι πλάττεται, εἰς ψυχήν, οὐκ ἀγ ρὸν καὶ ἀδιατύπωτον, ἀλλ' εἰς νοερὰν καὶ ζῶσαν ὄντως.—"This mind would be really earthly and corruptible, if it were not that God had breathed into it the spirit of genuine life; for then it becomes a soul, and is no longer one made, one inactive and incapable of proper formation, but a really intellectual and living one"[8] (ibid. I. 32).

Hence only the god-given power of true life makes the earthly

[8] Yonge's translation has been slightly changed.

and perishable νοῦς into a living soul in combination with the rational mind. That both νοῦς are spoken of as actually distinct is evident from the immediate observation: "But someone may ask, why God has thought an earth-born mind, which was wholly devoted to the body—τὸν γηγενῆ καὶ φιλοσώματον νοῦν—worthy of divine inspiration, and yet did not treat the one made after his own idea and image—τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν γεγονότα καὶ εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ—in the same manner" (ibid. I, 33).

Thus the whole trend of this present treatise confirms what we have seen in Philo's former work, that Gen. 2, 7 ff. is nothing more than a repetition and allegorical amplification of Gen. 1, 26 f. It would hardly be just to charge Philo with inconsistency on account of this figurative terminology and theoretic distinction, since it is in no way contradictory of his previous definitions, and best answers the scope of his allegorical treatise.

In the second book of the Νόμων ἀλλεγορίαι we again meet the same distinction of two kinds of men, in connection with the creation of a helpmate for Adam (Gen. 2, 18): Δύο γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γένη· τό τε κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα γεγονός, καὶ τὸ πεπλασμένον ἐκ γῆς.—"For there are two kinds of men, the one made according to the image, the other fashioned out of the earth" (*Leg. alleg.* II, 4). Although the interpretation is grossly allegorical, referring the term "helpmate" to the body as subservient to the sensation or irrational mind, it is important and interesting to see the same terminology recur. We might add here other passages, which contain the same contrast, but we shall have occasion to refer to them in the following chapters, where the characteristic terminology shall be considered in particular.

2. *The Two Genera of Man in Particular.*

The term γένος, as was shown in the preceding chapter, is applied by Philo to those creations in the Hexaemeron, which were to serve as archetypes of future reproductions (cf. *Leg. alleg.* I, 22 f.). When an individual or specific creation is spoken of, the term εἶδος is used. This latter term is also applied to man when the really existing individual is meant,—so both to the first historical man Adam, who was shown to be composed of two generic natures (cf.

Op. mund. 82; *Leg. alleg.* II, 13; also *Op. mund.* 135; 140), as well as to later individuals of the race (cf. *Quis rer. div. her.* 57).

It may be argued that in *Leg. alleg.* II, 4 and 13 Philo calls only the earthly element of man εἶδος, not the composite creation. However, we must note that the complete creation of man had already been accounted for in connection with Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7, and that here the process is allegorically explained. Hence Philo states (*Leg. alleg.* II, 4) that historically the πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος cannot exist alone. Besides, he adds (*Leg. alleg.* II. 24) that immediately after the creation of the mind it was necessary that the external sense should be created. Indeed, the name Adam is given to man because of his earthly part (*Leg. alleg.* I. 90; *Quis rer. div. her.* 52), but historically speaking the species Adam was composed of both the rational and irrational natures (cf. *Op. mund.* 151). The combination of the two natures, separately called ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος and ἄνθρωπος γήϊνος, is well expressed by the term ἀπεργάζεται (*Leg. alleg.* II, 13), which cannot imply a new creation, but a finishing off, a development in the process of creating the individual species man.

The question so frequently touched upon by critics, whether Philo attributes to Adam an androgynous nature, is not important in our investigation, but we may refer to it briefly, since the answer seems to lie on the surface of our investigation. It would appear that *Leg. alleg. II.* 13 has given rise to the various theories about the relation of the androgynous "Urmensch" to the Philonic generic man: προτυπώσας γὰρ τὸν γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ γένος φησὶν εἶναι. Here it is said of the generic man that in him the male and female genus are contained. It may be admitted in favor of the above-mentioned theories of critics, that Philo may well have been familiar with the conception of the androgynous original man. Oriental literatures make frequent allusion to the same idea of a bisexual nature, because for the Oriental, as A. Jeremias observes,[9] it conveys the idea of perfection. The same author mentions the examples of Ishtar and Aphrodite, to whom a double nature had been ascribed:[10] and he can cite Berossus for instances

[9] Jeremias, *Handbuch d. altorient. Geisteskultur*, Leipzig 1913, 231.

[10] Ibid. 253. Cf. also Hepding, *Attis seine Mythen u. sein Kult*, Gieszen 1903, 105 n. 1.

of men with two heads, male and female, and the sexual organs of both.[11] The deified fighters of Dragons were also represented by the Babylonians as having this male-female nature.[12] J. G. Müller already remarks[13] with reference to Philo: "Es ist eine weitverzweigte orientalische Ansicht, dass der Urmensch Mannweib gewesen, die sich bei den Chinesen, Hindus und Persern vorfindet." Even more to the point is Plato's allusion in Timaeus, where Aristophanes relates a myth about the androgynous race;[14] but it must be noted that Philo himself scores and ridicules this myth (*De Vita Contemp.* 63). Hippolytus[15] speaks of an ἀρσενόθηλυς ἄνθρωπος in his refutation of ancient myths. It was indeed possible that Philo adopted the idea into his theory of interpretation, because it was common property in the Jewish-Alexandrian thought of his day.[16] We have sufficient evidence in the Talmud and Midrash, which shows a like interpretation of Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7. Megilla 9a adds, in connection with Gen. 1, 26 f., "as man and woman he created him; they (the Seventy) did not write: he created them." This is explained in Berakhoth 61a in reference to Gen. 2, 7: "Two faces has the Holy One, blessed be he, created in the first Adam." We are not surprised to read, therefore, in the footnote to the German translation of Cohn's text of Philo, under *Op. mund.* 76: "Diese Anschauung von der mannweiblischen Natur des ersten Menschen wird auch im Midrasch Beresch. R. cap. 8 erwähnt (aus Philo entlehnt?): 'In der Stunde da Gott den ersten Menschen erschuf, erschuf er ihn mannweiblisch (אנדרוגינוס); denn es heisst: Man und Weib erschuf er sie'."

However, from the preceding interpretation it is clear that in Philo the *generic earthly man,* the ἄνθρωπος γενικός, in whom alone is said to be τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, is not the historical Adam, but only his earth-born, incomplete generic element.

Three other passages, moreover, shed light on Philo's notion of this twofold sexual nature. In *Op. mund.* 76 the male and female

[11] Jeremias, *A. T. im Lichte d. Alten Orients,* Leipzig 1916, 20.
[12] Witzel, *Drachenkämpfer Ninib,* Fulda 1920, 250.
[13] Müller, *Des Juden Philo Buch von d. Weltschöpfung,* Berlin 1841, 268.
[14] Plato, *Symposium,* 189 f.
[15] Hippolytus, *Philos.* V. 7 in MPG 16, III. 3131.
[16] Cf. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres,* Leipzig 1904, 110 f.

species are distinguished in the genus, but not as already having individual existence—*μήπω τῶν ἐν μέρει μορφὴν λαβόντων.* In *Op. mund.* 134 the *διαπλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος* is said to be man or woman—*ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή.* In *Quis rer. div. her.* 164 Philo adds in explanation of the Mosaic text, *ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν* (Gen. 1, 27) : *οὐκέτι αὐτόν, ἀλλ' "αὐτοὺς" ἐπιφέρει πληθυντικῶς, ἐφαρμόττων τὰ εἴδη τῷ γένει διαιρεθέντα, ὡς εἶπον, ἰσότητι.* Hence the future species are adapted to the genus, in which they are potentially contained. From this it would follow that Philo, in spite of his indefinite statements about the creation of woman (*Op. mund.* 151), never conceived the composite species Adam as androgynous; but he held, in conformity with his Platonic principle about the generic creation, that the earthly generic nature of man is potentially both male and female, and therefore in the first creation of man he accounted for the later existence of both species.

The passage, in which the two genera of man are mentioned, calls the one the heavenly and the other the earthly man (*Leg. alleg.* I, 31). This one is said to be *πλασθείς*, the former *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς.* In *Op. mund.* 134 the *διαπλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος* is described as either male or female, whilst to the *κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος* is denied this qualification of *ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ.* From this we must conclude that the *γένος ἀνθρώπων* of *Op. mund.* 76, as well as the *γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος* of *Leg. alleg.* II. 13—since to both is attributed the distinction into male and female—are identical with the generic *πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος*, the earthly man. Now, how did Philo conceive and describe these two genera of man, the earthly and the heavenly?

a) The Earthly Man—*γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος.*

If we look back to the preceding accounts of the creation of the *πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος*, we observe that Philo speaks of him as consisting of body and soul (*Op. mund.* 134) ; that he calls him *νοῦς*, "which would be really earthly and corruptible, if it were not that God had breathed into it the spirit of genuine life" (*Leg. alleg.* I. 32). In the context of this latter passage Philo is explaining the process of the creation of the earthly man, and from this view-point he speaks of the earthly mind separately, before its union with the body. So the earthly man, before he receives the spirit of God, possesses a soul, whose chief faculty is the earthly mind, distinct

from the rational mind; for it was said (*Op. mund.* 66) that to this man was given a superior mind, a soul as it were of the soul—νοῦν ἐξαίρετον, ψυχῇ τινα ψυχήν. In other words, in the creation of the first individual man the rational mind was given to the irrational part of the soul and is then the dominant portion of it. Commenting on the expression "ἐνεφύσησεν" (Gen. 2, 7), which Philo considers equivalent to "ἔπνευσεν ἢ ἐψύχωσε τὰ ἄψυχα" (*Leg. alleg.* I. 36), he makes clear this relation between the two minds. For he continues: "God breathed into man's face both physically and morally. Physically, when he placed the senses in the face; and this portion of the body above all others is vivified and inspired; and morally, in this manner: as the face is the dominant portion of the body, so also is the mind the dominant portion of the soul. It is into this alone that God breathes. . . . The mind is vivified by God, and the irrational part of the soul by the mind, for the mind is as it were a god to the irrational part of the soul. . . . . The irrational part of man was indeed made by God, but not through God, but through the reasoning power which bears rule and sovereignty in the soul; and Moses has used the word 'breath,' not 'spirit,' as there is a difference between the two words; for the spirit is conceived according to strength and intensity and power; but breath is a gentle and moderate kind of breeze and exhalation. Therefore, the mind, which was created in accordance with the idea and likeness of God, may be justly said to partake of his spirit, for its reasoning has strength; but that which is derived from matter is only a partaker in a thin and very light air, being as it were a sort of exhalation" (*Leg. alleg.* I. 39-42).

The earthly mind, which in actuality is the life principle of man's animal nature, is here said to receive its power of life through the rational mind, because, the former being material, it could not, except through a proper medium, participate in the immaterial. Thus Philo expresses the inter-relation of the parts of man's trichotomous nature; whereas in another context he sums up the same process of the inbreathing in these few words: "The Creator endowed the body with a soul" (*Op. mund.* 139).

In Philo's anthropology the most material part of man, the body (σῶμα), receives very little consideration. The other two parts, however, he contrasts the more strongly. Thus in *De Migr. Abrah.*

3, where he distinguishes σῶμα and αἴσθησις, he adds: αἴσθησις δὲ συγγενὲς καὶ ἀδελφόν ἐστι διανοίας, ἄλογον λογικῆς, ἐπειδὴ μιᾶς ἄμφω μέρη ψυχῆς ταῦτα. The one human soul, therefore, has two parts, the irrational and the rational. Philo puts this in another way: "Everyone of us is two persons, the animal and the man; and each of these two has a cognate power in the faculties, the seat of which is the soul assigned to it. To the one portion is assigned the vivifying faculty according to which we live; and to the other, the reasoning faculty in accordance with which we are capable of reasoning. Therefore, even the irrational animals partake of the vivifying power; . . . (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 82).

Considered by itself, the ἄλογος νοῦς, which is really sensation (αἴσθησις) and its kindred passions (cf. *Leg. alleg.* II. 6), enjoys the peculiar faculties of imagination and appetite, for Philo elsewhere says, that "a living animal is superior to that which is not a living animal in two points, imagination and appetite" (*Leg. alleg.* I. 30), whilst man has in addition the possessive, progenitive, reasoning, comprehending, and many other powers, in virtue of the rational mind (cf. *Leg. alleg.* II. 22 f.). There is in the human soul another power akin to these, the power of sensation (*Leg. alleg.* II. 23). This latter is the faculty of the earthly νοῦς, or irrational part of the soul which, as is elsewhere stated, "is divided into seven parts, the senses of seeing, of smelling, of hearing, of tasting, and of touch, the organs of speech, and the organs of generation" (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 168).

Thus then is the νοῦς γεώδης, the γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος, the ἄνθρωπος πλασθείς, considered either apart, or in its relation to the rational mind in man. One remark may yet be added for a better understanding of Philo's anthropology. The irrational animals are said to partake neither of virtue nor of vice, because they are devoid of the νοῦς and λόγος (*Op. mund.* 73); but evil and vice is the result of the conflict between the irrational, or sensual, nature and the rational, or heavenly; or, as Philo states it repeatedly, of the want of proper subordination of the former to the latter (cf. *Mut. nom.* 33-34).

b) The Heavenly Man—οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος.

The heavenly man, of whom alone it is said that he is made according to the image of God, Philo defines as entirely immaterial

"an idea or genus or seal, perceptible only by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, imperishable by nature" (*Op. mund.* 134; *Leg. alleg.* I. 31). In "Questions and Solutions" (Yonge, Works of Philo, IV, 285, from the Latin of Aucher) Philo asks for the distinction between the man who was created and the man who was made after the image of God, and makes the reply: "This man was created as perceptible to the senses and in similitude of a being appreciable only by the intellect; but he who in respect to his form is intellectual and incorporeal, is the similitude of the archetypal model as to appearance, and he is the form of the principal character; but this is the word of God, the first beginning of all things, the original species, or the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe." Philo here comments on Gen. 2, 7, and hence he distinguishes in the first individual man the two elements, the earthly and the heavenly. For in another passage he describes the rational faculty as "a certain representation and character of the divine faculty, which Moses calls by its proper name an image, showing by his language that God is the archetypal pattern of the rational nature, and that man is the imitation of him, and the image formed after his model; not meaning by man that animal of a double nature, but the most excellent species of the soul which is called mind or reason" (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 83).

Again, when speaking of the god-likeness of the individual man, our author emphasizes that the likeness does not exist in the body—for neither has God a human form, nor is the body of man god-like—but in the dominant νοῦς of the soul, "for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model" (*Op. mund.* 69).

But what is this primitive model, this universal archetype? "The image of God is his most ancient word," answers Philo (*De Confus. ling.* 146). The λόγος θεοῦ is not only the model of the human copy, so that the latter can be called μίμημα θείας εἰκόνος, but the Logos is the archetypal seal of all things created; in other words, it is the νοητὸς κόσμος (*Op. mund.* 25). For, as we have noted repeatedly, God first created the ideal world in his divine Reason, and consequently the ideal world can be identified with

the Logos of God (*Op. mund.* 20). Again Philo speaks of the Logos as God's instrument in creation (*De Migr. Abrah.* 6);[17] that it is above all the world and is the most ancient and most universal of all things created (*Leg. alleg.* III. 175); yea, in relation to man it is the archetypal ideal man, and men are "sons of one and the same father, and he not mortal but immortal, the man of God (*ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ*), who being the reason (*λόγος*) of the everlasting God" (*De Confus. ling.* 41).

Under these aspects the divine Logos bears an almost hypostatic character, like the *σοφία* of the Wisdom literature; in fact, Philo identifies the wisdom of God with the Logos (*Leg. alleg.* I. 65). The confusion of Philo's Logos doctrine, pointed out succinctly by Kennedy,[18] need not concern us here, since the one and chief conception of the Logos, not as a personal being, but as the reason or thought or the word of God, serves as the model for the human mind, the *ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος*.

Our author makes an interesting distinction, when he explains the relation between the human copy and the divine archetype. Allegorizing about the two birds (Gen. 15, 10), he calls them *δύο λόγοι*, and adds: "One of them being the archetypal pattern and above us, and the other being the copy of the former and abiding among us. And Moses calls the one which is above us the image of God, and the one which abides among us the impression of that image. 'For,' says he, 'God made man,' not an image, but 'after an image' (Gen. 1, 27). So that the mind which is in each of us, which is in reality and truth the man, is a third image proceeding from the Creator. But the intermediate one is a model of the one and a copy of the other" (*Quis. rer. div. her.* 230-231). Accordingly the mind in each of us (*καθ' ἕκατον ἡμῶν*) is not created directly after the archetypal divine Logos, which is the mind *ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς*, but after the generic *νοῦς*, which was made first *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ*, before the rational species, the *λόγον ἔχουσα εἴδη* (*Leg. alleg.* I. 22). Alluding to that first creation of man, Philo says:

[17] Yet Philo elsewhere excludes the help of an independent outside agent, saying that in the beginning God made use of no one but himself—*οὐδενὶ δὲ παρακλείτῳ—τίς γὰρ ἦν ἕτερος—μόνῳ δὲ αὐτῷ χρησάμενος ὁ θεός.* (Op. mund. 23). This refers to the ideal creation.

[18] Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, London 1919, 162-177.

"As the image was modelled according to God, so man was modelled according to the image, which thus received the power and character of the model" (*Leg. alleg.* III. 96).

This distinction of Philo's anthropology is important for his interpretation of Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7 and similar texts. However, in the wider scope of his moral allegories the comparison between the divine image and individual man is drawn directly, to emphasize the dignity of man's rational nature. Thus, for instance, in *De Confus. ling.* 146 Philo moralizes in this fashion: "Even if there be not as yet any one who is worthy to be called a son of God, nevertheless let him labor earnestly to be adorned according to his first-born word. . . . For which reason I was induced a little while ago to praise the principle of those who said, 'we are all one man's sons.' For even if we are not yet suitable to be called the sons of God, still we may deserve to be called the children of his eternal image, of his most sacred word."

The exalted character of man's rational nature is made clear in another consideration, to which allusion has already been made, namely, in explanation of God's breathing into man the breath of life, whereby he becomes a living soul (cf. *Leg. alleg.* II. 39-42). There the vivifying of man's earthly nature is described as taking place through the rational part of the soul. More frequently, however, Philo overlooks the details of this process, as he understands it of the first generic creation of man, and deals directly with God's action upon the rational mind.

The constitution of this dominant faculty in man Philo defines in connection with Gen. 2, 7, when he says: "Others who say that our mind is a portion of the ethereal nature, have by this assertion attributed to man a kindred with the air; but the great Moses has not named the species of the rational soul by a title resembling that of any created thing, but has pronounced it an image of the divine and invisible being, making it a coin as it were of sterling metal, stamped and impressed with the seal of God, the impression of which is the eternal word. For says Moses 'God breathed into man's face the breath of life,' so that it follows of necessity, that he that received the breath must be fashioned after the model of him that is sent forth" (*De Plant.* 18-19). Again referring to the same Mosaic text (Gen. 2, 7), he says: "The faculty which is

common to us with the irrational animals, has blood for its essence. But that, having flowed from the rational fountain, is spirit (πνεῦμα),"(*Quod det. pot. insid.* 83). This rational fountain is previously said to be God—ὁ θεός, ἡ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου λόγου πηγή (ibid. 82). The breath of God (πνεῦμα) is therefore called the essence of life (ibid. 81; also *De Spec. leg.* IV. 123), the life of the higher soul, for "the soul of man he (Moses) names the spirit, meaning by the term man not the compound being, . . . but that god-like creation by which we reason" (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 84). Hence Philo rightly calls man the "*only heavenly plant on earth*" (ibid. 85), since God breathed into him from above something of his own own divine nature (ibid. 86); the πνεῦμα, namely, is a "ray emitted from the blessed and thrice-happy nature of God" (*De Spec. leg.* IV. 123); cf. also *De Somniis* I. 30 ff.).

In this manner then was the first-created νοῦς of the generic man of the ranks of the heavenly beings, and Philo properly applies to it the term οὐράνιος to denote its participation in the divine nature; for "he who is inspired from above is thought worthy, having received a portion of heavenly and divine inheritance, being in fact the most pure mind, disregarding not merely the body, but also the other fragments of the soul" (*Quis rer. div. her.* 64; cf. ibid. 182 f.). Consequently the οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος is the rational generic νοῦς. For when Philo answers the question, to which man was addressed the command in Paradise (Gen. 2, 16), he again makes a definite distinction between the earthly mind, the factitious man, whom he calls Adam, and him created according to an image, who is not earthly but heavenly—οὐ γήϊνος ἀλλ' οὐράνιος (*Leg. alleg.* I. 90).

What has been said of these generic prototypes of man's twofold nature, theoretically holds good also in the composite individual and forms the basis of Philo's ethical doctrines. Thus to explain the plural verb in the prohibition (Gen. 2, 17) he says: "Very properly therefore does Moses address reason alone on the point of the acquisition of virtue. But for indulgence in vice man requires many things, soul and reason and the external senses of the body" (*Leg. alleg.* I. 104). So also does human experience warrant the distinction of a twofold species of man, "the one being the race of those who live by the divine spirit of reason—θείῳ πνεύματι

λογισμῷ—the other of those who exist according to blood and the pleasures of the flesh" (*Quis rer. div. her.* 57). The ambition which Philo holds out to us therefore is to let the energy of the mind entirely overcome and control the vigor of the body, till the latter is as it were dissolved in the soul and becomes one species with the soul and itself acceptable to God (*De Mut. nom.* 33-34).

3. *Difficulties in Philo in Reference to his Anthropology.*

Before we sum up the characteristic terms and their meaning in Philo's anthropology to facilitate a comparison with the Pauline terminology and concepts, it may be well to add a few examples of the alleged contradictions in Philo, bearing on our study. For apart from the textual and contextual evidence for the foregoing interpretation of Philo's commentary on the Mosaic account of man's creation, the many contradictions, which critics claim to have discovered in the works of the Alexandrian exegete, should make us suspect that possibly some of these difficulties are not at all to be attributed to the learned writer, but rather to the misinterpretation of his critics. It will sufficiently serve our purpose to draw attention to some of the inconsistencies the critics become guilty of in trying to explain the so-called contradictions in Philo, which have reference to his anthropology.

A striking example is given us by J. G. Müller,[19] who undertakes to refute a fourfold contradiction in Philo, as discovered by Gfrörer. These difficulties are noted by Müller as follows: In the passage in which Philo comments on Gen. 1, 26 f. he interprets the creation of the ideal man, whereas on the sixth day we should expect a sense-perceptible creation, and only later that of the sense-perceptible man. The point of the argument becomes clear from Müller's refutation. Admitting the case as stated, he argues that in the whole context there is mention of the ideal man in such a way as to pertain to the earthly man as well. But Müller also misses the point of Philo's explanation by not determining the relation of the ideal man to the earthly man. For he adds, that if Philo

[19] Müller, *Des Juden Philo Buch von d. Weltschöpfung*, Berlin 1841, 263 f.

Cf. Gfrörer, *Krit. Geschichte d. Urchristenthums*, Stuttgart 1838, I. 406 f.

made a mistake, it was one of arrangement and not a contradiction. But how else could our author have disposed his expositions, if he wished to remain faithful to the sacred text? Müller, moreover, admitting both the male and female nature in the ideal man, also identifies the ideal with the earthly generic man by having recourse to Philo's own words, that the species are contained in the genus (*Op. mund.* 76).[20] The true meaning of this genus we have already discussed (cf. p. 32 ff.).

A second contradiction: The ideal man could not be created after the animals. To this objection Müller answers correctly, that Philo speaks about the ideal man only then when he comes to speak about man at all. But in Gen. 1, 26 f. Philo is not concerned merely with the generic ideal man, but with the formation of the first historical man Adam out of the two generic components, the heavenly and the earthly man.

The third contradiction consists in this, according to Gfrörer, that if mention were made here (Gen. 1, 27) of the real earthly man, he would have to be created by the Logos. Müller retorts by referring to the Philonic principle: God creates through the Logos. Leaving aside the difficult Logos-problem, we resort to Philo, who in connection with the ποιήσωμεν of Gen. 1, 26 does assume co-operators in explaining the creation in question (cf. above, p. 25).

A fourth contradiction is said to exist between the above passage about the co-operators in the creation of man and the doctrine of the fall of the spirits in their pre-existence; for if the human souls are fallen spirits, then evil did not first arise from the mixed nature of man as a result of the co-operation of the demiurges in the creation. Müller answers properly that evil is not a result of the demiurges, but rather that demiurges were employed in man's creation on account of the evil; and he might have added that Philo never maintained categorically that human souls are fallen spirits. The evil arises from the conflict between the νοητόν and the αἰσθητον in man, as Philo points out in contradistinction to previously created things (*Op. mund.* 73-74). This difficulty will again be touched upon below.

In his classic on Philo, Siegfried does not enter into discussions about contradictory passages, but merely points them out. Thus,

[20] Müller, op. cit. 268 f.

for example, the problem we have several times referred to, because it is one of the decisive points of our interpretation, is left to stand without further comment. Namely, Siegfried identifies the ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος with the γενικός, yet places side by side Philo's seemingly opposite statements, that the οὐράνιος is neither male nor female, and that the γενικός is both male and female.[21]

When Zeller[22] refers the κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος—ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ (*De Conf. ling.* 41) to the oriental Urmensch, it appears to be stretching terms too far, since in the passage in question only a spiritual being, the Logos, is described anthropomorphically.

It is best to note in this connection that there is evidently a passage (*De Conf. ling.* 146), where Philo lapses in giving to the Logos of God the title κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, which phrase in accordance with his explicit explanations elsewhere (cf. above, p. 39 f.) can only be applied to the generic νοῦς, the higher soul in man. The insistence of Billings[23] on the identification of the Logos with the ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος on the ground of this one passage (the ἀδιαφοροῦντα of § 62 does not imply identity) in face of the numerous texts to the contrary, is not in harmony with his otherwise scholarly dissertation.

But again, that Philo should identify the ideal man with the νοῦς as well as with the Logos[24] is rather an identification on Zeller's part, because the two, the ideal man and the Logos, can easily be confused, since they both have the same spiritual nature.

Drummond[25] explains another of Zeller's Philonic inconsistencies by correctly applying the word νοῦς in Philo both to the faculty "which receives impressions (also in brutes) through the senses," as well as to the higher part of the soul, the νοῦς ἐξαίρετος. "The higher and lower meaning thus attaching to the word mind may serve to explain 'one of the numerous contradictions in the anthropology of Philo' to which Zeller calls attention." (Cf. Zeller, op. cit. III, 2, 398.)

This gives the solution of another of Zeller's difficulties, namely

[21] Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, Jena 1875, 242.
[22] Zeller, *Philosophie d. Griechen*[3], Leipzig 1881, III. 2, 377.
[23] Billings, *Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, Chicago 1919, 38 f.
[24] Zeller, op. cit. 389 note.
[25] Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, London 1888, I. 322.

that Philo in one place conceives the essence of the soul as material, in another as immaterial: "So stark aber hiemit der Unterschied des Geistes von den übrigen Bestandteilen der menschlichen Natur betont wird, so weiss sich doch auch unser Philosoph von materialistischen Vorstellungen über das Wesen der Seele nicht ganz frei zu halten; in demselben Augenblick indem er den Geist vom Leib unterscheidet, sagt er wieder, er sei ein Einfluss jenes Aethers, aus welchem der Himmel und die Gestirne gebildet seien."[26] In the passages on which Zeller bases his reasoning, Philo distinguishes merely between body and soul (*σῶμα—ψυχή*). But we have seen above, that the soul is said to consist of two portions, the *νοῦς γεώδης* and the *νοῦς ἐξαίρετος*, the one material and the other incorporeal. When God endows man with life, by breathing into his face the *πνεῦμα*, this process can be described as taking place directly on man's soul (as in *Spec. leg.* IV. 123), or mediately through the higher or rational portion of the soul. (Cf. above p. 35 f.). In either case, in order that the earthly or brute soul share in the divinely-bestowed life-principle, the contact must be conceived to be in some way material. Hence Philo also here is not guilty of a contradiction, but at most of a certain looseness of expression. For to solve the mystery of the operation of spirit on matter has neither been granted to Philo.

When Drummond comes to speak of Philo's higher anthropology he also meets with difficulties; for he says, that Philo's acceptance of Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul disappears when he speaks of the creation of man and the communication to him of the divine spirit. And here it cannot be explained how Philo argued.[27] His distinction of a higher and lower *νοῦς* is nearer the solution than Drummond surmised, because the higher mind, the *οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος*, was part of the pre-created *κόσμος νοητός*, and Philo understands Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7 only of the combination of the higher or heavenly mind with the lower and with the body on the sixth day. This also explains another disturbing difficulty,[28] that "some things in Gen. are said of the ideal man, whilst others are applicable only to the concrete representative." Drummond takes the "ideal or generic man" in the strict sense as the combination of the "idea of mind" and the "idea of sensation," wholly

[26] Zeller, op. cit. 396.
[27] Drummond, op. cit. II. 277.
[28] Drummond, op. cit. II. 276.

immaterial, whilst the "earthly" concrete man was an imperfect copy of this heavenly archetype.[29] That Drummond also identifies the ideal with the generic man, is evident from this explanation:[30] "Agreeably to this doctrine (nothing perceptible without incorporeal pattern), he maintained that the generic man was created first, and subsequently the species known as Adam (*Leg. alleg.* II. 4; CW II. 13). The creation of the former was indicated in Scripture by the use of the word 'made,' the latter by the word 'moulded' (Gen. 1, 27 ἐποίησεν; 2, 7 ἔπλασεν). The genus was made 'according to the image of God,' the species was formed out of clay, into which God breathed the breath of life."

Similar difficulties are illustrated in a more recent study of Philo,[31] where another series of "contradictions" can be accounted for as a mere misunderstanding of Philo's views. According to Heinisch a threefold contradiction is contained in the following statements of Philo: Man, because of his mixed nature, was created by God in cooperation with the angels; yet God created the animals that are certainly much worse than man. Then we are told (*Op. mund.* 134-135) that Gen. 1, 26 f. does not at all treat of the creation of the real man, but only of the ideal man, since Gen. 2, 7 first speaks of the real man. Hence the threefold contradiction, as Heinisch sees it: 1) The ideal man (Gattungsbegriff) cannot be created by both God and the angels, because he is an idea. 2) Likewise God cannot, according to Philo's view, call the real man into existence, just as little as the animals, lest he become contaminated with matter. This creation belongs to the Logos, who separates God and matter. 3) If in Gen. 1, 27 the ideal man is meant, then it is wrong to say that the animals were created before him to serve him, since nothing serves an idea, and Philo asserts elsewhere that all ideas existed simultaneously in the divine Logos.

As to the first objection, we have seen that not the ideal man alone, but the combination of the higher and lower nature in man, of the rational and of the brute parts of the soul—the one ideal, the other earthly—is spoken of in Philo's explanation of Gen. 1,

[29] Ibid. 275.

[30] Ibid. 275.

[31] Heinisch, *Einfluss Philos auf d. älteste christl. Exegese*, Münster i. W. 1909, 118.

26 f. Against the second objection stands the express view of Philo, that plants and brutes (material things, therefore) are not evil—neither good nor bad—*τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὔτ' ἀρετῆς οὔτε κακίας μετέχει· ὥσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα ἄλογα* (*Op. mund.* 73). Hence there was no danger of pollution in the material creation, evil resulting alone from the conflict in the mixed nature of man. Philo's reasons for employing cooperators in the creation of composite man are enumerated in *Op. mund.* 72-76 and *De Fuga* 68-70. The third objection is very logical, but based on the false premise that in Gen. 1, 27 an ideal man is said to be created, whereas there is mention of the real historical man Adam.

In another recent study of Philo a similar difficulty is left to stand as an inconsistency, where our previous interpretation offers a ready solution. Kennedy [32] concludes: "Occasionally he (Philo) seems to presuppose a human *νοῦς*, whose origin he does not explain." Philo indeed mentions and also accounts for the origin of two kinds of *νοῦς*, the *νοῦς γεώδης* and the *νοῦς ἐξαίρετος* or *ἡγεμονικός*, these being the lower and the higher parts of the soul respectively. By not recognizing this distinction the same scholar finds it impossible to justify Philo's description of the divine inbreathing of the principle of life into man; and consequently must be struck by "the fluidity of Philo's conceptions" and his "oscillation of ideas." [33]

Another student of Philo [34] has struggled with the seeming confusion in the Alexandrian's anthropology and felt obliged to take a stand against the interpretation of Drummond in regard to the two types or races of men. In his own argumentation, however, Bailey so obviously misses the essential distinction of Philo's reasoning, that he well serves as another illustration of how easily a superficial study of the Philonic terminology will lead to contradictory conclusions. For Bailey the ideal man of Gen. 1, 27 is the Logos, or the prototype of man and the image of God, confusedly thought of by Philo.[35] But when this critic lines up and compares a number of passages bearing on the two genera of man,

[32] Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, London 1919, 87.

[33] Ibid. 84 f.

[34] Bailey, *Does Hellenism Contribute Constituent Elements to Paul's Christology?*, Chicago 1905, 22.

he arrives at the remarkable conclusion that "an examination of the above passages indicates that Philo held at least three distinguishable conceptions concerning the relation of Gen. 1, 27 and 2, 7." [36] It is needless to refute this assertion; still it is noteworthy that in two of the three conceptions, despite his unfounded implications, Bailey agrees that both Gen. 1, 27 and 2, 7 are interpreted of the historical man.

It is clear that the "heavenly man" problem in Philo is obscured by the failure to grasp the trend of his anthropology. That a satisfactory solution is still wanting, has been expressed by a recent writer in *Biblica* in these words: [37] "Quid vero in concreto per hominem coelestem intellexerit Philo, nesciunt definiri critici, id solum unanimiter asserentes conceptum illum maximopere fluctuare." If then we have in the foregoing chapters established Philo's definite concept of the heavenly man, the way is open to a satisfactory comparison with the parallel term in St. Paul.

We sum up and then proceed to the second main part of our problem—the conceptions of St. Paul in 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. and their relation to Philo. The net results of the foregoing study in their direct bearing on our problem may be briefly given as follows.

Philo distinguishes between a heavenly and an earthly man. But the *οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος*, the *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς*, is the *νοῦς ἐξαίρετος* or *ἡγεμονικός*, the rational soul in man; whilst the *γήϊνος*, the *πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος*, is the *νοῦς γεώδης*, the brute soul in man. Thus both the heavenly man and the earthly man in Philo are not two separate persons, but the complementary portions of the *ψυχή*, the human soul. The higher portion of the soul has its name *οὐράνιος* from the fact that it belongs to the heavenly creation of the first day, for it is ideal, incorporeal, is made according to the image of God, which is the Logos, and participates of the divine *πνεῦμα*. It is called "man," apart from the *γήϊνος* or earthly portion, because it forms the essential and characteristic element of human nature. It is said to be created first, in as far as the ideal or incorporeal creation preceded in order of importance the real and material, although in time all creation was one. The lower portion, the "earthly man," is so called, in contradistinction with its higher

[35] Ibid. 22 f.

[36] Ibid. 24.

[37] Vitti, Christus Adam, in Biblica 1926, 142.

spiritual complement, because it is said to consist of earthly, material substance, and is the most important part of the ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητός, the human body being entirely subject and much inferior to this brute soul. And because according to Philo's ethical standard the animal body of man ranks only as the slave and tool of the brute soul, it is this latter portion, the νοῦς γεώδης, which merited for the first individual man the name Adam, i. e. earth.

In having shown that Philo's "heavenly man" idea did not originate from a double creation theory, and that therefore St. Paul could not have borrowed from him, it would be precipitate to conclude that no connection exists between the two great contemporaries. The whole scope of the noble-minded Alexandrian, the ethico-religious import of his extensive allegorization on the divinely revealed Law and his persistent striving to point out to his groping Hellenistic age the way to true happiness,—this is too near the aim of the great missionary of the Gentiles to preclude—in the face of similar terminology—all possibility of interdependence. The position of the notion of πνεῦμα in Philo's religious speculation lends itself much more readily to a comparison with St. Paul's usage of the term. The search after the true God, the elevation of man by a total conquest of his lower nature through the rational, divinely inspired faculty of the soul, the attainment of happiness by an intimate union with God—these are ideals that give warmth and vigor to Philo's words. Here it is where he approaches the Christian idea of St. Paul, and in this phase of Philo's anthropology may we hope to find light for a better understanding of the Pauline terminology of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. The "heavenly man" of Philo, as we have learned to know him in the foregoing pages, is the corner-stone of his ethico-religious philosophy. So also in St. Paul the Heavenly Man, in our passage, is the centre and all-important subject of the parenetic conclusion to the doctrinal content of the entire chapter.

Bearing in mind, then, the frequent emphasis Philo places on the character of the πνεῦμα, the divine breath, which not only gave life to the combined faculties of man, but as a divine ray or emanation makes man share in the very nature of the divinity and enables him to rise to a most intimate union with God, we are prepared to investigate into the true meaning of our passage 1 Cor. 15, 45-47.

III.

Pauline Terminology and Concepts in 1 Cor. 15, 45-47.

The results of the foregoing study lead to several conclusions which answer, in part, the questions left unsolved by critics (cf. above, p. 15) anent the problem of a possible relation between St. Paul and Philo. The parallelism of terminology no longer appears so striking. In Philo the ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιος is incorporeal, the rational mind, whilst in St. Paul the ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is the Christ. Moreover, St. Paul calls the Heavenly Man the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, but Philo says expressly that the name Adam cannot be applied to the οὐράνιος, because Adam means earth, and belongs to the γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος. Hence where Philo treats of one Adam only, St. Paul distinguishes two, so that the parallelism is entirely destroyed, and a reference to the "heavenly man" in both authors seems to be merely accidental.

However, a closer study of St. Paul's terminology is required to set forth definitely the difference in concepts between the Apostle and the Alexandrian philosopher, and, where possible, to reveal whatever points both may have in common. For just as the anthropology of Philo could be analyzed and viewed more clearly under several distinct terms and concepts, so also will the Pauline terminology and connected ideas become clearer when studied, not alone in their immediate context, but in connection with the whole range of his teaching.

1. *Text and Context of 1 Cor. 15, 45-47.*

a) The Context.

The citation from Gen. 2, 7 in our passage (1 Cor. 15, 45) may appear somewhat unexpected, since the Apostle is not in the present context concerned with man's creation, but with quite another topic. Some among the Christian community at Corinth, whose first faith had already become tainted by adherence, or reversion, to pagan associations, were harrassed by the rationalistic doubt, whether the dead rise again. This was by no means the least of the problems submitted to St. Paul for explanation, and

he undertakes to reply to this doubt; for here as on other occasions (Acts 17, 18; 23, 6, etc.) he defends the resurrection of the dead with an emphasis that is in itself a most potent and winning argument for belief in this doctrine. The whole Gospel of the redemption depends on it; the divine personality of Christ stands or falls by it. No wonder, then, that St. Paul should hark back to it so frequently and on this occasion devote an entire chapter to its consideration.

As among the first truths of the same Gospel which he had preached to them before, he recalls to their minds the death and resurrection of Christ (vv. 1-4), which fact is supported by most reliable testimony (vv. 5-8), and points to the conclusion inherent in this doctrine, that the dead shall also rise (vv. 12-19). The belief in the resurrection of the dead is based on our intimate union with Christ, we being members of his mystical body and becoming, as it were, of one nature with him. As his body, permeated and identified with his divine nature, did not undergo corruption, but in its glorious resurrection triumphed over sin and its natural consequences; so we too, by sharing the triumph and glory of Christ, shall one day rise again. Behold, therefore, what follows from the denial of the resurrection of the dead: Christ did not rise; our preaching is a fraud and your faith an illusion, and our testimony to his resurrection a falsehood; aye, more, if Christ be not risen, then your belief in him was of no avail and your sins were never forgiven, and those who died in Christ have perished, so that we, finally, are miserable dupes for believing in him.

The Apostle well knows the strength of these arguments, that such conclusions will never be admitted by his readers. Hence he can safely construct his explanation of the resurrection on the fact that Christ is risen (vv. 20-28). That Christ is called the first-fruits (ἀπαρχή) of the dead, implies the contradistinction to a general resurrection; for Christ died that we may rise: that was the purpose of the incarnation. "For by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead. And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive" (vv. 21-22). The law of solidarity holds good as well in the spiritual as in the natural order. All born of Adam must die; all regenerated in Christ shall live; or rather, all living in Christ shall be revivified.

In the present context the resurrection of the just alone is spoken

of, because it is the point of the argument that their resurrection is a consequence of their union with Christ in life and death. Hence the proper order is, that Christ be the first-fruits and afterwards at the general resurrection follow all that are Christ's and that are to share the glory of his coming (v. 23). This shall be the end, the time when the whole mystical body of Christ shall have triumphed over the world and Satan, when by virtue of the general resurrection even the last enemy, death, shall have been overcome, and when Christ shall have handed his kingdom over to his heavenly Father.

Two other practical arguments "ad hominem" are adduced by the Apostle. What of the practice of receiving baptism for the dead, if the dead do not rise (v. 29)? Whatever may have been that practice, or St. Paul's attitude towards it, the argument received its weight from the belief of the Corinthian community in its efficacy in behalf of the departed.[1] Furthermore, why do we expose ourselves to constant dangers, if not in the hope of a future resurrection? To what good were Paul's struggles at Ephesus, familiar to his readers, if no reward after this life is in store, if the dead do not rise? Then it were far more reasonable to live in the manner of the Epicureans, to eat and drink and enjoy the pleasures of this life as long as we can (vv. 30-32). Surely, the readers admitted the falsity of such a doctrine, and the Apostle could count on their better judgment. Still, the warning is in place, not to be seduced; rather to heed Menander's old saying, "Evil communications corrupt good manners" (v. 33). For it must be said to their humiliation, that some have need of reform, since the knowledge in which they pride themselves is not the knowledge of God (v. 34).

With v. 35 St. Paul takes up a new argumentation against such

[1] Ingenuous is the solution of this difficult passage, suggested by Gutjahr (*Zwei Briefe an die Kor.*, Graz 1922 ad loc.). The preposition ὑπέρ is also used to express motive or purpose—in view of; so that the sense of this passage could be: If there be no resurrection, how foolishly do they act who accept baptism in view of the dead, i. e. knowing they shall belong to the dead and never rise again! This interpretation would bring out more strikingly the antithesis between the Christian consciousness and the effects of baptism as the portal of life on the one hand, and the denial of the resurrection and of eternal life on the other.

as doubt the resurrection of the dead, because they are unable to explain it. They ask: "How do the dead rise again? or with what manner of body shall they come?" Such queries grate on the strong faith of the Apostle and provoke the impatient rebuke: "Senseless man" (ἄφρων)! More calmly he proceeds with a direct explanation by analogies, which not only remove the seeming contradiction in the idea that a dead body should rise again, but also take away the repulsiveness of corruption itself (vv. 36-37). Look at the seed, which is sown and which must first decay before there sprouts forth new life, each plant in the proper form God gives to it. Two points are here indicated and developed in the following verses, namely, that the risen bodies also differ from the mortal bodies, and moreover, that the resurrection bodies are different among themselves by preserving a certain individuality in external appearance (vv. 38-41). As not all flesh is the same flesh, but that of men, or of beasts, or of birds, or of fishes; as there are bodies celestial and terrestrial, each with its own glory and perfection; as the brightness of the sun and the moon and the stars varies in intensity—so also is the resurrection of the dead. Corruption and dishonor and weakness shall give place to incorruption and glory and power (vv. 42-44a). The two opposite states of the body are expressed by the terms ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. "What is sown a natural body doth rise a spiritual body." Evidently the σῶμα ψυχικόν as well as the σῶμα πνευματικόν are here not bodies merely, but are taken as animated by their respective life-principles: the one by the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual faculties of the soul (ψυχή) as the principle of the natural life; the other by the divine πνεῦμα as the principle of supernatural life. Mortal man shall die and rise a spiritual man.

The text of our problem connects directly with the preceding as an additional confirmation of the conclusion, "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body" (v. 44b). For "*Even so it is written, the first man Adam became 'a living soul': the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual which is first, but the natural,* [*and*] *then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, earthly; the second man is from heaven.*"[2] (vv. 45-47).

[2] Translation from WVSS.

b) The Text.

The Greek text [3] and the Vulgate version [4] render our passage as follows:

45. οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται· "ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν·" ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν.	45. sicut scriptum est: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem.
46. ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν.	46. Sed non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale est; deinde quod spiritale.
47. ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.	47. Primus homo de terra, terrenus; secundus homo de coelo, caelestis.

The variant readings are of no essential importance, as they do not in the least influence the meaning. They either add or omit what is already implied by other members of the text.

v. 45. The reading *καθῶς* (sicut) stands for *οὕτως καί* (sic est) in F G Vulg. Aug.
B K and a few minuscles omit *ἄνθρωπος*. So also Bultmann and Lachmann.

v. 47. Many codices insert *ὁ κύριος* after *δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος*: ℵ^{c} A D^{b+c} K L P, the Syrian, Armenian, and Gothic versions, Chrys., Scrivener.
But it is omitted in ℵ B C D* E F G, some minuscles, Vulg., the Coptic and Aethiopic versions. Also by Tert., Cypr., Hilar.
A few texts add *οὐράνιος* at the end to balance the second member with the first: F G Vulg. Ambr. Ambrtr.

With the text of Vogels above agree also the editions of Tischendorf, B. Weiss, v. Soden, Nestle, Hetzenauer, Brandscheid, Weymouth, Oxford, Cambridge, etc.

c) Various Questions Arising from the Text.

Serious difficulties confront us in the interpretation of the text, as has already been partly indicated in outlining the various source-

[3] Edition of H. J. Vogels.

[4] Edition of H. J. White.

theories for the "heavenly man" idea in St. Paul. The chief points of controversy may be summarized in the following questions:

a. Is v. 45b also to be considered as a Scriptural quotation?
b. When did Christ become εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν?
c. To what does τὸ ψυχικόν and τὸ πνευματικόν refer?
d. What is the meaning of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ?

Every phase of the discussion is intimately connected with our problem about the Pauline Heavenly Man, because every word of the text is important for the correct understanding of the Apostle's ideas embodied in the sharply drawn contrast between the first and the last Adam. Preliminary to a more thorough study of the antithesis, as well as a fuller characterization of the Heavenly Man, a short sketch of opposing opinions on the questions will be found helpful toward a clearer presentation of the problem.

It is generally admitted that St. Paul quotes Gen. 2, 7 in v. 45 in order to introduce a proof for the statement in v. 44b: "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body." Some critics, however (Hausrath,[5] Holsten,[6] Brückner,[7] J. Weiss,[8] Holtzmann,[9] etc.), conclude that since v. 45b contains the really decisive proof, the quotation embraces both members of v. 45, so that ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν must be derived from Gen. 1, 26 as v. 45a from Gen. 2, 7 (Philonic parallel!). According to the Tübingen School and its more or less faithful followers, Christ the second Adam was a created being, man like the first Adam, only of a higher order,[10] the pre-existent "heavenly man." Hence the εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν must express the spiritual nature with which this heavenly man was created. But then, how explain v. 46: "But it is not the spiritual which is first, but the natural"? This difficulty is brushed aside by the gratuitous assertion, that St. Paul is here referring to a pre-determined general law in the world's evo-

[5] Hausrath, *Apostel Paulus*, Heidelberg 1872, 164.
[6] Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus*, Berlin 1880, 431.
[7] Brückner, *Entstehung d. paul. Christ.*, Strassburg 1903.
[8] J. Weiss, in *Meyers Kommentar*, I Kor. ad loc. 1910.
[9] Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch d. ntl. Theologie*, Tübingen 1911, II. 61.
[10] Cf. F. C. Baur, *Paulus*, Stuttgart 1845, 628 f.

lution. In the words of Brückner,[11] "Der letzte Adam, will Paulus mit dem gegensätzlichen ἀλλ' οὐ sagen, ist zwar als πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν selbstverständlich vor dem πρῶτος Ἀδάμ 'geworden'; aber er wird gemäss dem allgemeinen Weltenwicklungsgesetze erst als zweiter Mensch vom Himmel kommen, wo er bis dahin verborgen ist." This then is also the meaning of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, as Pfleiderer explains more precisely,[12] that Christ as man did not become a spiritual or heavenly man through the resurrection, but that he is of heavenly origin, and already before his earthly life pre-existed as heavenly man.

Interesting is the solution of Reitzenstein.[13] To obviate the difficulties about the Scriptural quotation, he omits εἰς in v. 45b as a later insertion, suggested by the absence of ἐστίν in what was originally an independent affirmation. However, to explain the origin of this abrupt affirmative construction, he admits is impossible, although an ἄνθρωπος-myth must be in the background. If v. 45b remains without fuller explanation, then v. 46 is also a hidden statement. The ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in somewhat forced correspondence to ἐκ γῆς must denote origin.

More logical is the interpretation of most non-Catholic critics, according to which the εἰς πν. ζωοπ. follows from the contrast ("ex natura oppositorum"), based on Gen. 2, 7 and already indicated in v. 45a by the insertion of πρῶτος and Ἀδάμ into the Septuagint version of the text. The foundation for this contrast Godet[14] considers to have been a truth as well known as Scripture. Feine,[15] Stanley,[16] etc. refer to the Rabbinic tradition that the Messiah is the second Adam. Bachmann[17] supposes a Scripture text which St. Paul had in mind. The majority of interpreters, however, do not postulate a remoter basis at all, but explain the second member as a comment or an expansion of Gen. 2, 7.

Opinions differ again in regard to the period or event in Christ's

[11] Brückner, op. cit. 77.
[12] Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, Leipzig 1890, 117 f.
[13] Reitzenstein, *Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig 1910, 173-175.
[14] Godet, *Commentaire sur la I. Ep. aux Cor.*, Paris 1885, ad loc.
[15] Feine, *Theologie des N. T.*, Leipzig 1919, 226.
[16] Stanley, *Epistles of St. Paul to the Cor.*, London 1865 ad loc.
[17] Bachmann, in *Zahns Kommentar*, Leipzig 1905, 1 Cor. ad loc.

existence when the εἰς πν. ζωοπ. was accomplished. As Alford says,[18] the Incarnation, or the Resurrection, or the Ascension are assumed by some, but "the whole complex of his suffering and triumphant state seems to be embraced in these words." Those that interpret St. Paul's christology in this wise, that according to the Apostle Jesus of Nazareth was predestined to become a divine being (Schnedermann,[19] B. Weiss,[20] Findlay,[21] etc.) see the accomplishment of this prerogative in the resurrection through the elevation of Christ's pre-resurrection body into a spiritual, heavenly body. "Erst in the Auferstehung ist Christus in obigem Sinne (v. 45) der in der Endzeit auftretende Adam (ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ) geworden, sofern er, nachdem er durch den Tod der auch von ihm auf Erden getragenen psychischen Leiblichkeit entledigt, ganz zum πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, und somit auch seine Leiblichkeit eine pneumatische geworden ist. . . ."[22] Edwards argues for the incarnation, because "Christ was essentially the source of all supernatural grace. His Incarnation was the intrusion of a Divine force into humanity."[23] Again according to Godet[24] Christ began to exercise the power of πνεῦμα ζωοπ. at the Incarnation, but this power was suspended by voluntary submission to death, shone forth again in the Resurrection, and was completed by the Ascension.

These interpretations account for v. 46 either as a polemic against Philonic Alexandrianism (Bachmann, Feine), or as emphasis on the two world economies, that of the ψυχή prior to that of the πνεῦμα. Thus the view of Godet is adopted by Findlay:[25] "The Apostle does not share the notion long regarded as orthodox, that humanity was created in a state of moral and physical perfection. . . . Independently of the Fall there must have been progress from an inferior state, the psychic, which he posits as man's point of departure, to a superior state, the spiritual, foreseen and

[18] Alford, *The Greek Testament*, London 1894, 1 Cor. ad loc.
[19] Schnedermann, in *Strack-Zöckler Kom.*, München 1894, 1 Cor. ad loc.
[20] B. Weiss, *Lehrbuch d. bibl. Theol. d. N. T.*, Stuttgart 1903, 295.
[21] Findlay, in *Expositor's Greek Testament*, London 1904, 1 Cor. ad loc.
[22] B. Weiss, op. cit. 295.
[23] Edwards, *Com. on I. Ep. to the Cor.*, New York 1886, 444.
[24] Godet, op. cit. 417.
[25] Findlay, op. cit. ad loc.

determined as man's goal from the first." Beyschlag,[26] arguing from a gradual awakening of conscience and a development of the moral personality in primitive man, sees in v. 46 a statement of "the law of the development of the higher from the lower."

There is also a diversity of opinions regarding the exact meaning of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. As a genetivus qualitatis in antithesis to ἐκ γῆς it denotes the state of Christ's heavenly existence, not in his pre-existence as the "Urmensch" (B. Weiss with the Tübingen School), but in his post-existence as the head of the spiritual mankind, or already as the glorified, risen Christ (Godet, Findlay, etc.). To Somerville "it seems most in accordance with the context to take the words 'from heaven' (ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) as pointing to the nature and origin of the spiritual body with which he is now clothed, for the whole discussion in this passage has reference to his body"; and he further observes in this connection, "Other interpreters of note, such as Gess, Hofmann and Meyer, view the words 'from heaven' as referring to the second coming of Christ in glory, when believers shall receive the resurrection body."[27]

The Catholic interpretation, as it is represented by the recent exegetes MacEvilly,[28] Bisping,[29] Schaefer,[30] Cornely,[31] Prat,[32] etc., also explains v. 45b as a conclusion naturally arising from the antithesis to v. 45a, a typical connotation, suggested by Gen. 2, 7 in the present context, and made absolutely clear to the readers through St. Paul's accommodation of the text by adding πρῶτος and Ἀδάμ. The first Adam at the creation became a living soul, i. e. a body animated by the ψυχὴ ζῶσα, which he transmitted to the human race. So it likewise follows from the hypostatic personality and redemptive mission of Christ, that he became the second Adam, since his life-principle was from the very incarnation and manifestly at his resurrection a life-giving spirit, which he will transmit to the members of the spiritual race. The argument is strengthened by v. 46 and it is prepared by v. 47 for the subsequent paren-

[26] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theology*, Edinburgh 1895, II. 63.
[27] Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edinburgh 1897, 51 f.
[28] MacEvilly, *Exposition of the Ep. of St. Paul*, Dublin 1875, ad loc.
[29] Bisping, *Exegetisches Handbuch z. N. T.*, Münster 1883, ad loc.
[30] Schaefer, *Bücher d. N. T.*, Münster 1883, ad loc.
[31] Cornely, in *Cursus Scripturae S.*, I Cor. ad loc.
[32] Prat, *Theologie de S. Paul*, Paris 1912, I ad loc.

etic corollary. For as in the economy of salvation the natural precedes the spiritual, so the psychic Adam preceded the heavenly Adam, the risen Savior. Being sons of Adam, we all die, because he was of earth, earthly; but regenerated through Christ, we shall live, because he is ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. The meaning of this term is well summed up by Prat:[33] "Il est du ciel par sa nature divine, par sa personalité et par le droit qu'elle lui donne de possider la plénitude de l'Esprit Saint pour lui et pour ceux qui lui sont unis. Et il devient, dans toute la force du terme, homme celeste, esprit vivifiant, au moment où il reçoit en fait, dans son âme et dans son corps, la gloire qui lui est due et où, la redemption achevée, il peut nous associer a cette gloire."

The argumentation of our passage might therefore be briefly summed up in these words: From the creation of Adam, as attested by Genesis, and from the existence of Christ, in whose spiritual divine nature you firmly believe, you must admit not only the existence of a natural body, as was that of the first Adam, but the existence also of a spiritual body, such as Christ, the second Adam, manifested after his resurrection. Why then doubt that our bodies can likewise become spiritual through the power of the life-giving Spirit; and if spiritual, that then our bodies also must rise again? We are indeed of the race of the first Adam, earthly; but that we become children of a spiritual race in the general resurrection, let us be like unto Christ, the heavenly Adam of a spiritual mankind.

In this reasoning the antithesis between

σῶμα ψυχικόν—πρῶτος Ἀδὰμ ἐκ γῆς—ψυχὴ ζῶσα and
σῶμα πνευματικόν—δεύτερος Ἀδὰμ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ—πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν

contains the pivotal terminology. Here must be sought the solution. Are St. Paul's ideas in any way related to those of Philo, or does each writer refer to the οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος in a different sense? The Apostle seems to touch here upon the essentials of anthropology, so that many critics find in the equivalents of σῶμα ψυχικόν a restriction of the idea of human nature to that which Adam possessed before the fall. Perhaps this is doing violence to the Pauline text; yet the attempt is of no serious consequence to

[33] Prat, op. cit. II, 251.

our problem. For the outstanding contrast between the human, earthly nature, which we share, and the spiritual heavenly nature, after which we strive, is little influenced by the theoretic distinction, allowing for the human discrepancy between Adam's pristine state of natural perfection and the weakened condition of his physical and moral faculties which he incurred over and above the loss of the right to the gratuitous gifts, reserved for him on the "tree of life." Essentially Adam was not changed by the fall. As St. Paul could not imply that we must assume a nature, equal to Christ's, to become spiritual just as little can it be intended that the human nature here spoken of is the perfect human nature of Adam in his first innocence. The emphasis rests on the influence the *πνεῦμα* exercises over human nature, on our natural bodies, to render them worthy of their spiritual destiny. It is the inestimable merit of Christ's redeeming death, that he restored to us the heirship to his spiritual kingdom and reinstated us into the influence and operation of the divine Spirit.

However, since our understanding of the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* and of the Heavenly Man depends on the proper distinction with the first Adam, and on a clear definition of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, we must enter upon a closer investigation of this antithesis in the language of St. Paul.

2. *The Pauline Anthropology—ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς.*

The argumentation in 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff., is built up on the seemingly parallel contrasts of

πρῶτος Ἀδάμ	*ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ*
ψυχὴ ζῶσα	*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*
σῶμα ψυχικόν	*σῶμα πνευματικόν*
ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς	*ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*

In what sense the terms on either side of the antithesis are truly parallel or synonymous, what meaning St. Paul wishes to convey by them, and wherein lies the force of the juxtaposition, are questions to be investigated in the following chapters.

"Man from earth earthly" is the first Adam called (1 Cor. 15, 47) who had been endowed with a living soul. The soul—*ψυχή*, so

Reinhard [34] summarizes in a conclusive study, in agreement with other critics, " is in Pauline psychology the principle of the natural sensuous life. It corresponds to the Hebrew נפש. Paul is by no means trichotomist. Psychic consciousness is with him always undivided. Ψυχή and νοῦς, resp. πνεῦμα, are merely two sides of the same substance. He calls the human soul ψυχή when he thinks more of its sense activity; νοῦς in so far as it is the principle of the higher natural life of the spirit." Guided by this distinction, we shall view the Pauline concepts about the earthly man, as he consists of body and soul, under the headings: σῶμα—σάρξ and ψῦχή—νοῦς—πνεῦμα.

a) Σῶμα—σάρξ.

St. Paul speaks of the physical part of man in terms of σῶμα and σάρξ, however in manifold variations of meaning. The essential difference in signification between these two terms is, that σάρξ properly denotes the material substance of the body, the flesh, whilst σῶμα stands for the whole physical organism as the seat of the life-principle.[35] So it is possible to combine the words into one phrase, as σῶμα τῆς σαρκός (Col. 1, 22; 2, 11). The term σάρξ, however, always implies the animated substance of the body, living flesh, not meat (κρέας—1 Cor. 8, 13); and in an expression like σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα (1 Cor. 15, 50) the distinction is not between blood and a bloodless substance. Natural relationship " according to the flesh " is indicated by means of this term; e. g. συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα (Rom. 9, 3); τέκνα τῆς σαρκός (Rom. 9, 8). Thus σάρξ signifies the living human body (Rom. 2, 28; Gal. 6, 13; Eph. 2, 11; 5, 29; Col. 2, 5. 13). In a slightly figurative turn the word is used as in profane literature to characterize man in general—the Hebrew כל בשר—(Gal. 2, 18; Rom. 3, 20; 1 Cor. 1, 29). Occasionally also it emphasizes the physical frailty of human nature (2 Cor. 4, 11; Gal. 4, 13). From here it was an easy step to the ethical notion, whereby in a moral sense the earthly and sensual human nature is opposed to, or compared with, the inner and spiritual man. Thus the Apostle in Col. 2, 11. 12 contrasts the

[34] Reinhard, *Wirken d. Hl. Geistes im Menschen*, FThSt Heft 22 (1918) 13 n. 1.

[35] Zorell, *N. T. Lexicon Graecum*, in loc.; Thayer's *Greek-English Lexicon*, ad σάρξ.

higher life of the Christian dispensation with that under the Pharisaic externalism of the Law in the figure of circumcision of the flesh—*τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός*—and of Christ, i. e. of the spirit. Again, not the descendants of Abraham according to the flesh—*κατὰ σάρκα*—are children of God, but the children of promise (Rom. 4, 1. 2; 9, 8). The worldly wise are called *σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα* (1 Cor. 1, 26) and the wisdom of the world is *σοφία σαρκική* (2 Cor. 1, 12). So likewise St. Paul explains that as followers of Christ the Christians do not wage war according to the flesh, for they do not fight with weapons of the flesh—*ὅπλα σαρκικά* (2 Cor. 10, 3. 4).

This figurative use also shows itself with characteristically Pauline force in the numerous passages where *σάρξ* represents, no longer as in Rom. 7, 25 the seat of the sinful desires, but the source of evil in man. The term is even identified with sin. The warfare between the good and evil natures in man is frequently referred to as the conflict between the *σάρξ* and the *πνεῦμα* (Gal. 5, 17; Rom. 8, 4 ff.; Eph. 2, 3; etc.), where *σάρξ* stands for the evil principle.[36] To be in the flesh—*εἶναι ἐν σαρκί* (Rom. 7, 5; 8, 8) is equivalent to sinfulness.

This equation was interpreted by certain of St. Paul's critics as a return to the dualistic principle of Greek philosophy.[37] The error of such an interpretation shall be seen when we treat of the Pauline doctrine on the elevation and sanctification of man's lower nature.

The vital question here is, does St. Paul use the word *σάρξ* in its literal and restricted meaning, i. e. as the material component element of man, to denote the natural cause of man's sinfulness? [38] In the texts already referred to the term is evidently employed in

[36] Cf. Sokolowski, *Begriffe Geist u. Leben bei Paulus*, Göttingen 1903, 114 f.

[37] Benz, *Ethik d. Apostels Paulus*, BSt XVII (1912), 16 f. This work offers an extensive refutation of the false conclusions of modern critics concerning St. Paul's anthropology. So also Schauf, Sarx, NtlAbh XI, 1-2 (1924).

[38] Heinrici, repudiating the inference of dualism in St. Paul (*Paulinische Probleme*, Leipzig 1914, 54), adds: "Wenn daher das Fleisch als Sitz und Triebkraft der sündhaften und Gott widerstehenden Begierden beschrieben wird, so ist er nicht als sündhaft geschaffen, sondern als sündhaft geworden anzusehen." For a fuller refutation see Schauf, op. cit. 174-192.

a figurative, ethical sense. This meaning becomes more clear when the term is studied together with the notion of the word σῶμα. For σῶμα as the more comprehensive term is used particularly in the sense of the outer man in the familiar contrasts of σῶμα and ψυχή (1 Thess. 5, 23) and of σῶμα and πνεῦμα (1 Cor. 5, 3; 7, 34; 1 Thess. 5, 23). Σῶμα is the vessel of the higher spiritual element (2 Cor. 4, 7. 10; 5, 1-8; 12, 2. 3). Equal to the ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος of 2 Cor. 4, 16, the word stands here for the mortal and corruptible coil of the immortal soul, in which sense also σάρξ is often its equivalent. This can be seen by comparing, for instance, 1 Cor. 5, 3 with Col. 2, 5, where both words are employed respectively to denote the human body; or 2 Cor. 4, 10. 11; Eph. 5, 28. 29, where σάρξ substitutes σῶμα in the following verse. Yet whilst in the sense of material body the two terms are synonymous, the word σῶμα has a wider range and implies the whole organism, and thus can be applied to other creatures as well; e. g. to plants and stars (1 Cor. 15, 38. 40; cf. Hebr. 2, 14). In a figurative sense σῶμα refers also to the mystic organism, the Church, as the organic union of the faithful with Christ (Rom. 12, 5; 1 Cor. 12, 12. 27; Col. 1, 18; Eph. 1, 23; etc.). Again σῶμα at times replaces the personal pronoun and by way of synechdoche stands for the personality spoken of (2 Cor. 10, 10; 1 Cor. 6, 19).

The terms σῶμα and σάρξ, then, in expressing the material, earthly part of man, fitly describe his origin ἐκ γῆς and justify the qualification χοϊκός (1 Cor. 15, 47). However, when the earthly substance received in creation the breath of life, man became a living soul—ψυχὴ ζῶσα.

b) Ψυχή—νοῦς—πνεῦμα.

St. Paul uses the term ἔξω ἄνθρωπος (2 Cor. 4, 16) as correlative of ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (2 Cor. 4, 16; Rom. 7, 22; Eph. 3, 17) for outer and inner man respectively. For the outer or material man we have seen the terms σῶμα and σάρξ employed. Now applied to the inner man, the human soul—ψυχή—and its functions we meet in St. Paul such terms as νοῦς, συνείδησις, καρδία, πνεῦμα. Without trying to be exhaustive in accounting for their various occurrences in the Pauline literature, we shall attempt to discern in general the meaning which attaches to each term.

Most general among these is the concept of νοῦς. In Rom. 7, 22 f. it stands synonymous with ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, the inner or spiritual part of man, the seat of moral consciousness and tendency. Literally it is the power of reason, mind (1 Cor. 1, 10); and in relation to law the exercise of this faculty becomes an ethical function (Rom. 12, 2; 14, 5), like that of conscience—συνείδησις—in the natural man, who has the law written in his heart—καρδία (Rom. 2, 15); or Rom. 13, 5 where there is question of a positive human law. Whenever reason—νοῦς—does not obey that law, it is said to be foolish or vain (Rom. 1, 28; Eph. 4, 17); or when it follows the carnal nature it is νοῦς τῆς σαρκός (Col. 2, 18).

Now similarly, and more frequently, νοῦς denotes the ethico-religious agent or arbiter in reference to the revealed Law of the Gospel. For in the Christian there must take place a renewal of the mind—ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός, a transformation from worldlimindedness to a seeking of the will of God (Rom. 12, 2; Eph. 4, 23). The same νοῦς therefore is capable of either yielding to the lower appetites (Col. 2, 18), or of conforming with the natural law (Rom. 2, 15; 7, 22) or of tending towards God (Eph. 4, 23; 1 Cor. 14, 14 ff.). In this last sense St. Paul at times uses the term καρδία to express the source of higher religious life (1 Thess. 3, 13), or obedience to the Gospel (Rom. 6, 17); or of virtue (2 Thess. 3, 5; 1 Tim. 1, 5). The καρδία, like the νοῦς, can prove unworthy of a knowledge of God and yield to carnal desires and shameful passions (Rom. 1, 21 ff.).

What we have seen so far sufficiently illustrates the various activities of the inner man as a rational being. We come now to the investigation of the meaning of the term πνεῦμα, which seems to cause great difficulty.[39] The difficulty is expressed in the threefold question: Does St. Paul admit a human created πνεῦμα,[40] or does πνεῦμα practically always refer to the divine Spirit,[41] or is the hu-

[39] Benz, *Ethik d. Ap. Paulus*, 22-29, where different interpretations are noted.

[40] Sokolowski, *Begriffe Geist u. Leben bei Paulus*, 141: "Ganz abgeleugnet wird das Vorkommen eines menschlich-geschöpflichen πνεῦμα bei Paulus von Niemandem."

[41] Cf. Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus*, Berlin 1898, 11: "Paulus hat unter 113 stellen an 91 πνεῦμα vom geiste Gottes und vom göttlichen dem

man πνεῦμα nothing but the νοῦς raised to a supernatural sphere of being?[42] This question is put by Feine in another way:[43] Is πνεῦμα in St. Paul the popular term (cf. Zauberpapyri) opposed to flesh, or is it always the Holy Ghost, or is it the regenerated human spirit? The manner in which St. Paul employs the term in its several contexts will have to give the decisive answer to these questions. By showing that the term is used to denote the natural faculty of man, even of the unregenerate man—although it will appear that St. Paul uses it consistently with reference to the Christian—we have settled the point that interests us here.

In his recent study of the divine πνεῦμα in St. Paul, Reinhard[44] briefly distinguishes various concepts in which St. Paul makes use of the word πνεῦμα, apart from the meaning "divine Spirit": thus in the original sense of "breath" (2 Thess. 2, 8); for created spirits, as angels, demons, departed souls (Eph. 2, 2; 6, 12; Hebr. 1, 7. 14; 12, 9. 23); again for "disposition," "way of thinking," "sentiment" (1 Cor. 2, 12; 4, 21; 5, 3. 4; 2 Cor. 2, 13; Rom. 11, 8; Phil. 1, 27); finally to denote the natural spirit of man (1 Cor. 2, 11; 5, 5; 7, 34; 16, 18; Rom. 8, 16; Gal. 6, 18; Phil. 4, 23; Eph. 4, 23; Philm. 25; 2 Tim. 4, 22; Hebr. 4, 12). We shall not subscribe unreservedly to the interpretation of the enumerated texts, which is implied by this division, but we shall rather be guided by the keen argumentation of another scholar, Bertrams,[45] who closely examines the relevant texts, with due consideration of modern commentaries.

To expect to find in St. Paul a formal system of psychology, or a consistent technical use of psychological terminology, would prove a vain wish.[46] So especially with regard to πνεῦμα the context will determine in every instance the particular nuance in which the term occurs. The text which Beyschlag[47] calls an intentionally

menschen immanent gewordenen geiste, nur an 12 πνεῦμα vom menschengeiste gebraucht."

[42] Benz, *Ethik d. Paulus*, 23: "Das menschliche πνεῦμα ist also der in eine übernatürliche Seinssphäre erhobene νοῦς."

[43] Feine, *Theologie des N. T.*, Leipzig 1919, 340.

[44] Reinhard, *Wirken d. Geistes*, 6 f.

[45] Bertrams, *Wesen des Geistes*, 5-22.

[46] Ibid. 27, n. 2. Prat, *Theologie de S. Paul*, II. 68.

[47] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theology*, Edinburgh 1895, II. 36.

psychological passage, 1 Cor. 2, 11: *τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ*, quite clearly refers *πνεῦμα* to the natural spirit of man, where in the previous and following verses the contrast with the divine Spirit is stressed. In 1 Cor. 5, 3 the *παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι* over against the *ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι* is everyday language and calls for no deeper meaning than "presence in spirit," despite the "absence in body." So also in Col. 2, 5. According to the principle,[48] that the natural sense occurs whenever the concept *πεῦμα* is contrasted with the concept *σῶμα* or *σάρξ* as "human body," Bertrams interprets Rom. 8, 10 in the sense, that through justification the natural human spirit participates in the true life in Christ, whilst because of sin the body is dead, i. e. has no share in the higher life. Very obvious also seems the natural sense in the group of texts: 1 Cor. 5, 5; 7, 34; 2 Cor. 7, 1; 1 Thess. 5, 23. Here is question respectively of saving, of sanctifying, of cleansing from defilement, of preserving whole without blame—each with reference to *πνεῦμα*, which would certainly be incompatible with the divine Spirit. The difficulty caused by the compound verb *συμμαρτυρεῖ* in Rom. 8, 16 is explained away by new light from the Koine, where compound verbs frequently replace simple verbs.[49] Hence a satisfactory translation would here be: The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit, i. e. to our natural faculty of cognition. For how could man arrive at the knowledge of supernatural truths at all, if there were no possible contact between the divine and the human?

Suffice it merely to point out other texts in which Bertrams with equal clearness interprets *πνεῦμα* in the natural sense: Rom. 1, 9; Gal. 6, 18; Phil. 4, 23; 2 Tim. 4, 22; Philm. 25. Eph. 4, 23 is especially interesting, since here *πνεῦμα* signifies, like *νοῦς* in Rom. 12, 2, the province or capacity of spiritual renewal in man. In the peculiar Jewish sense of "sentiment" or "courage"[50] *πνεῦμα* is met with in 1 Cor. 16, 18; 2 Cor. 2, 23; 7, 13.

A number of doubtful passages, where the natural sense of the

[48] This principle Schaub (op. cit. 89, n. 1) shows to be inapplicable to St. Paul.

[49] For instances, see Bertrams, op. cit. 11 f., n. 1.

[50] Cf. Shoemaker, *Use of* רוח *in the O. T. and of πνεῦμα in the N. T.*, Menominee 1904, 18, 22, 28, etc. Also Benz, op. cit. 22, n.

meaning of divine Spirit may reasonably be applied, is discussed by Bertrams. But we are satisfied with the result, so far obtained, that St. Paul uses πνεῦμα to signify the spiritual side of the natural man, the human spirit, as opposed to man's physical nature, so that in most cases it can be said to be the equivalent of νοῦς.

One other question it will be well to touch upon briefly, namely the relation of the πνεῦμα to the ψυχή. Here again Bertrams [51] has ably covered the field of the problem, and we need but summarize his results. It is pointed out that the concept ψυχή has by some scholars been limited to the lower life-principle, including the sphere of the senses, over against πνεῦμα as the higher and purely spiritual powers in man.[52] But this is contradicted by such texts as 2 Cor. 1, 23 f. and 12, 15, where ψυχή must also refer to man's higher faculties. In Eph. 6, 6 and Col. 3, 23 the servitude ἐκ ψυχῆς according to the will of God, demanded of the slaves, again shows the soul as the innermost essence of man, the seat of personality.

When in 1 Thess. 5, 23 St. Paul mentions πνεῦμα, ψυχή and σῶμα together, it can not, in view of his pronounced dichotomy, be taken as a psychological distinction, but it is merely a rhetorical flourish, emphasizing the spiritual character of ψυχή. This is of importance for our comparison with Philo, who clearly distinguishes between a higher, spiritual, and a lower, earthly soul in man, in harmony with the trichotomy of Greek philosophers before him.

From the given meaning of ψυχή it follows that the term ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος (1 Cor. 2, 14) is appropriately expressive of man, the fully endowed, purely natural man, in contradistinction to the πνευματικός of the following verse. This brings us to our familiar antithesis in 1 Cor. 15, 44: σῶμα ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. The psychic body is therefore one that bears all the characteristics of the psychic earthly man, who according to the quotation from Gen. 2, 7 in the context (v. 45) became a "living soul." The psychic man, therefore, must be susceptible of all that St. Paul, in the many texts quoted, understands under the several terms σῶμα, σάρξ, νοῦς, πνεῦμα, ψυχή. Because in v. 47 St. Paul styles this man χοϊκός

[51] Bertrams, op. cit. 23-28.

[52] Cf. above, p. 65, the view of Reinhard, who cites other opinions in agreement with his own.

to stress the elements of the contrast, Bertrams aptly says in this connection: [53] "Der Mensch als ψυχὴ ζῶσα umfasst den natürlichen Geist mit, mag auch an diesen 1 Kor. 15, 45 zunächst nicht gedacht sein." The contrast here is between the first Adam—πρῶτος Ἀδάμ—in his "purely natural life, without regard to supernatural gifts bestowed or restored," and "the second Adam, the founder of the race in the supernatural order." [54]

3. Πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν.

Now that we know the meaning of one side of the antithesis of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. we can proceed to examine the opposite terms, of which πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν appears to be the most decisive. For the antithesis to the first Adam, becoming in creation εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (v. 45), demands the parallel idea of the last Adam becoming in a similar situation εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. So obvious is this conclusion that a number of critics even assume v. 45b to be meant by the Apostle as a part of the Scripture quotation.[55] What then did St. Paul wish to express by the statement that the last Adam, i. e. Christ (cf. Rom. 5, 21 ff.) became a life-giving spirit?

The first Adam was "a figure of him that was to be" —τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (Rom. 5, 14). In this context (Rom. 5, 12-17) Christ is presented to the readers as the repairer of the harm done to mankind by the sin of its natural progenitor Adam. And so as Adam was the universal father of a race of sin, doomed to death, so Christ through grace and justification became contrariwise the founder of a new race unto life (1 Cor. 15, 22). In 1 Cor. 15, 45 the means of this new life is indicated by the words: "The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." "For the law of the Spirit of the life—τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς—in Christ Jesus hath delivered thee from the law of sin and death" (Rom. 8, 2). The Christian is here reminded that being born in sin of the first Adam, and destined for death, he was through the Spirit of life in Christ, the second Adam, regenerated and renewed "by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost—διὰ λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου (Tit. 3, 5). The deliv-

[53] Bertrams, op. cit. 27.
[54] WVSS, *N. T.*, v. III ad loc.
[55] See above, p. 55 f.

erance from the law of sin and death is therefore produced by the washing of regeneration through the holy Spirit, and the result of this spiritual re-birth is newness of life, a new creature—*καινὴ κτίσις* (2 Cor. 5, 17). Here we have the elements of the work of the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*, which call for special consideration: the law of sin and death, the regeneration through the holy Spirit, and the new creature.

a) The Law of Sin and Death.

Sin—*ἁμαρτία*—St. Paul considers inherent in the *σάρξ* (resp. *σῶμα*), not in the dualistic sense that the *σάρξ* is objectively and essentially sinful,[56] not as the absolute cause of sin, but as an abiding evil force in fallen man, hostile to the law of God and producing a state of ethical and physical death (Rom. 5, 12). The origin of sin and its consequence, death, was the transgression, the offense, the disobedience—*παράβασις, παράπτωμα, παρακοή* (Rom. 5, 14. 15. 19)—of Adam as the common parent of mankind; and through him all have sinned—*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* (Rom. 5, 12). To so perverse a state is the human nature reduced by the first sinful act of Adam that sin is said to reign—*ἐβασίλευσεν* (Rom. 5, 21), that it is a law (Rom. 7, 23. 25; 8, 2), a tyrant whose wage is death (Rom. 6, 23), and to whom man is become a slave (Rom. 6, 16. 17). Yet this tyranny of sin is a practical one only, for man is free to resist and refuse submission (cf. 1 Cor. 2, 14), although in practice the unregenerate man usually succumbs to the powers warring in his members (Rom. 7, 17-23). The depraved state of man therefore, since original sin, is a constant war of the concupiscences of the flesh against the higher nature. Sensual man is by this fact naturally selfish, opposed to the ideal God had decreed for man in his creation, and consequently gives way to sin, whose tyrannical sway manifests itself ultimately in death. "The end of them (i. e. sins) is death" (Rom. 6, 21); "your body is dead by reason of sin" (Rom. 8, 10).

It is important to note St. Paul's distinction in the notion of death, the use of the word in the physical and the ethical sense. The final physical realization of death in punishment of the first sin (cf. Gen. 2, 17) is in an ethical sense already virtually realized wherever the state of sin exists. Thus St. Paul can say:

[56] See above, p. 91.

"sin sprang into life and I died . . . for sin, getting a hold on me . . . deceived me and killed me" (Rom. 7, 10. 11). This is not said of the spiritual death of the soul, because here is question of the state of man before justification. The point at issue is rather that because of sin man is dead—although physically alive—in view to eternal life. So not only before he has been regenerated through the Spirit is man dead, but even in the Christian the body is dead —*σῶμα νεκρόν* (Rom. 8, 10)—as far as eternal life is concerned. The idea is well brought out in the text just animadverted to (Rom. 8, 10 f.): "If Christ be in you, your body is dead by reason of sin—*διὰ ἁμαρτίαν*—but your spirit is life by reason of justness—*διὰ δικαιοσύνην*. And if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwelleth within you, then he who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also bring to life—*πνεῦμα . . . ζωοποιήσει*—your mortal bodies through his Spirit who dwelleth within you."

This situation explains 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. Even the Christians, being earthly like unto the first Adam, although endowed with a soul as the human life-principle, in their present state possess a body that is as good as dead—*σῶμα νεκρόν*—i. e. by necessity destined to die. But when they become spiritual like unto the second Adam Christ, then his life-giving Spirit shall also in due course raise up their mortal bodies to eternal life. This is said in answer to the objection (1 Cor. 15, 12): "There is no resurrection of the dead."

From the foregoing it becomes clear that we must keep apart two view-points in speaking of the life-giving activity of the Spirit; the one that frees unregenerate man from the law of sin and death, the other that removes the sting of death (1 Cor. 15, 56) even from the body of regenerate man at the resurrection. Although this latter view-point predominates in the context of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff., we must also consider the former to understand the full meaning of *εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*.

b) Regeneration through the *πνεῦμα*.

Alongside of *ἁμαρτία* and *θάνατος* there frequently occurs in antithesis the expression *δικαιοσύνη* and *ζωή*. So in the text quoted above (Rom. 8, 10). In the contrast of the first and second Adam (Rom. 5, 12-17) we read (v. 17): "For if by reason of the offence

of the one man death hath reigned through the one man, much more shall they who receive the abundance of the grace and of the gift of justness—δικαιοσύνης—reign in life—ζωῇ—through the one Jesus Christ." And a little later (v. 21): "as sin hath reigned in death, so also grace may reign through justness—δικαιοσύνης—unto life everlasting—ζωὴν αἰώνιον—through Jesus Christ our Lord." The emphasis of the parallels is obvious: as through sin came death —both physical and spiritual—upon mankind, so through justness through Jesus Christ came life everlasting—analogously as to body and soul. Δικαιοσύνη (from δίκαιος, just, righteous) is therefore the state of man that again renders him acceptable to God and restores to him everlasting life. The process of this transformation has been called regeneration—παλινγενεσία—and renewal—ἀνακαίνωσις—of the holy Spirit (Tit. 3, 5). We must now see how this is brought about.

In 1 Cor. 6, 11, after mention is made of certain classes of sinners, St. Paul assures his readers: "And such some of you were; but you have washed yourselves clean—ἀπελούσασθε, but you have been hallowed—ἡγιάσθητε, but you have been justified—ἀδικαιώθητε in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God." To be hallowed and to be justified in the name of, or through, Christ and the holy Spirit are here evidently effects that follow upon the ἀπελούσασθε. This term reminds of λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας in Tit. 3, 5, where by effect of the washing and the pouring out by Christ of the holy Spirit upon us we are said to be justified—δικαιοθέντες (vv. 6-7). Undoubtedly ἀπολούεσθαι and λουτρόν in these texts refer to the sacrament of baptism. In baptism then Christ effects through the divine πνεῦμα in unregenerate man a new state of justness and holiness which gives claim to life. Hence from a state of death man is transformed and renewed; in other words, he is reborn into a new sphere of life; through the outpouring of the divine πνεῦμα upon him he is become spiritual—πνευματικός. But in how far is the effect of this spiritual renovation to be attributed to Christ, and how far to the divine πνεῦμα? The Pauline idea of salvation is fully realized in and through the person of Jesus Christ. God "sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh—ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας—and as a sin-offering, he hath condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8, 3). The Messiah of the

world, subjecting himself freely to the physical effects of sin by assuming a human body in the likeness of a sinful body, wrought our salvation by overcoming death in his own expiatory death and triumphant resurrection (Rom. 4, 25; 5, 9; 8, 34; 1 Cor. 15, 3. 4. 17; 2 Cor. 5, 15; Eph. 2, 13. 14; Col. 1, 22; etc.). In baptism man participates in a mystical, sacramental manner in this victory of Christ over sin and death, and is renovated unto justness and life. This is clearly conveyed by Rom. 6, 3-4: "Know ye not, that as many of us were baptized unto Christ Jesus, we were baptized unto his death? We were buried therefore with him through this baptism unto his death, that as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also should walk in newness of life." If then this mystical participation, through baptism, in the glory of Jesus Christ, who "by an act of power in accordance with the holiness of his spirit was marked out Son of God by resurrection from death" (Rom. 1, 4), is the assurance of our justness and life (2 Cor. 5, 15), then baptism is for us the earnest of the spirit—*ἀρραβῶνα τοῦ πνεύματος* (2 Cor. 5, 5); then in baptism "the law of the Spirit of the life in Christ Jesus hath delivered [us] from the law of sin and death" (Rom. 8, 2). Thus then baptism is the *λουτρὸν παλιγγενεσίας καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου* (Tit. 3, 5), and we see how St. Paul consistently identifies the *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* with the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* (Rom. 8, 9), indeed not as an identification of person, but as one and the same divine power.

Here now we have it indicated how Christ is become the life-giving Spirit—*εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (1 Cor. 15, 45)—in his resurrection from the dead. At the moment of his victory over death, the power of the Spirit changed the mortal nature of the God-Man into a spiritual and imperishable one. And in like manner, although now only in a mystical way, the power of the Spirit through baptism, having removed in man all that is of sin, endows his mortal nature with the guarantee of spiritual life. Man is spiritually renewed; he is become a new creature.

c) The New Creature.

How the ethical sense predominates in St. Paul, is best seen in his allusions to the spiritual renovation of man. The old man—*παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Rom. 6, 6; Col. 3, 9; Eph. 4, 22) is understood

to have been put off when man was renewed by the Spirit in baptism, and a new man—*νέος ἄνθρωπος* (Col. 3, 10), or *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Eph. 4, 24) was put on. Through the mystical union in baptism this new man can be said to be one with Christ—*ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε* (Gal. 3, 27), and the Christian is now truly a *καινὴ κτίσις* in Christ (2 Cor. 5, 17). For in stripping off the fleshly body in the circumcision which is of Christ, along with him the Christians were buried in baptism: along with him also they had their resurrection through their faith in the power of God, who raised him up from the dead (Col. 2, 11. 12).

In a special study of the formula "induere Christum," Ohleyer [57] explains the text *ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ* (Eph. 4, 24) and illustrates it beautifully from St. Chrysostom. The meaning is "to give oneself up to the possession and power of the new man, to be possessed by the new man, i. e. the new life. . . . Our new life then is a life of justice and holiness. By creating this new man, says St. Chrysostom, God created man a son; but this takes place in baptism.—*Υἱὸν εὐθέως, φησίν αὐτὸν ἔκτισε· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος γίνεται.* In these words Chrysostom describes the grand effect (*υἱὸν—ἔκτισε*) and the cause (*ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος γίνεται*) of this *ἐνδύεσθαι*."

Thus the new creature has entered into a new and intimate relation with God himself, the adoption of sonship—*υἱοθεσία* (Rom. 8, 14. 15; Gal. 3, 20; 4, 5. 6; Phil. 2, 15; Eph. 1, 5; etc.). For if the Christian cleaveth to the Lord he is one Spirit with him (1 Cor. 6, 17); having died with Christ in baptism, his life is hidden with Christ in God (Col. 3, 3); and in his mystical union he has entered into fellowship—*κοινωνία*—with Christ, to which God has called him (1 Cor. 1, 9). We have already seen in what this fellowship consists. Lattey pointedly summarizes [58] the process of man's mystical union with Christ: "With Christ and in Christ he must be crucified, that is, his flesh, the 'old man' must be crucified with its passions: with Christ and in Chirst he is buried: with Christ and in Christ he arises from beneath the waters of baptism as from the grave, in the glory of a new and risen life, which is Christ living within him (Gal. II. 20)." From this

[57] Ohleyer, *Pauline Formula "Induere Christum,"* NTSt II (1921), 96.
[58] Lattey, in WVSS *N. T.*, vol. III., Append. III., Pt. II. 247.

union then follows our adoption as sons—*νἱοθεσία* (Gal. 4, 5). In connection with the following verse (4, 6) Reinhard [59] draws attention to the activity of the Holy Ghost in this process. "And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba, Father!'" The conjunction "because" —*ὅτι*—does not mean to convey the idea that the reception of the divine Spirit is only subsequent to the *νἱοθεσία*, but that here the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost is emphasized over and above the reception of the *πνεῦμα νἱοθεσίας* (cf. Rom. 8, 15) as a supernatural quality, superadded to man in baptism. Then already had man been sealed with the holy Spirit of the promise—*ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἁγίῳ* (Eph. 1, 13). The seal is actually a new form or quailty of being.[60]

Consequently the new creature is a changed being. The whole process of the change is given in Rom. 8, 29. 30: "For those whom he (God) hath foreknown, them he hath predestined to bear a nature in the image of his Son's, that he should be first-born among many brethren. And those whom he hath predestined, them he hath also called: and those whom he hath called, them he hath also justified: and those whom he hath justified, them he hath also glorified." As Christians therefore, being converted to Christ (2 Cor. 3, 16), having become one with Christ through the mystical union in baptism, we are "transformed into his very image from glory to glory, as through the Lord the Spirit"—*τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος* (2 Cor. 3, 18). This transformation from the "old man" to the "new creature" is then the work of the Lord the Spirit through the regeneration of baptism and the continuous operation *ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν*. Perfect Christ-likeness is the ultimate aim of this operation in the Christian: begun in the mystical death with Christ in baptism, the likeness becomes complete only in the "gaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ" (2 Thess. 2, 14). As the divine *πνεῦμα* through Christ has wrought the beginning of the mystical transformation by the gift of faith (1 Cor. 2, 10-18) and baptism, he continues to perfect the spiritual state of the new creature—be that by inspiration, or by actual graces, or by sacramental operation—until the glory of Christ is fully realized in the

[59] Reinhard, op. cit. 45 f. [60] Ibid. 21.

new man at his own resurrection. Hence the paramount duty of the reborn man, in no way to hinder this operation, but having put off the man of sin, effectually to strive after perfect Christ-likeness. This is the meaning of the exhortation in 1 Cor. 15, 49: "Even as we have borne the likeness of the earthly, so let us bear the likeness of the heavenly." But the crowning effect of regeneration is accomplished only at the resurrection: "For if we have become one with him in likeness of his death, why, then, we shall also be in likeness of his resurrection" (Rom. 6, 5).

d) The Likeness of the Resurrection.

The Parousia is evidently the moment when we shall be fully vested in the likeness of the resurrection. "When Christ, our life, shall appear, then also shall ye appear with him in glory" (Col. 3, 4). More clearly is this expressed in Phil. 3, 20. 21: "Our country is in heaven, whence we eagerly await as savior the Lord Jesus Christ, who will transform the body of our lowliness, that it may be one with the body of his glory." The likeness of the resurrection, therefore, is one of glory—δόξα. The meaning of this term in reference to our glorified state after the resurrection is of decisive importance here, because on it depends in a way the interpretation of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (1 Cor. 15, 47).

Etymologically the concept of δόξα, like its Hebrew equivalent כבוד, is determined, even in its most abstract sense, by the inherent idea of something external to the object of which it is predicated; not in the sense that it is a substance or something material, for it denotes merely the characteristic or quality in which the object appears, or which underlies an opinion or estimate. This elementary notion pervades every use of the word δόξα. In the meaning of "opinion," "judgment," and the like, in which it predominates in profane literature, it denotes the result of an estimate on the basis of perceptible characteristics in the object. In St. Paul δόξα occurs mostly in the sense of "honor," "dignity," "glory," "majesty." When referring to man it is used in view of his elevated state as the "new creature"; when referring to God, or to Christ, it denotes the heavenly character, or the manifestation of divine essence. In no case does it literally imply material substance, for it is but the appearance of the nature of a thing,

and not part of its substance. However, because of the Jewish tendency to realism it was an easy step to visualize by means of the term δόξα the material manifestation of God's presence and power; e. g. Ex. 24, 17; Lk. 9, 32; etc. But St. Paul brings out the immateriality of δόξα in the passage 2 Cor. 3, 7 ff. by contrasting the glory of the face of Moses (Ex. 34, 30) with the glory of justification under the new dispensation. The passage is metaphorical. The ministry ἐν δόξῃ (v. 7) of the children of Israel foreshadowed the more glorious ministration—μᾶλλον . . . ἐν δόξῃ—of the spirit (v. 8). What is it that can be called more glorious in the life of the Christian? There is here no material splendor to compare with the light that shone in the face of Moses; there is only the intrinsically superior value in the dignity of the Christian worship and in the spiritual gifts it bestows. The veil is stripped off (v. 16), and the δόξα θεοῦ is mirrored in the faces of the regenerated and transformed (v. 18). Certainly no material substance can be thought to inhere in this glory. But what is it? St. Paul gives the explanation in the sequel (4, 4. 6): "the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ"—φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ,—the light "that hath shone in our hearts, unto the illuminating knowledge of the glory of God, in the person of Christ"—ὃς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ. The illumination therefore is a spiritual one, and the δόξα is an immaterial manifestation of the divine glory in the Christian, the new creature, who is transformed into the image of Christ, who is the image of God (3, 18; 4, 4). During the Christian's life, even whilst he grows in Christ-likeness "from glory to glory" (2 Cor. 3, 18), no physical manifestation necessarily betrays in him the heavenly δόξα. Only at the resurrection when Christ "will transform—μετασχηματίσει—the body of our lowliness, that it may be one with the body of his glory" (Phil. 3, 21), shall the δόξα Χριστοῦ also become manifest in our risen bodies.

Concerning our resurrection body, Bertrams has argued with convincing clearness,[61] that according to St. Paul it shall undergo a change without alteration of substance; in other words, the same body in which we live and that is buried shall rise again in a new

[61] Bertrams, op. cit. *Excurs* 3: Auferstehungsleib, 121-143.

form. This Pauline doctrine of the substantial identity of our bodies before and after the resurrection shows the interpretation of those critics to be wrong who maintain that the risen body is a new body, composed of a heavenly pneumatic substance, called δόξα.[62] The decisive texts must needs be considered. For if it is untenable that δόξα is a separate substance, then in our text: ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος [ἐγένετο] ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (1 Cor. 15, 47b), St. Paul cannot imply that the substance of Christ's spiritual body is "of heaven."

Did St. Paul actually conceive the idea of a body "of heaven," of a heavenly substance, in which Christ appeared in his resurrection and in the likeness of which the Christians shall be clothed at Christ's second coming? In the many passages, where he speaks of the raising of the dead and of the resurrection, the terms used—ἐγείρειν and ἀνάστασις—imply clearly enough that one and the same body is meant. Death is represented by the familiar figure of sleep. The departed Christians are spoken of as "those who have fallen asleep in Christ"—κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ (1 Cor. 15, 18); and in the same context (v. 20: νυνὶ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων) Christ's resurrection entitles him to be called "the first-fruits of them that sleep." Plainly then the belief, underlying the figure, can be none other but which was common to Judaism,[63] namely, that the dead shall rise again and that the resurrection body is identical with man's earthly body. Hence when Feine argues for a substantial difference of the resurrection bodies from the absence of any reference to corporeity in 1 Cor. 15, 47: "the second man is from heaven," as also in the following verses where mention is made of the likeness of the heavenly man, of incorruptibility, of a change in those who shall be still alive at the Parousia,[64] he not only fails to sense the true meaning of the ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, but he disregards the obvious sense of ἐγείρειν and ἀνάστασις in Pauline usage. No sound reasoning can circumvent the stringent literalness of ἀνάστασις in the texts in question.[65]

[62] Cf. Feine, *Theologie d. N. T.*, Leipzig 1922, 295 f.

[63] Felten, *Neutl. Zeitgeschichte*, Regensburg 1910, II. 205, 210.

[64] Feine, op. cit. 296.

[65] Cf. Rom. 1, 4; 1 Cor. 15, 12 f.; Phil. 3, 10; 1 Thess. 4, 14. 16; 2 Tim. 2, 18.

Only that can be said to be raised up which has been previously buried; from the sleep of death the same bodies rise up that have before been laid in the earth. However, they shall be changed, indeed not substantially, but in a manner to conform with the new spiritual life to which they are raised.

This transformation of the earthly bodies into spiritual and heavenly bodies also takes place in the case of those that survive the Parousia (1 Thess. 4, 17; 1 Cor. 15, 51). In 1 Cor. 15, 52: "for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall rise incorruptible, and we shall be changed," the verbs *ἐγερθήσονται* and *ἀλλαγησόμεθα* stand in contrast; both terms in this context imply a marked alteration in the human body, yet neither term permits of the loss of man's substantial identity. That this is exactly the mind of St. Paul on this point is unmistakable in that other passage (Phil. 3, 20 f.): "Our country is in heaven, whence we eagerly await as saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, who will transform the body of our lowliness—*ὃς μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν*—that it may be one with the body of his glory." Christ at his second coming shall change the *σχῆμα* of our earthly bodies unto the likeness of his body of glory. The word *σχῆμα* has reference only to external appearance, as has been decisively established by H. Schumacher in his work on Phil. 2, 5-8.[66] Hence *μετασχηματίζειν* in the text can only mean to transform the external appearance of lowliness into that of glory, without change of identity of substance as to our bodies.

The whole force of this problem enters into the interpretation of the main text of our study, and of its immediate context; for the contrary conclusions which we have briefly cited above (p. 56 f.) are mostly the result of the falsely conceived premise, that St. Paul argues for the substantial difference of the pneumatic resurrection body. Beginning, however, with the very question: "How do the dead rise—*ἐγείρονται*? And with what manner of body are they coming?" (v. 35), St. Paul stresses the point at issue. He answers with a striking analogy. Yet the emphasis of the illustration does not lie in the entire and ultimate application of the analogy, but rather in the form of expression by which the author

[66] Schumacher, *Christus in seiner Praeexistenz u. Kenose*, Rom. 1921, II. 167.

plainly indicates its force and extent in the application to the truth to be illustrated. So when a comparison is here drawn between the death and resurrection of the human body on the one hand, and on the other the sowing of the grain and its sprouting forth in new form, the words *ζωοποιεῖται* and *ἀποθάνῃ*, referring as they do literally to the grain, point out the emphatic thought: the loss of the old form and the coming forth in a new form through the power of God that gives life (v. 38); and so also it is through the divine *πνεῦμα* that the renewal of life is effected in the human body. This is a Pauline thought we have already met in other texts (cf. p. 68 ff.). Hence as little as the plant that sprouts forth is entirely different from the grain from which it sprang, so little is the spiritual body of the resurrection different substantially from that which was laid in the earth. The difference is one of form and appearance only, as the following comparison further illustrates (vv. 39-44). The degree of difference—no matter how much at variance one state in the process of transformation is with the other—can not gainsay the clearly expressed fact that one and the same body is the subject of the marvellous change. The *σῶμα ψυχικόν* dies and it rises a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* (v. 44). This is the mystery of the resurrection.

Now, the risen Christ, as the *ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων* (1 Cor. 15, 20), is the pattern for every Christian in his resurrection. For like unto the nature of the first Adam, who was "of earth, earthly," man is corruptible, so like unto the imperishable nature of the glorified Christ, the second Adam, who is "of heaven," man will become glorified and incorruptible; in one word "heavenly"—*ἐπουράνιος*, i. e. bearing the image of the heavenly (v. 49).

4. *Ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.*

We have now seen enough of St. Paul's doctrine about Christ as the second Adam, the author of man's regeneration unto a new and spiritual race, and about the likeness of the resurrection body, that we should be able to arrive at a sound interpretation of the much disputed phrase *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*. We shall first examine the meaning that is suggested by the context, and then trace its interpretation in that field of scholarship in every way most competent to speak a decisive word on this problem, the Greek Patristic.

a) According to the Context.

The antithesis between the first and second Adam is here introduced by St. Paul in the course of his answer to the question as to the nature of the resurrection bodies (v. 35). The whole spirit and letter of the reply gives evidence, as we have seen, to the belief that the same body that is buried shall rise again, transformed through the power of the life-giving πνεῦμα. The first step in this process of transformation has already been taken in the regeneration through faith and baptism. As baptism is the earnest of the πνεῦμα (2 Cor. 5, 5), so the πνεῦμα is the guarantee of the transformation "from glory to glory" unto the day when we shall appear with Christ in glory (Col. 3, 4), which is the day of the Parousia, or of the general resurrection.

Now Christ is called the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, not alone because through his power is effected the regeneration of the Christian, but primarily because in Christ himself at his own resurrection became manifest the life-giving Spirit in a manner that accounts for the hope in a general resurrection. The context of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. asks for evidence for the manner of the resurrection. In several passages St. Paul expresses the idea that Christ was raised to life through the πνεῦμα or the power of God (Rom. 8, 11; 1 Cor. 6, 14; 2 Cor. 13, 4). We have seen above that in texts, like 2 Cor. 3, 18; 1 Cor. 6, 11; Rom. 8, 10 f., Christ and the divine Spirit are said to exercise a similar power in regard to man, not already by raising him from a state of physical death, but by gradually transforming his nature (note μεταμορφούμεθα in 2 Cor. 3, 18) into Christ's very image from glory to glory unto the ultimate resurrection from the dead. Therefore there must be an equality of power through the divine πνεῦμα that is shared by Christ with God. This is the all-important conclusion that furnishes the meaning and poignancy of St. Paul's argument in 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff.

How do the dead rise? The natural man, born of the first Adam, is of the earth. Although he is endowed with the ψυχὴ ζῶσα he is but a specially gifted animal, with no claim to resurrection, since as to his body he is of the earth earthly and perishable. But the heavenly man, Christ, is a life-giving spirit, and as such he is known from his glorious resurrection (1 Cor. 15, 3 f.). Now, as by the power of the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν the Christian becomes trans-

formed into the likeness of Christ, so the same power of the Spirit shall in due time raise him up bodily in the likeness of Christ. "As the heavenly [man], so are the heavenly. And even as we have borne the likeness of the earthly, so let us bear the likeness of the heavenly" (vv. 48 f.); for in this have we the assurance of a resurrection like unto that of Christ, the ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

The point of the argument in this context lies in the comparison of the nature of the bodies of the first and second Adam respectively, or rather in the principle of life controlling the destiny of the respective bodies. To the readers' experience it is evident that the ψυχὴ ζῶσα is no guarantee of resurrection for the body ἐκ γῆς. On the other hand they likewise know that Christ, whose body underwent death and burial, rose again. Therefore more than a "living soul" must have been the source of this new life in Christ's body. What was it? The πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. And how so? Because Christ is ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

No juggling with the Pauline terminology will do justice to the context by placing ἐκ γῆς and ἐξ οὐρανοῦ of v. 47 in absolute contrast, with the conclusion that as ἐκ γῆς obviously denotes the material origin of the earthly body, so the ἐξ οὐρανοῦ must likewise denote the material source of Christ's risen body. If πνεῦμα or δόξα were meant by St. Paul to be the material substance of the heavenly body, the contrast would call for ἐκ πνεύματος or ἐκ δόξης.[67] The answer to the question, "With what manner of body are they coming?" becomes sufficiently clear by pointing to Christ's resurrection body. The vexing question for the readers, however, is, how can that be accomplished in their own case? The emphasis in the illustration from the bare grain that is sown rests on the words: "God giveth it a body as he hath determined" (v. 38). So too, to explain the life-giving power in the case of Christ's body the answer is given that "the last Adam is a life-giving spirit" (v. 45); and again, to account for the vivifying power of this spirit it is later added (v. 47): "the second man is from heaven."[68]

[67] Cf. Bertrams, op. cit. 136.

[68] The similar terms ἐκ θεοῦ and ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in 2 Cor. 5, 1 f. only confirm our interpretation, if properly understood. We cannot here enter into the controversy regarding this text. The difficulties have been ably solved by Bertrams (op. cit. 138-143) in perfect agreement with all relevant Pauline texts.

What then is the meaning of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ? In the immediate context it means "of a heavenly nature or sort." As the first man was of the earth, of an earthly and perishable nature, so the second man was of heaven, i. e. of a heavenly and imperishable nature. And consequently when our earthly nature has been transformed (μεταμορφούμεθα) into the very likeness of Christ's heavenly nature (2 Cor. 3, 18), then shall it be like Christ imperishable and heavenly.

Implicitly, however, the context establishes a more fundamental meaning of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, namely the heavenly origin of Christ, his equality with God, hence divinity. That Christ manifested himself as the life-giving divine Spirit in his resurrection—the meaning of v. 45b demanded by the context—stands consistently in harmony with St. Paul's teaching about man's regeneration, which is to culminate in his glorious resurrection. In the passages we have considered to illustrate this doctrine the process of man's spiritual rebirth is attributed to the power of the holy Spirit through Christ (Tit. 3, 5 f.; Rom. 8, 10 f.; 5, 17. 21; 1, 4; 2 Cor. 3, 18; Phil. 3, 20 f.). In Rom. 8, 9. 11. 21; 1 Cor. 6, 11; Gal. 4, 6 is this power of the Spirit and of Christ more definitely identified with the πνεῦμα θεοῦ or πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῦ. Hence Christ's divinity and divine Sonship is exhibited in this spiritual operation, just as "by an act of power in accordance with the holiness of his spirit [he] was marked out Son of God by resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1, 4).

Yet not by the resurrection from the dead did Christ become Son of God, since this dignity was his before he began his earthly mission, God "sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8, 3).[69] Christ was man "according to the flesh," and at the same time is "over all, God blessed forever" (Rom. 9, 5). Interpreting this latter text, Durand[70] vindicates the title of Christ's divinity; and he draws other parallels (p. 367) from the Pauline Epistles. His conclusion, particularly in reference to Phil. 2, 5-11, where St. Paul asserts that before his incarnation Christ was in a divine state ("condition divine," ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ), which is,

[69] Lepin, *Christ and the Gospel*, Philadelphia 1910, 386-390. Cf. Bartmann, *Paulus*, Paderborn 1914, 25-32.

[70] Durand, *La divinité de Jesus Christ dans S. Paul*, RB 1903, 550-570.

in short, equality with God (*ἴσα θεῷ*), is decisively corroborated by H. Schumacher in his critical examination of the passage in Phil., with the result: "Christus ist für den Apostel ein persönliches, von Ewigkeit her in der Wesenheit Gottes existierendes Wesen." [71]

The belief in Christ's pre-existence has been a prolific source of theories about the meaning of *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, as we have seen in the outset of our study. Now the results show that we can agree only on the fact, but not as to the manner of Christ's pre-existence, nor as to the source of St. Paul's terminology. Viewing the expression in its context as well as in the wider framework of Pauline christology, we fail to see any direct point of contact with the mythological Anthropos or Urmensch, or even with the pre-existent Messiah of the Jewish Apocalyptic. Any notion of corporeity in the pre-existent state is foreign to the Heavenly Man of St. Paul. His language is precise; and obscurer texts receive light from passages more clear and obvious. So when the second Adam is called *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, we learned elsewhere that he was *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* before he appeared *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων* (Phil. 2, 6 f.); that he is the Son of God whom the Father sent in the likeness of sinful flesh—*ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* (Rom. 8, 3); that he as Son of God is the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀορατοῦ, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα* (Col. 1, 15 f.), before all created matter;—in one word, that God became man. Or to say it in the order of the context, Christ was God *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*.

If this interpretation expresses the mind of St. Paul, then it should find an outspoken corroboration in the early Greek Patristic; for the Greek Fathers, above all, were able to control both the linguistic and christological traditions coming down from the apostolic writers. Their consentient testimony should therefore prove authoritative.

b) According to the Greek Patristic.

In making a brief chronological survey of patristic comments bearing on our problem, it would seem expected to touch on those passages only that directly refer to our text. We cannot, however,

[71] Schumacher, *Christus in s. Praeexistenz u. Kenose*, II. 327.

pass over the eloquent testimony of St. Ignatius of Antioch who presents such a striking parallel to the antithesis in 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. In Eph. VII. 2[72] he states that Christ, in order to redeem the world, assumed a human nature in addition to his spiritual nature, and Ignatius describes this event in these remarkable contrasts:

> Εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικὸς καὶ πνευματικός,
> γεννητὸς καί ἀγεννητός,
> ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός, . . .
> καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ,

The expressions: σαρκικός, γεννητός, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐκ Μαρίας, show quite forcibly that Ignatius recognized the ἄνθρωπος in Christ. Yet Christ was not always and not only man; he became man in time (γεννητός—ἐκ Μαρίας). But whilst he was man, he was at the same time God (ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός), proceeding from God (ἐκ θεοῦ), spiritual and without beginning (πνευματικός, ἀγεννητός). Of ἀγενητός Rackl says in his able study about Ignatius:[73] "Dieses Wort besagt bei allen Schriftstellern die absolute Anfangslosigkeit und Ursprungslosigkeit eines göttlichen Wesens, bei christlichen Schriftstellern die absolute Ewigkeit und Anfangslosigkeit des einzigen wahren Gottes." Before Christ was ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ he was θεός. Hence in place of the expression ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ we find in Ignatius the more definite ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός, ἀγεννητός, ἐκ θεοῦ, θεός.

Likewise in the Shepherd of Hermas there is no mention of our text, but the author of this valuable document uses the word ἄνωθεν in the sense of ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in referring to the divine πνεῦμα (Mand. XI. 2).[74] As in St. Paul this Spirit is identified with the Son of God: ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τὸ πνεῦμα ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν (Sim IX. 1);[75] and as an explanatory parallel to 1 Cor. 15, 45b: ἐγένετο εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, we find: τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τὸ προόν, τὸ κτίσαν πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν, κατῴκισεν ὁ θεὸς εἰς σάρκα (Sim. V. 6).[76] Christ therefore is "man from heaven," because "the Holy pre-existent Spirit, which created the whole creation, God made to dwell in flesh."

[72] Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, London 1898, 107.
[73] Rackl, *Christologie d. hl. Ignatius v. Ant.*, Freiburg 1914, 124.
[74] Lightfoot, op. cit. 335.
[75] Ibid. 370.
[76] Ibid. 352.

St. Justin Martyr says of Christ that he pre-existed as God—*προϋπάρχων θεὸν ὄντα πρὸ αἰώνιον τοῦτον τὸν Χριστόν*;[77] that he became man—*ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γεννηθείς* (ibid.); that he proceeded from the Father before all creation—*πρὸ πάντων ποιημάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς . . . προσελθόντα*;[78] that he was the Lord and God, existing as the Son of God—*ὅτι κύριος ὢν ὁ Χριστός, καὶ θεὸς θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων.*[79] In these and numerous other passages he gives us to understand what he means by *ἀπὸ Πατρός*, which is his equivalent for the Pauline *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, namely that Christ was *ἄνθρωπος-θεός*, or as Justin calls him, *Λόγος ἀνθρωθείς.*[80]

In the Epistle to Diognetus we again meet with a striking parallel. In chapter VII.[81] we read, that God himself from heaven—*αὐτὸς ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ*—implanted truth and his holy teaching into the hearts of men, not by sending a subaltern, or an angel, etc., but by sending the Creator of the universe himself—*αὐτὸν τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δεμιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων.* He sent him as God, yet as man unto man—*ὡς θεὸν ἔπεμψεν, ὡς ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἀνθρώπους.* The scheme of the redemption had been communicated to the Son from the beginning—*τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡτοιμασμένα* (c. VIII), and when the time came which God had ordained, he parted with his own Son, as a ransom for us, the holy for the lawless—*τὸν ἄκακον ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν*, the just for the unjust—*τὸν δίκαιον ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*, the incorruptible for the corruptible—*τὸν ἄφθαρτον ὑπὲρ φθαρτῶν*, the immortal for the mortal—*τὸν ἀθάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν θνητῶν.*[82] The Son of God, sent *ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ*, as the immortal and incorruptible one became man for the sake of raising man unto immortality and incorruptibility. This is likewise the argument of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff.

A direct literal reference to our text we first find in St. Irenaeus of Lyons. Quoting from 1 Cor. 15, 49: "we shall also bear the image of him who is from heaven," he proposes the question, "What is the heavenly?", and answers precisely: "The Spirit" (*Contra*

[77] Dial. c. Tryph. MPG 6, 536.
[78] Ibid. 709.
[79] Ibid. 773.
[80] Ibid. 713.
[81] Lightfoot, op. cit. 495.
[82] Ibid. 497.

Haer. V. 9).[83] Does Irenaeus imply that Christ's resurrection body is of a spiritual substance? In lib. IV. 38 [84] he explains that "our Lord . . . came to us, not as he might have come, but as we were capable of beholding him. He might easily have come to us in his immortal glory—ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ αὐτοῦ δόξῃ—but in that case we might never have endured the greatness of his glory." Two conclusions follow from this: First, that Christ in his pre-existent state was in immortal glory, impossible for mortal eyes to behold; secondly, that Christ's glorious resurrection body, being possible to behold, must have been else than ἐκ δόξης, the supposed equivalent of some modern critics for ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. The first conclusion is supported by such oft-repeated expressions as: υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ μονογενῆς, ὃς καὶ Λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἐλθόντος τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χρόνου, σαρκοθέντος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ[85] or "Verbum Dei existens, a Patre descendens." [86] In chapters 7-14 of c. Haer. lib. V. Irenaeus eloquently justifies the second conclusion, with frequent reference to the context of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. "Quomodo Christus in carnis substantia surrexit . . . sic et nos suscitabit per virtutem suam.[87] Moreover, in chapter 14 the thesis is defended, that if the flesh of the risen body were not of the same substance which the Word had assumed, then our reconciliation were not truly accomplished. Hence, without further multiplying quotations, the testimony of Irenaeus for the meaning of ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ can be summed up in his own words, that "He is himself in his own right, beyond all men who ever lived, God and Lord, and King eternal, and the Incarnate Word." [88]

St. Clement of Alexandria does not use the phrase ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, but when such expressions are applied to Christ, as ὁ οὐράνιος ἡγεμών (Paed. I. 1),[89] θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπου σχήματι ἄρχοντος (Ibid. I. 2),[90] φῶς ἡμῖν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (Cohort. ad Gent. XI.),[91] Κύριος ἀπαθὴς ἀνάρχως (Strom. VII. 2),[92] and others, we see that Clement is plainly speaking of the Heavenly Man, and that the οὐράνιος-quality denotes divinity.

[83] *Transl. Ante-Nicene Christian Libr.*, Edinburgh 1869, IX. Cf. MPG 7, 1145.

[84] MPG 7, 1105 f.

[85] Ibid. 931.

[86] Ibid. 932.

[87] Ibid. 1139.

[88] Ibid. 940.

[89] MPG 8, 249.

[90] Ibid. 252.

[91] Ibid. 232.

[92] MPG 9, 409.

In the extant fragments of his commentary on Genesis, St. Hippolytus bears witness to the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15, 47. In c. XLIX. 21-26 [93] he explains against Apollinaris that our Lord Jesus Christ, the same who is the only-begotten Word of God, God existing of God—*ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγος, θεὸς ὑπάρχων ἐκ θεοῦ*—is he that is referred to in various texts of Scripture. He describes him further as being always in the glory proper to God—*ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν δόξῃ θεοπρεπεῖ . . . πρὸ πάντος αἰώνος.* Especially enlightening is the question he subjoins: "Who else is this than is thus shown us by the Apostle, namely the Second Man, the Lord from heaven?"—*Τίς ἄλλος οὗτος, ἢ καθῶς δείκνυται ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ Ἀποστόλου, ὅτι ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.* The words "from heaven" therefore describe Christ as *θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ*, pre-existent *ἐν δόξῃ θεοπρεπεῖ.*

The Origen-citations in Cramer's Catena on 1 Cor. contain no comment on the text 15, 47,[94] but we have other passages in which the *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* is mentioned in its context. In *Com. in Joan.*[95] in reference to 3, 31 Origen asks ironically: "Was perhaps the Savior not from heaven, especially in as far as he was the first-born of all creation?"—*τάχα γὰρ ὁ Σωτὴρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦν, μάλιστα καθὸ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως ἦν*; then he adds emphatically: *Τὸ γάρ· ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἦν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.* Indeed the second man was from heaven, and he was the Savior, the first-born of all creation. In the extant Latin version of his *Com. in Ep. ad Rom.* lib. V.[96] Origen again makes mentioon of the Heavenly Man in relation to our Pauline text, and goes on to explain still more clearly what the Apostle meant by exhorting us to bear the image of the heavenly—"imaginem portare coelestis, id est, ut secundum Verbum Dei viventes renovemur, et reformamur secundum interiorem hominem ad imaginem Dei, qui creavit eum." Hence "coelestis" is here directly equivalent of "Deus." Christ was God, for in him is everything that is of God—*πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τοῦ θεοῦ τοιαῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν.*[97] Among the excerpts from Origen (*Ex G. Bulli Def. Fid. Nic.*)[98] it is stated that we say Christ became

[93] MPG 10, 600 f.
[94] Cf. JThSt. VI (1905), 113.
[95] MPG 14, 564.
[96] Ibid. 1010.
[97] Ibid. 13, 337.
[98] MPG 17, 1289.

something composite—*συνθετόν τι χρῆμα φαμὲν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι.* And again Origen calls Christ God, appearing in a human body—*θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ φανέντα σώματι.* Now if Christ became a composite, (for which Origen coined the name God-Man—*θεάνθρωπος*), there must have been a time when either of the components existed alone. This is explained in *Apol. pro Orig.*[99] where Pamphilus quotes from Origen: "Factus est quod ante non erat. Manifestum est enim quia secundum carnem non erat prius." Before Christ became the composite *θεάνθρωπος* he did not exist according to the flesh, i. e. as *ἄνθρωπος*, he was only *θεός*. Consequently *θεάνθρωπος* is synonymous with our Pauline phrase *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*.

St. Method of Lycia in his work on the resurrection (*De Resur.* XIII.)[100] speaks of Christ in connection with 1 Cor. 15, 49 as the *ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος*, who bore our image and flesh, through which, not being man, he became man—*ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὤν, ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο.* Important for the elucidation of *ἐπουράνιος* here is, that he was not man before. Consequently the *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* does not refer to the origin of the *ἄνθρωπος* in Christ. Elsewhere Method says of Christ, that being God he chose to put on human flesh—*ᾑρετίσατο τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνδύσασθαι σάρκα, θεὸς ὤν.*[101] What arose from the union of divinity and humanity he calls Christ, the man full of pure and perfect divinity—*Χριστόν, ἄνθρωπον ἀκράτῳ θεότητι καὶ τελείᾳ πεπληρωμένον.*[102] What is divine is said to be from heaven, and hence Christ on account of his divine nature is called *ἐπουράνιος*.

In the writings of St. Athanasius we have a classical interpretation of the *ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος* in direct and indisputable words to our point, and in evident connection with 1 Cor. 15, 47. Against Apollinaris II. 16[103] Athanasius cites the difficulty of the heretics, how Christ can be the immutable Word—*ὁ Λόγος ἄτρεπτος*, and being God, appear as a rational man. He answers with reference to our text and under the influence of his apologetical tendency—to prove that Christ is both God and man,—pointing out what is disputed in the passage of 1 Cor. and giving his own meaning con-

[99] Ibid. 561.
[100] MPG 18, 284.
[101] Ibid. 45.
[102] Ibid. 63.
[103] Ibid. 1160.

cerning the Heavenly Man. The Κύριος is called the *ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος*, not as if he had taken the flesh from heaven, but by making the flesh from the earth heavenly—*ἐπουράνιος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Κύριος οὐχὶ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιδειξάμενος, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπουράνιον συστησάμενος*. The origin of the *ἄνθρωπος* is this earth. But the *σάρξ* became *ἐπουράνιος* by an act in the course of time, as the aorist *συστησάμενος* indicates. It is here implied that the subject assuming the flesh (*συστησάμενος*) is heavenly, for it is the same who was previously mentioned (ibid. II. 10),[104] the Logos who, being God, became man—*ὁ Λόγος θεὸς ὢν . . . γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπος*. This remarkable origin of the Heavenly Man is further illustrated in the same context: The Word that was God became man in order that man might be reborn to life—*εἰς ζωοποίησιν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. Therefore he appeared in human form and in the visible flesh of the Second Adam—*ἐν ἐπιδείξει μορφῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ σαρκὸς τῆς ὁρωμένης τοῦ δευτέρου Ἀδάμ*. Athanasius proceeds to describe the great mystery of the union of the *ἐπουράνιος* and the *σάρξ*. Christ did not appear in human form by splitting the persons—*οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων*, but by combining the divinity with the humanity —*ἐν ὑπάρξει θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος*. In *De Incarn.* 8 against the Arians[105] Athanasius explains the parenetic import of our entire passage in 1 Cor. Essentially we have here the same notion of the Heavenly Man: He that was the Son of God by nature—*αὐτὸς οὖν κατὰ φύσιν υἱὸς ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ*—became flesh—*ὁ Λόγος καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐνωθεὶς σαρκί, γέγονε σάρξ*. But the further remark is not to be overlooked: Christ became flesh that men, being united to the Spirit—*ἑνωθέντες πνεύματι*, may become one Spirit. Thus as Christ is God bearing the flesh, so we are men bearing the Spirit—*αὐτὸς οὖν ἐστι θεὸς σαρκοφόρος, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωποι πνευματοφόροι*. Another forcible argument against the Arians is drawn from Christ's resurrection (*c. Ar.* I. 44).[106] All men that are from Adam only die and have death ruling over them. But Christ rose again, because he was not ruled by death—*οὐ δὲ κεκράτηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου*. Wherein then lies the difference between Christ and other men? Again the answer is definite: *ὁ γὰρ Λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο*. It is the divine Word that became flesh, or as Athanasius expresses it in other

[104] Ibid. 1148.
[105] Ibid. 996.
[106] Ibid. 104.

words, because being God he became man—*ὅτι θεὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο.* For this reason, he further explains, is this man, Christ, called *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐπουράνιος,* because he is the Logos that came down from heaven—*διὰ τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβεβηκέναι Λόγον.*

Numerous are also the expressions of St. Cyril of Jerusalem in his *Catechesis,* which leave no doubt that he wished to make clear his notion concerning the Heavenly Man. Thus he speaks of Christ (*Catech.* IV. 9)[107] as the only-begotten Son of God, who on account of our sins came down from heaven upon this earth—*ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατῆλθεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.* Cyril wants to have it understood that two things are implied by this coming of Christ "from heaven upon earth," because he remarks in this connection,[108] that Christ was twofold, namely man that is become visible and God that is not become visible—*διπλοῦς ἦν ὁ Χριστός, ἄνθρωπος μὲν τὸ φαινόμενον, θεὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον.* Twofold therefore was the Heavenly Man: *ἄνθρωπος,* i. e. visible man, and *ἐπουράνιος,* i. e. invisible God. This he illustrates again by saying that Christ was not mere man—*οὐκ ἦν ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος,* nor an angel only—*οὐκ ἦν ἄγελλος μόνον,* but God become man—*ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας* (ibid. XIII. 33).[109] Hence *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* does not merely denote heavenly origin, as angels are also said to come from heaven; but it expresses the divine character. Cyril dwells again on this definition in *Hom. in Occ. Dom.* X.:[110] *Ἄνθρωπος* is what can be seen—*τὸ ὁρωμένον,* and *θεός* what can be thought—*τὸ νοούμενον,* namely that which can be apprehended only with our mental vision. Now alluding to a Pauline text (Phil. 2, 6) he continues: He who being in the form of God now took our form—*νῦν τὴν ἐμὴν μορφὴν ἔλαβε,* without thereby lowering the dignity of his divinity—*οὐ μειώσας τῆς θεότητος τὸ ἀξίωμα.* Since the *θεότης* was not lost by Christ, nor even lessened, when he became man, then *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* must likewise embrace Christ's complete divine nature. And after the union of the divinity with our nature—*τῆς ἐμῆς φύσεως φύραμα* (ibid.), Cyril properly calls Christ "heavenly and earthly"—*Χριστὸν . . . τὸν οὐράνιον καὶ ἐπίγειον,*[111] which is the same as *οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος.*

[107] MPG 33, 465.
[108] Ibid. 468.
[109] Ibid. 813.
[110] Ibid. 1197.
[111] Ibid. 1189.

Our Pauline text is used by St. Basil the Great in his work *De Spir. S.* XLVII.[112] to disprove the error of subnumeration of the three persons in God, as dissolving the communion of nature (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κοινωνία). If it be granted, Basil argues, that what is second to anything is spoken of in subnumeration to it, what will follow? Here he quotes 1 Cor. 15, 47 and v. 46 as its parallel, laying stress on the contrast: "the first man is from earth earthly; the second man the Lord from heaven," and "that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual." Weighing the teaching of his opponents on the strength of these texts, he reasons further: If the second is subnumerated to the first, that which bears the subnumeration is less honorable; then he points out the obviously false consequence: Less honorable is therefore, according to you, the spiritual man than the natural, and the heavenly man than the earthly—ἀτιμότερος οὖν καθ' ὑμᾶς τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ὁ πνευματικός, καὶ τοῦ χοϊκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐπουράνιος.

This evident protest of Basil shows plainly who is meant by the ὁ ἐπουράνιος. It is the ὁ Κύριος. But he is placed in contrast to the ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς. Was not the Heavenly Man also ἐκ γῆς? Indeed, he was ἄνθρωπος, but stress is here laid on ἐπουράνιος, which stands in opposition to χοϊκός. The parallel describes him as ὁ πνευματικός, whilst the other verse of the parallelism attributes to the earthly man only the term ψυχικός. Therefore, in as far as the Κύριος is man he is also ψυχικός, but being ἐπουράνιος he is also πνευματικός. This additional quality, the being spiritual, is peculiarly a heavenly quality. What is spiritual is beyond the realm of carnal nature, as Basil explains in reference to the Spirit,[113] for carnal man cannot raise his eyes to the spiritual light of truth. And what is it that renders the Πνεῦμα entirely beyond the perception of carnal man? The Spirit is divine as to nature—θεῖον τῇ φύσει, and unbounded in greatness—ἀχώρητον τῷ μεγέθει. Herein lies the quality of the πνευματικός, which explains the ἐπουράνιος, that he has a divine nature. For the Spirit was with the flesh of Christ from the beginning—πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦ Κυρίου συνῆν (τὸ Πνεῦμα),[114] that is, from the moment when as the last

[112] MPG 32, 153.
[113] Ibid. 168.
[114] Ibid. 140.

Adam he assumed a body—ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ . . . τὸ σῶμα ἔλαβεν.[115] Christ then, when he was without a body before he became man, was purely divine, i. e. ἐπουράνιος, and after he assumed a body he is still called ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, i. e. πνευματικός, θεῖος τῇ φύσει, because he retained his divine nature. But being become man, he is entitled Heavenly Man on account of the union of the humanity with the divinity.

Precise and emphatic is the explanation which St. Gregory of Nazianzen gives in part to our text. He writes to Cledonius (*Ep.* CI.)[116] about those heretics that affirm that the body of Christ is from heaven. He opposes this heresy with the authoritative condemnation: If anyone assert that his flesh came from heaven, and is not from hence, and from us, although above us, let him be anathema—εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν σάρκα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατεληλυθέναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν, εἰ καὶ ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. The reason for this condemnation he derives from the interpretation of our text—ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, as well as from similar texts which he quotes; because they are to be understood as said on account of the heavenly union—νομιστέον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς οὐράνιον ἕνωσιν. The human body therefore of the Heavenly Man is not from heaven, but of human descent; yet he is above us. And why? On account of the heavenly union, or as the translation has it: the union with the heavenly.[117] What Gregory means by the heavenly, is made clear in the same context,[118] where he professes Christ to be the one and the same who formerly was not man—πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, but God and only Son, before all ages, devoid of a body and things of the body—ἀλλὰ θεὸν καὶ υἱὸν μόνον, πρόαιώνιον, ἀμϊγῆ σώματος, καὶ τῶν ὅσα σώματος. The heavenly in Christ is the divine (θεός), the pre-existent (προαιώνιον), the incorporeal (ἀμϊγῆ σώματος). This marked contrast between the ἐπουράνιος and ἄνθρωπος in Christ is repeated and further explained by Gregory in the following antithesis, portraying Christ as: capable of suffering as to his flesh, but without suffering as to his divinity—παθετὸν σαρκί,

[115] MPG 30, 465.
[116] MPG 37, 181.
[117] *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, v. VII. 440.
[118] Ep. CI. MPG 37, 177.

ἀπαθῆ θεότητι, circumscribed as to the body, but uncircumscribed as to the spirit—*περιγραπτὸν σώματι, ἀπερίγραπτον πνεύματι*, one and the same is earthly and heavenly—*τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπίγειον καὶ οὐράνιον*. Hence what is opposed to the earthly, the limited body, and the suffering flesh, is heavenly, the unlimited spirit, the insensible divinity.

An entire treatise of St. Gregory of Nyssa (*Adv. Apoll.*)[119] deals with the consideration of Christ as *ἄνθροπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*. This text, according to Apollinaris,[120] does not mean that the man coming down from heaven was from earth—*οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ γῆς ἄνθωρπος, ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβὰς ἄνθωρπος*, but rather that the man Christ preexisted—*προϋπάρχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστός*. This statement implies, as Gregory quotes later,[121] that the divinity of the Son was from the beginning man—*αὐτὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν θεότητα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνθρωπον εἶναι*. The doctrine of Apollinaris is in short: Christ who as man came down from heaven was divine man from the beginning. Gregory commences his refutation by placing the question:[122] If the man is not from earth, but came down to us from heaven, how can he be called Son of Man, coming down from heaven? For if his father was another man in heaven, must we imagine a heavenly people and life like ours? But if he is called Son of Man because he is born of Mary from the seed of David according to the flesh, he is falsely called Son of God, appropriating neither the heavenly, nor the earthly to the divine—*μήτε τοῦ οὐρανίου, μήτε τοῦ γηίνου πρὸς θεῖον οἰκειουμένου*. Yet Gregory is ready to believe that Christ is both God and man—*τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ θεὸν πιστεύειν*, however not in the sense of Apollinaris. Indeed, Christ is God, but in as far as he is God he was not born of woman—*οὐ γάρ, ᾗ θεός ἐστιν, αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς ἐγενήθη*. For to him who exists before creation, the being-born in flesh does not give existence—*ὁ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς κτίσεως ὤν, τὸ διὰ σαρκὸς γεγενῆσθαι αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται*.[123] What results from this for the understanding of the Heavenly Man? Gregory emphasizes the *ἄνθρωπος*-quality in the strongest words in stating that the *ἄνθρωπος* has his origin on earth, since it were ridiculous to assume that his Father in heaven was man. But with equal force he insists on the *ἐπουράνιος*-quality. Christ

[119] MPG 45, 1124.
[120] Ibid. 1136.
[121] Ibid. 1148.
[122] Ibid. 1136.
[123] Ibid. 1141.

who appeared as the man Jesus existed before creation; he is God —*θεός ἐστιν.* To show how Christ as God was commonly understood, Gregory asks:[124] Who does not know that God who became manifest to us in the flesh was according to the account of pious tradition incorporeal and invisible—*ἄϋλος καὶ ἀφανής,* simple—*ἀσύνθετος,* who both was and is infinite—*καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν ἀόριστος,* unbounded—*ἀπερίγαπτος,* always existing—*παντοσοῦ ὤν*? These qualities are attributable only to a divine nature, and they belong to Christ not as *ἄνθρωπος,* but because he is *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.*

With his usual keen exegesis St. John Chrysostom interprets our Pauline passage. In *Ep. I. Cor. Hom.* XLII.[125] he explains the parallel as follows: Adam was not only earthly, but he had also another kind of substance congenial with heavenly and incorporeal beings—*καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ εἶχεν οὐσίαν συγγενῆ τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἀσωμάτοις,* which the Scripture calls "soul" (*ψυχή*) and "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*). Christ was not "from heaven" only—*οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ Κύριος ἦν ἄνωθεν μόνον,* although he is said to be from heaven, but he has also assumed our flesh—*ἀλλὰ καὶ σάρκα ἀνειλήθει.* Now, what Chrysostom means by "heavenly" for Adam is plain; it is the soul. But what does he mean by "heavenly" for Christ? Two things follow absolutely from the preceding parallel: first, the main characteristic of the *ἐπουράνιος,* or of the *ἄνωθεν* or *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ,* is the incorporeal being (*ἀσώματον*). Secondly, this characteristic belonged to Christ even before he assumed flesh. This latter conclusion is confirmed in *Hom.* VII. 1[126] concerning the passage Phil. 2, 6. Chrysostom says in reference to Christ's pre-existence in the equality with God, that he did not rob the equality, because he had it by nature (*φυσικόν*). The peculiar fact about Christ is therefore, that two natures were combined in him; the divine, denoted by *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ,* and the human, denoted by *σάρξ.* For we are told in *Hom.* XXVII.[127] that Christ himself was accustomed to call his whole person often from his divinity and often from his humanity—*ἔθος αὐτῷ, πολλάκις μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς θεότητος, πολλάκις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τὸ πᾶν καλεῖν.* The two elements, however, were not equal; the heavenly was superior—*τὰ κυριώτερα οὐράνια.* What is

[124] Ibid. 1160.
[125] MPG 61, 361 f.
[126] MPG 62, 227 f.
[127] MPG 59, 158.

here meant by the plural οὐράνια is immediately explained: He had a soul and he shared in a Spirit not from this earth. That the soul, which also the first Adam had, is from heaven, was stated above. By the Spirit not from this earth is therefore meant the divine essence, that which is peculiarly ἐπουράνιος in Christ.

Comparing the first Adam with the Second Adam, St. Cyril of Alexandria quotes from our text, 1 Cor. 15, 47, that "the second is from heaven"—ὅ γε μὲν δεύτερος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ;[128] and he adds in explanation: For although the Logos of God became ²esh—εἰ γὰρ καὶ γέγονε σὰρξ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγος, he was also from heaven—καὶ ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. From this it follows: 1) that Christ was not always man (γέγονε σάρξ); 2) that the Logos of God became man; 3) that ἐξ οὐρανοῦ expresses the nature of the Logos of God in Christ. Cyril tells us more about the twofold being of Christ in commenting on John 3, 13:[129] Just as the Logos is of God—ἐκ θεοῦ Λόγος, so the man is of woman—ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γυναικός. Thus there are two distinct origins; but he continues: As to the rest there is one Christ of both—εἷς δὲ λοιπὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁ Χριστός. Therefore Christ is one, yet ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: he became man besides being the Logos. Λόγος-ἄνθρωπος then is the equivalent of ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος. The Logos is God, having appeared of God—ὁ ἐμ θεοῦπεφηνὼς θεὸς Λόγος.[130] Hence Christ, who was the Logos that appeared as man, become visible from above—ἄνωθεν . . . ὁρώμενος,[131] was God and pre-existed according to the nature of God—θεὸς κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχει Χριστός. This is the meaning conveyed by ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

The writings of St. John of Damascus have ever been considered "a faithful mirror of the traditions of the Greek Church."[132] His numerous quotations from the Fathers would alone justify this assertion. To him therefore we can safely turn for the final word in our investigation of the Greek Patristic interpretation of the Pauline Heavenly Man.

Too numerous for us to quote are the passages in the works of

[128] MPG 74, 909.
[129] MPG 73, 249.
[130] MPG 74, 900.
[131] MPG 73, 273.
[132] Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, Freiburg i. B., 1908, 582.

John Damascene that elucidate our problem. His commentary on our text is, however, hardly more than a paraphrase, because he aims there merely to bring out the parenetic import of the text. In reference to a similar text, Jn. 3, 13,[133] he asks: How could the Son of Man descend from heaven, unless, being the Son of God and God by nature, he became the Son of Man?—*εἰ μὴ υἱὸς θεοῦ ὤν, καὶ φύσει θεός, υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου γέγονε?* And again: If Christ descended from heaven, how is he another than God the Logos, Son of God?—*εἰ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβέβηκεν ὁ Χριστός, πῶς ἄλλος ἐστὶ παρὰ θεὸν Λόγον, τοῦ θοῦ υἱόν?* This precise explanation is based on the admitted fact that Christ was the Son of Man, because he was *ἄνθρωπος*. Yet John expressly tells us that Christ became Son of Man—*υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου γέγονε*. If we bear in mind that he directs these arguments against the Nestorians who, while admitting that Christ was God and man, denied that one and the same person possessed the nature of both, we see the force of the verb *γέγονε*. Its meaning and tense imply that there was a time when Christ was not Son of Man, that he became man when for that purpose he descended from heaven.

The same line of argument John makes use of against the Jacobites.[134] The Son of Man ascended to where he first was—*ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον*. He pre-existed. But does John answer our critical question that now suggests itself: Was the Son of Man *ἄνθρωπος* where he first was? Note the precise answer: *οὐχ ᾗ τὸ πρότερον ἄνθρωπος ἦν*, he was not man there, but he existed there as God—*ἀλλ' ἔνθα ὡς θεὸς ὑπῆρχεν*. Point for point, anticipating our questions, John continues: Neither do we say that his divinity was capable of suffering—*οὔτε γὰρ τὴν θεότητα παθητήν*, nor that it suffered through the flesh—*ἢ πάσχειν σαρκί*, nor that the flesh, or the humanity, existed before the ages—*οὔτε τὴν σάρκα, ἤτοι τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, προαιώνιον ὁμολογοῦμεν*. But him having both, the one and the other, when indeed being of both, we call Christ—*ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀμφοτέρας, ταύτην κἀκείνην ἔχοντα, ὅτε μὲν ἐκ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, Χριστὸν ὀνομάζομεν*. Yet when we call him from one of the parts, from the divinity on the one hand, we call him God—*ὅτε δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν μερῶν, ἐκ μὲν θεότητος, θεόν*, and man on the other hand from the humanity—*ἄνθρωπον πάλιν ἐξ ἀνθρωπότητος φάσκομεν*. Divinity and humanity

[133] MPG 95, 216. [134] MPG 94, 1480.

are therefore clearly distinguished in Christ; viewed as to the one he is θεός, as to the other ἄνθρωπος. The θεός-Christ descended from heaven—ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. The expression ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος, or ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, is therefore equivalent to God-Man.

This brief evidence of the Greek Patristic literature shows a remarkably persistent unanimity of interpretation concerning the meaning of the Pauline Heavenly Man, and nothing will explain this unanimity, if not the fact that the Greek Fathers have faithfully and accurately voiced the very meaning of St. Paul. The conclusion then is well established, that Christ, the Heavenly Man, is indeed another Adam, since he assumed a perfect human nature ἐκ γῆς, like unto that of the first Adam, so as to become the father of a new life, of a heavenly life, because he was by nature ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, i. e. God.

IV.

Comparison of the Terminology of St. Paul and Philo.

We have now learned from the study of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. in its context, as well as in the Greek Patristic, that St. Paul's idea of the Heavenly Man is clearly and consistently delineated throughout the whole corpus of his writings. Not the vexing doctrine of man's resurrection alone, but the all-embracing teaching of man's salvation is bound up with it. The ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is the keystone of the Pauline Gospel. This very fact accounts for the origin of this unusual title for Christ, the divine Savior of the human race. For the juxtaposition of the first and second Adam emphasizes the universal importance of their respective position relative to mankind. "Since by a man [came] death, by a man also [cometh] resurrection from the dead. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made to live" (1 Cor. 15, 21 f.). The life-giving and redeeming work of Christ establishes him with equal right as the protoparent of a race unto a new life, just as Adam was the first father of a mortal race. "The man of earth" became the father of a sinful offspring; "the man from heaven" became the first-fruits of the living.

The Heavenly Man in St. Paul is a personality in a special sense distinct from the first man Adam. Deriving his origin "from heaven" and, for the purpose of redeeming mankind from the bonds of death, uniting himself to the mortal flesh of our sinful race, he is infinitely superior to Adam. As the life-giving Spirit he manifests in himself a divine power, he is a divine person. The ἐξ οὐρανοῦ therefore does not only express Christ's divine origin, it also conveys his divine quality, his divinity. This has been the conclusion of our investigation of the term ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

In Philo the situation is by no means parallel to the Pauline contrast of the earthly man and the Heavenly Man. The Hellenist philosopher distinguishes two genera of men: the earthly and the heavenly. But these two kinds of men are not specific human beings or individual personalities; they exist distinct only in the realm of philosophical and exegetical speculation about the generic creation which Philo speaks of as having preceded the origin of

specific creatures. Through the mist of Philonic reasoning and allegorizing we detect the definite outlines of the two genera of men, of the οὐράνιος and the γήϊνος ἄνθρωπος. There is no lack of precise terminology in Philo to show what he understands by the respective terms. This above all must be borne in mind, that he speaks of each genus separately, as if created before Adam came into existence; but in reality it is only from the union of these two generic creations that there results Adam, indeed generic in his component elements, yet actually the first specific original historic man. Pursuant of the principle, derived from the repeated phrase κατὰ γένος (Gen. 1, 11 et al.; cf. *Leg. alleg.* II. 13) that God first created generic creatures from which the species were to originate, Philo clearly speaks of a generic man, created on the sixth day. This principle of a generic creation is, however, dominated by another, drawn from Platonic preconceptions, that the ideal world precedes the real. Accordingly in Philo's cosmogony the ideal creation of the world, inclusive of man, is interpreted of the first or one day creation (*Op. mund.* 26 ff.; 130; *Leg. alleg.* I. 22-24). It follows then logically that a distinction must be made between the ideal man and the real generic man. But this is not yet what Philo means by the distinction of the "heavenly" and the "earthly man." The ideal man is the invisible model of the real generic man. The former has existence only in the Logos, the Reason of God (*Op. mund.* 20). The generic man, created on the sixth day (Gen. 1, 26 f. and 2, 7), consists of the two generic parts, the rational and the irrational. The irrational and earthly element is the body with all its sense faculties, and being conceived to be generic it potentially contains both sexes. Philo speaks of it as the earthly νοῦς, or the ἄνθρωπος γήϊνος. The rational element, on the other hand, is the human mind, the higher soul, which God breathed into the earthly man to give him rational life, and in virtue of which man shares in the likeness of God. This is the οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος. Neither of the two human elements has independent existence, because both are complementary to each other, and in their union on the sixth day they complete each other to form the first individual man Adam.

This brief summary of the results of our study should set the question at rest regarding the parallel between St. Paul and Philo.

The concepts underlying the Pauline and Philonic usage of the similar terminology are so widely apart, that analogy in the respective passages has no logical foundation. In St. Paul the ἄνθρωπος is in either case an independent personality, and the ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is the God-Man, the Son of God having assumed a complete human nature; in Philo the earthly and the heavenly man are incomplete generic speculative concepts that have real existence only in the one personality of the original man. The οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος of Philo as the rational mind or the higher soul in man, is part of complete human nature, and hence is possessed by the Pauline Heavenly Man already as ἄνθρωπος, apart from his οὐράνιος-quality.

Here is given the answer to the first question, with which we confronted ourselves at the outset (p. 15): St. Paul does not present the same views as Philo concerning the "heavenly man." What each author really means by the term, has been set forth in the preceding. The third and fourth questions, however, must be answered with more hesitation. Since St. Paul could easily be familiar with the Philonic terminology, it is difficult to say that the similarity of expression is merely accidental. The frequent ethical and moral evaluation of the distinction in Philo would seem to find an echo in the parenetic import of 1 Cor. 15, 45 ff. Yet the course of argumentation is so vastly different in both writers, that a direct literal dependence of St. Paul is out of question. Nor is v. 46 of the Pauline passage a polemic against Philo's order of the heavenly man before the earthly, because it has been shown that the πνευματικόν is a different concept in both; and Pauline anthropology has nothing in common with the Platonic trichotomy, nor with the speculative belief in the pre-existent ideal creation, which in Philo accounts for a perplexing variety of terminology. However, when Philo, in developing his system of ethics, comes to speak of the elevation of man from a state of sin and wrong-doing to the state of righteousness and the practice of virtue, he approaches St. Paul in numerous points, and it is here we must examine and compare the ideas of each author more closely for a possible contact.

Like St. Paul, Philo recognizes in man's lower nature the root of sin. Thus alongside of Rom. 7, 23: "I behold another law in

my members, warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin which is in my members," we can place *Leg. alleg.* III. 71: "the body is evil by nature and a thing that plots against the soul." Similarly Rom. 7, 24 and *Leg. alleg.* III. 211. There is then a power in the soul, the νοῦς, capable of striving against the natural inclination to sin, and of acting as official arbiter in questions of moral conduct. "An approving conscience (συνείδησις) beareth them (the Gentiles) out, amid the debate of thoughts that accuse or defend" (Rom. 2, 15); Philo speaking of the ἀλήθινος ἄνθρωπος, i. e. the νοῦς ἐξαίρετος calls him: "the convictor (ἔλεγχος) that dwells in the soul, who when he sees the soul in perplexity, and considering and investigating deeply, exerts a prudent care in its behalf, that it may not wander and so miss the right road" (*De Fuga* 131 f.). For St. Paul and Philo alike the seat and capacity of the upward striving is in the rational nature of the soul. The reason for this natural aspiration towards God lies in the πνεῦμα, the divine gift, "the godlike creation by which we reason" (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 84).[1] Cf. p. 40 f. above. Yet under whatever aspects this spiritual power of the soul be taken, it remains the human πνεῦμα, albeit man can ascend by virtue of this power to the heavenly realms (*Op. mund.* 144; *De plant.* 22 f. etc.) and arrive at a knowledge of God. It is the human πνεῦμα, similar to πνεῦμα in St. Paul as the νοῦς or ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, even though Philo calls it a ray of the nature of God (*De Spec. leg.* IV. 123). In *Op. mund.* 144 he speaks of the original man as "being akin and nearly related to the ruler of all, in as much as a great deal of the divine spirit had flowed into him"; and he immediately explains this relationship: "Every man in regard to his intellect (διάνοια) is connected with divine reason, being an impression of, or a fragment or a ray of that blessed nature." So also in *Quod det. pot. insid.* 83 the πνεῦμα is described as flowing from the rational fountain, i. e. the Logos, and is identified with νοῦς καὶ λόγος. Cf.

[1] No matter how Philo's use of the word πνεῦμα is to be squared with the philosophical notions of his day (cf. Leisegang, *Der Hl. Geist*, I. 1. Teil 85-98), so much is certain that the divine πνεῦμα in man is considered the ground for his relationship with God, God having breathed into man something of his own divine nature (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 86; *Op. mund.* 142 and 144).

De plant. 18. The class of men that lives by the divine spirit is said to live by reason—λογισμῷ (*Quis rer. div. her.* 57).

Thus far Philo is quite in agreement with St. Paul, who also recognizes the human πνεῦμα as a natural faculty of the soul, by means of which man can arrive at supernatural truths, or by which man can pursue a noble life of virtue.[2] But in view of the emphasis with which the Apostle dwells on the operation of the divine πνεῦμα in the process of man's spiritual elevation and transformation unto newness of life, we wonder if this notion is also familiar to Philo. Kennedy, in the valuable study already referred to, draws attention to several passages, where the Jewish philosopher, in allusion to the divine πνεῦμα, appears to voice his religious experience in the light of the Old Testament, but under pressure of Greek philosophies that bore heavily on his speculation. "Discussing the statement of Gen. 6, 3 (LXX): 'My spirit shall not dwell with men forever, because they are flesh,' he comments: 'He does remain sometimes, but he does not dwell always with most of us. Who indeed is so irrational . . . as never either voluntarily or involuntarily to receive a notion (ἔννοιαν) of the Highest? Nay, even over the reprobate there often hovers the impression (φαντασία) of the good, but they cannot grasp it and keep it by them. For it vanishes at once, turning away from those . . . who have abandoned law and right. Indeed, it would never have visited them, except to convict them sharply of preferring the base to the noble. Now, according to one usage, the air that rises from the earth is called Divine πνεῦμα . . . but according to another it means that pure (ἀκήρατος) knowledge in which every wise man fully shares' (*De gig.* 20 ff.)."[3] Evidently Philo is here no longer speaking of the permanent endowment of the soul, but of a special divine agent, much akin to the Logos. Again: "The invisible Spirit which is wont to com mune with me unseen whispers to me and says . . ." (*De somn* II. 252); and "The mind (νοῦς) in us departs at the coming of the Divine Spirit, and when it leaves, returns to its abode. For it is not fitting that mortal should dwell with immortal. Thus the sinking of reason and the darkness that encompasses it beget ecstacy and God-inspired frenzy" (*Quis rer. div. her.* 265); and

[2] Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, London 1919, 192-210.

[3] Kennedy, op. cit. 186 f.

"Let us keep still from wrong-doing in order that the Divine Spirit of wisdom may not easily remove and depart, but may abide with us for a long, long time, as with Moses the wise man" (*De gig.* 47).

These quotations will suffice to illustrate and justify our citing the concluding words of Kennedy on the subject: "But while there is a real approximation in Philo's use of the conception of the Spirit of God to that in the New Testament, we not only feel that in his thought it is secondary, but also that as an energizing power it is grasped with far less vigor and discerned in a dimmer light than, e. g. by St. Paul. We have no doubt that for Philo also it represents the formulation of an experience, but that experience lacks the sureness and depth and permanence which characterise the Apostle's endowment. And the reason surely is that in Philo the Divine Spirit is one special description of a fluctuating and elusive category like the Logos, while St. Paul indissolubly associates it with that which has the most concrete reality for his spiritual life, the person and activity of the living Lord." [4]

This conception of the πνεῦμα is the nearest approach to the Pauline doctrine of the Heavenly Man as the life-giving Spirit. The Philonic divine Spirit here seems conceived as a quasi-divine personality, like unto the Logos, God's perfect image, with whom he is frequently merged into one idea. But no life-giving power in the Pauline sense is attributed to him. Hence the ground for an analogy would also here prove very tenuous. For Philo the noblest aspiration of man is to attain to as perfect a knowledge of God as possible, and the supreme and ultimate goal of his being is a mystical union with God. He does not reach the Pauline ideal of spiritual life, nor is he familiar with the New Testament process of the παλιγγενεσία. Consequently he falls far short of that lofty conception of man's spiritual rebirth and redemption unto a heavenly life through Christ, the Heavenly Man and life-giving Spirit.

But this was due to no fault of Philo. He craves constantly for the higher life, vastly inferior though his ideal be to that glorious vision of life eternal in the New Testament. He had not been favored with the thought-renovating revelations of Jesus Christ.

[4] Kennedy, op. cit. 191 f.

The Jewish background of many of his religious aspects and aspirations frequently enough bring him into close proximity with the first Christian writers, particularly St. Paul, as is shown in numerous passages of the arresting work of Kennedy, cited above. Yet, when we now recall the last of the four questions we are facing in this study: Is the parallel terminology in St. Paul and Philo possibly due in some way to a literal dependence, or to an indirect relation?, the reasons for any conscious relation seem hardly strong enough to warrant an affirmative answer. Philo's doctrine about man's spiritual elevation—and this seems to us the only possible point of contact—in as far as it touches on Pauline ideas, is at best but a fraction of the Apostle's teaching about salvation and man's renewal unto the heavenly life. And if St. Paul's choice of the distinction of an earthly and a heavenly man had as its purpose to set forth the true Heavenly Man, to correct a prevailing false acceptation of the term, his exposition could as well have been prompted by, and directed against, the real source, namely those current philosophical and religious speculations to which he was co-heir with Philo.

This goes to emphasize the point we wish to make in conclusion: The ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ of 1 Cor. 15, 47 stands out as the unique divine-human figure to which nothing in pre-Christian religious thought can furnish an analogy.

Universitas Catholica Americae

Washington, D. C.

S. Facultas Theologica, 1926-1927

THESES

DEUS LUX MEA

THESES

QUAS

AD DOCTORATUM

IN

SACRA THEOLOGIA

APUD UNIVERSITATEM CATHOLICAM AMERICAE

CONSEQUENDUM

PUBLICE PROPUGNABIT

BASILIUS AUGUSTINUS STEGMANN, O. S. B.

ABBATIAE S. JOANNIS BAPT.

S. THEOL. LICENTIATUS

THESES

1.

St. Paul's teaching concerning the Second Adam as the Heavenly Man in I Cor. XV, 45 ff. is in harmony with all his references to Christ as the Second Adam.

2.

The teaching of St. Paul in I Cor. XV, 45 ff. embraces the fundamental truths of salvation and the general resurrection.

3.

The doctrine concerning the Heavenly Man is the keystone of St. Paul's Gospel.

4.

The term ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in I Cor. XV, 47 not merely expresses Christ's divine origin, but also his divine quality, i. e. divinity.

5.

I Cor. XV, 46 is no polemic against a prevailing notion of the cosmic order.

6.

Philo's distinction of a heavenly and an earthly man cannot be the source of St. Paul's antithesis in I Cor. XV, 45 ff.

7.

An Anthropos myth cannot account for St. Paul's conception of the Heavenly Man.

8.

The Rabbinic tradition about the Messiah as second Adam fails as a source of the Pauline distinction of a first and Second Adam.

9.

St. Paul's Christology is not merely the result of "a blending of history and faith."

10.

The doctrine of Christ's resurrection is the cornerstone of our faith, according to the context of I Cor. XV, 45 ff.

11.

St. Paul employs the word πνεῦμα in a threefold sense: as the human faculty of the soul, as the spiritual principle of regenerated man, and as the Holy Ghost.

12.

Christ is truly the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, because he regenerates man unto newness of life.

13.

Regeneration through the Spirit not only frees man from the law of eternal death, but also removes the sting of physical death (I Cor. XV, 56) through the hope in the resurrection.

14.

The regeneration of man is effected by the Spirit through faith and baptism.

15.

The ultimate effect of man's regeneration shall be realized only in the resurrection at the moment of the Parousia.

16.

It is un-Pauline to understand the term δόξα as a material substance, which is the glory of the resurrection body.

17.

The change of our mortal bodies into the glorified state takes place without essential alteration of substance.

18.

I Cor. XV, 38 by way of confirmatory illustration proves the divine power of the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν in effecting the change from the mortal bodies into the glorified state of the resurrection.

19.

The divine power of Christ as the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν is due him because of his heavenly origin and nature—ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.

20.

Christ's heavenly origin does not imply a corporeal pre-existence, as critics would infer from his title of Heavenly Man.

21.

Philo's method of allegorizing the Old Testament overreaches the bounds of sound exegesis.

22.

Philo's interpretation of the creation-accounts in Genesis, being determined by his philosophical preconceptions, does not give the literal sense of the biblical narrative.

23.

Philo's critics are in error, when they understand his interpretation of Gen. I, 26 f. and II, 7 as referring to separate creations.

24.

The Logos of Philo cannot be identified with the Old Testament Wisdom.

25.

Objections of modern criticism against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch can be satisfactorily answered by applying the principles enunciated by the Biblical Commission of June 27, 1906.

26.

Such texts from the book of Genesis as: XIX, 37; XX, 12; XXXI, 33; XXXV, 18; XLIII, 29, furnish no proof for the theory that matriarchy was the original form of the family.

27.

The striking coincidences between the biblical (Gen. I, 1-II, 4) and the Assyro-Babylonian account of the creation must be explained by this that both are based on an earlier common tradition.

28.

Characteristic and essential differences between the Codex Hammurabi and the Mosaic legislation warrant the belief, that both codes were written independently of each other.

29.

The problem of Immanuel in Is. VII-VIII cannot be solved by a text-critical study alone.

30.

The arguments advanced against the genuineness of Is. XL-LVI, although not idle or trivial, are by no means sufficient to disprove the authorship of Isaias.

31.

Christ's title of Heavenly Man does not imply that his body is from heaven, but it emphasizes the heavenly, divine nature of the God-Man.

32.

Christ's risen body is substantially that which was nailed to the cross.

33.

I Cor. XV, 45-47 contains a proof of Christ's divinity.

34.

The dogma of the Trinity is a mystery which cannot be grasped by reason, still we cannot maintain that it is contrary to reason.

35.

Christ from the very beginning had consciousness of his divinity and his Messianic mission.

36.

The New Testament is a reliable historical witness to the truths of the Christian religion.

37.

The unanimous testimony of the Fathers is a reliable testimony to the true Apostolic teaching.

38.

The fulfillment of the Messianic prophecies in Jesus Christ is a proof of his divine mission.

39.

The rapid spread of Islamism does not contradict the argument that the rapid spread of Christianity is a proof of the divine character of Christ's doctrine.

40.

The schismatic Greek church does not possess the marks of the true Church of Christ.

41.

The right and obligation of educating the child belongs primarily to the parents.

42.

Every man is by natural right entitled to a decent livelihood.

43.

The estimate of a living wage depends on the natural and acquired needs of the individual.

44.

Civil laws are binding in conscience in so far as they are imposed within the rights of the State.

45.

That an act serve a supernatural and it must be supernatural as to its source and motive.

46.

The immediate divine institution of the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Eucharist is directly established from the New Testament.

47.

The divine institution of the other sacraments is a matter of faith; and the teaching that their institution was divine and immediate is asserted on the authority of S. Scripture and Tradition as theologically certain.

48.

The Holy Eucharist is the sacrament of union in the sense which St. Paul clearly expounds (I Cor. X, 16-17) and St. Thomas explains (Summa III. qu. 79 art. 1).

49.

The Baptism of water can be supplied as to some of its effects by martyrdom, or by the Baptism of desire.

50.

The sacred bond of the sacrament of Matrimony is indissoluble.

51-55.

Canones 520-523.
Canones 524-530.
Canones 587-591.
Canones 1364-1366.
Canones 1367-1371.

56.

The allegorical interpretation of the Alexandrian School is largely due to the influence of Philo Judaeus.

57.

The Apostolic Constitutions, although probably only of the IV. century, are a valuable witness to the early history of the Liturgy.

58.

Although the baptism of children cannot be proven from S. Scripture, we have testimony among the Fathers that the custom was in keeping with Apostolic tradition.

59.

The suppression of the menace of Trusteeism in the early days of the Church in the United States was mainly due to the energetic stand of Bishop Hughes of New York and Bishop Kenrick of Philadelphia.

60.

Bishop Hughes of New York laid down the Catholic policy on the school question in the United States as it obtains to the present day.

BIOGRAPHICAL.

Basil Augustine Stegmann was born at Schippach, Bavaria, April 30, 1893. He came to the United States in 1905. In the following year he began his classical studies at St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, and there also completed the courses in philosophy and theology. He was professed in the Order of St. Benedict in 1913, and ordained to Holy Priesthood, May 15, 1918. In the fall of the following year he matriculated at the Catholic University of America, and pursued courses in the School of the Sacred Sciences, specializing in New Testament exegesis, and in the Department of Oriental Languages. He obtained the degrees of S. T. B. and S. T. L. in 1919. During the scholastic year of 1920-1921 he attended the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome.

15509

208
C17

AUTHOR
Stegmann

TITLE
Christ

ST. ALBERT'S COLLEGE LIBRARY

GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION LIBRARY
BERKELEY, CA 94709

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES

No. I. **The Pauline ΠΙΣΤΙΣ-ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ (Hebr. XI, 1).**
Rev. Michael A. Mathis, C. S. C., S. T. D., Holy Cross College, Brookland, D. C.

No. II. **The Pauline Formula "Induere Christum."**
Rev. Leo J. Ohleyer, O. F. M., S. T. D., 3140 Meramec St., St. Louis, Mo.

No. III. **The Boyhood Consciousness of Christ (Luke II, 49).**
Rev. Patrick J. Temple, S. T. D., The Macmillan Co., New York.

No. IV. **St. Paul's Concept of ΙΛΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ (Rom. III, 25).**
Rev. Romuald A. Mollaun, O. F. M., S. T. L., 1615 Vine St., Cincinnati, Ohio.

No. V. **The Lord's Command to Baptize (Mt. XXVIII, 19).**
Rev. Bernard H. Cuneo, O. F. M., S. T. L., The Old Mission, Santa Barbara, Calif.

No. VI. **Christ, the "Man from Heaven" (I Cor. XV, 45-47).**
Rev. Basil A. Stegmann, O. S. B., St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn.